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On 24th of March, 1972, the respondents filed a suit in which they prayed for a declaration that the appellant was not entitled to inherit as she was not be legally‑wedded wife of Muhammad Sadiq on the date of his demise. The trial Court, by judgment dated 14th of May, 1973, dismissed the suit holding that Talaq had not become effective as it was revoked by Muhammad Sadiq under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 19611. in giving this finding, the trial Court relied on Syed Ali Nawaz Gardezi v. Lt.‑Col. Muhammad Yusuf (PLD1963SC51

), as it was held in that case that Talaq could become effective only after the expiration of 90 days from the day on which notice under subsection (1) of section 7 was delivered to the concerned Chairman, but as no such notice was given and Muhammad Sadiq had himself stated in his reply dated 9th of September, 1970 that he had revoked it, there was no escape from this conclusion.

The respondents went in appeal but the Additional District Judge, Hazara, upheld this conclusion and dismissed the appeal on 22nd of

February, 1975. The respondents next filed a civil revision in the Lahore High Court and succeeded as the High Court held;

"Later, parties agreed to divorce. Two deeds, as mentioned earlier, were drawn up and bear thumb impression of Mst. Ghulam Fatima. She clearly requested for and accepted the divorce, turning it into either 'Khula' ' or mubara't type, but preferably mubara't, because both the parties wanted to be rid of each other. In case of mutual agreement revocation is not possible and so want of notice or otherwise will not effect finality of divorce. Section 8 lays down that;

Where the right to divorce has been duly delegated to the wife and she wishes to exercise that right, or where any of the parties to a marriage wishes to dissolve the marriage otherwise than by Talaq, the provisions of section 7 shall mutatis mutandis and so far as applicable, apply.

Clear indication is that its application is to unilateral action by either of the parties. It is not attracted in case where both the parties have agreed. Muslim Law does not contemplate revocation in such cases nor is there any purpose to efforts at conciliation, to need a notice. The two Courts misconstrued and misinterpreted law and in doing so gave an underived advantage to a party."

Leave to appeal was granted to examine the question as to whether the High Court had correctly construed Exhs. P. W. 1/1 and P. W. 1/2 to mean Khula' or a divorce by mutual consent (Mubara't) which in either case was irrevocable and, therefore, section 7 of the Ordinance had no application.

This brings us to the consideration of the evidence and the disputed documents. Exh. P. W. 1/1 is dated 21st of April, 1970, and recites that the appellant had received her belongings from Muhammad Sadiq through the intervention of the Jirga. Exh. P. W. 1/2 is another document of the same date which recites that the appellant had filed a suit for maintenance and dissolution of marriage; and as Muhammad Sadiq had, in the presence of the Jirga, pursuant to her desire, released her from the marital bond, she undertook not to prosecute the suit.

As the appellant had not produced the original Talaqnama, despite notice, Ghulam Haider, a Jirga member, was examined to give secondary evidence of its contents. What he states was that in his presence Muhammad Sadiq divorced the appellant thrice and the Talaqnama was written by Muhammad Taj; and that it was signed by Muhammad Sadiq and witnessed by Muhammad Siddiq and Muhammad Taj which was, thereafter, handed over to the appellant. She also executed two documents; one relating to the return to her of her belongings by Muhammad Sadiq which was written by a Moharrir of a Police Station and thumb‑marked by the appellant and witnessed by himself and Malik Daud. She also executed another document which was also scribed by the Moharrir and thumb‑marked by her which recited that having been divorced she would withdraw the suit.

It was further disclosed that as the appellant had gone to her parents' house and had brought alongwith her some of the household articles, Muhammad Sadiq attempted to bring her back but on her refusal, he lodged a report at Police Station Kot Najibullah where Mst. Ghulam Fatima was also summoned and an effort was made that they should compromise the dispute but as the appellant was adamant for her release from the wedlock, the S. H. O. asked Muhammad Sadiq to divorce her and detailed a Moharrir of the Police Station to visit the village for this purpose and on his arrival, a Jirga was convened and Muhammad Sadiq was asked to divorce the appellant which he did; and in this background the two documents were executed.

The learned counsel for the respondents wanted us to construe the two documents to mean, in the light of the evidence of Ghulam Haider, that in consideration of being released from the marital wedlock she had given up her right of dower and maintenance which eminently showed that it was a Khula' form of divorce.

As to whether such interpretation is discernible from these documents is a matter which has to be considered in the light of the conduct of the parties and the contents of the Talaqnama itself which unfortunately has not been produced in evidence. In this connection this document is referred as Talaqnama by the appellant and Muhammad Sadiq and the form of release as Talaq. As to how the parties construed these docu ments is apparent from their applications dated 14th of July, 1970, and 9th of September, 1970 In para. 2 of her application, she explicitly stated that on 21st of April, 1970, Muhammad Sadiq had released her from their wedlock by pronouncing Talaq and executing a Talaqnama and the parties had received their belongings from the other and, therefore, she prayed that the suit be decreed; whereas Muhammad Sadiq had denied the correctness of the allegations and further pleaded that in case Talaqnama was legally proved, then it had not become effective as he had revoked it. There is no mention of the waiver of dower in her application. Exh. P. W. 1/2, in no way militates against it for in that document the words "maintenance" and "dissolution of Nikah" are descriptive of the relief in the suit which the appellant undertook not to prosecute in the context of her release from the marital wedlock. Further, it nowhere recites that she had waive her right of dower pursuant to her desire for being released from the marital wedlock. Exh. P. W. 1/1 is not helpful at all to the case of the respondents as it incorporates what the appellant had stated in her application dated 14th of July, 1970, that she had received her belonging from Muhammad Sadiq. Although the appellant had denied the execution of documents, P. W. 1/1 and P. W. 1/2, yet it is. difficult to believe that she had not executed them when she had herself moved the Court and prayed

that the suit be decreed.