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The petition is barred by 38 days. The explanation furnished for condonation of the delay is that the petitioner was not aware of the date on which the High Court announced the judgment, and he being an old, ailing person aged about 77 years, could not undertake the journey to Lahore earlier so as to file this petition.

In case where a petitioner seeks reversal of an acquittal recorded in favour of an accused person, this Court has already ruled in Piran Ditta v. The State and 2 others (P L D 1970 S C 282) that 'the delay is condoned only in those cases where the petitioner is prevented by an act of the accused person to file the petition for special leave to appeal in time.

Even earlier this Court observed in Nabi Ba-khsh v. Ghulam Sarwar and others (1968 S C M R 780)

"This Court has already ruled that delay in an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal filed by a private complainant is not to be condoned unless it can be shown that the person seeking leave was actually kept out of knowledge of the acquittal, and/or prevented by some act of the respondents themselves from coming in time."

This view was based on the principle enunciated by this Court is Abdul Qayyum v. Ghulam Yasin (P L D 1963 S C 151). Although, the delay in that case was of only 13 days, yet this Court refused to condone it for the following reasons;-

"Although this is a petition in a criminal case, the fact that it is out of time by 15 days cannot be condoned: It seeks enhancement of a punishment of transportation for life awarded in a murder case, to the capital punishment. The convict might be placed, once again in peril of his life, by a petition of this kind, and it is for this reason that the technical requirement of limitation assumed importance. It is not too much to ask that he who seeks to place his fellow citizen's life in peril, by legal process, should satisfy all the technical requirements of that process. Delay would scarcely ever be condoned, and certainly not on the grounds here advanced, namely, that the petitioner was misinformed about the period of limitation, and that he was delayed in his village through the serious illness of his wife.

The petition is dismissed as barred by time."

In Mst. Rabfa Bibi v. Rasool Bakhsh and others (P L D 1966 S C 531) this Court emphasised the principle laid down in "Abdul Qayyum v. Ghulam Jasin" in that the order granting leave to appeal was withdrawn for the reason that the petition for leave to appeal was barred by time, although it was specifically noticed that on consideration of merits of the case, the order granting leave to appeal was fully justified. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under :-

"Having heard Mr. Sardar Muhammad on the merits of the case, we may say that the grant of such leave was amply justified by considerations arising out of the merits of the matter, but, however, that may be, the rule laid down by this Court in the case of Abdul Qayyum v. Ghulam Yasin cited above is one which is clearly in accordance with right principle and no circumstances appear out of the relevant facts in the present case to justify any departure from that rule. Accordingly, the order which we make in this case is that the leave granted to Mst. Rabia Bibi to appeal against the acquittal of Rasool Bakhsh and Khan Muhammad is recorded, and the order by which that leave was granted on the 29th June 1964, is hereby withdrawn. The result is that this appeal- which was entertained in consequence of the grant of leave also fails."

It cannot be over-emphasised that the right to life is the basic right that human beings possess. Once a charge for a capital offence, duly tried, results in acquittal, the accused person acquires a very precious right and he should not therefore be put in jeopardy of his life by a petition for leave to appeal filed out of time. The law that enables interference with the acquittal must therefore be strictly applied in favour of the accused person.