Find a Lawyer

Civil Petition No. 757 of 1980, decided on 28th June, 1980.

(On appeal from the judgment and order dated 30-4-1980 in S. A. O. No. 67/1980 of Lahore High Court, Lahore).

-----Art. 185(2) read with West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959), S. 15-Leave to appeal against order of High Court sought on grounds: (i) petitioner's counsel appearing before High Court had no authority to enter into compromise without consent of parties; (ii) recording of compromise by High Court illegal in view of provisions of Ordinance - Counsel of both sides, however, acting clearly under instructions of their respective clients and High Court not found to have violated any provision of law,, leave to appeal refused.

Ghulam Dasigir, Advocate with Muhammad Aslant Chaudhary, Advocate -on-Record for Petitioner.

Hamid Ali Mirza, Advocate with Naazar Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 28th June, 1980.

.-This petition seeks leave to appeal against an order made by a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court on the 30th of April, 1980, whereby S. A. O. No. 67 of 1980, instituted by the present petitioner, Ghulam Rasul against an order of ejectment made by the Rent Controller, and upheld by the Additional District Judge in first appeal, was disposed of in terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties, and they were left to bear their own costs.

It is contended by Ch. Ghulam Dastgir, appearing for the petitioner, that: (a) Mr. Talib Hussain Rizvi, Advocate, who appeared for the petitioner before the High Court, had no authority to enter into a compromise, which was, in any case, without the consent of the petitioner; and, (b) that the recording of the compromise by the High Court was illegal in view of the clear provisions contained in Order XXI(I, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Cod read with clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the West. Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959.

After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner at some length, we have formed the view that there is no merit in these submissions.

We find that the S, A. O. was admitted by the High Court to a full hearing on the 20th of April, 1980, and the stay application was directed to come up on the 30th of April, 1980. On that date it was recorded by the learned Judge that: after the appeal had been admitted both the learned counsel had requested that the case be adjourned to explore a chance of compromise between the parties. The application for the confirmation of the stay order was adjourned for today. i. e. 30th of April 1080. It was furthur observed that: "both the parties have entered into a lawful compromise and the terms have been specified in the application made in this behalf which has been marked Exh. C-I and has been signed by both the learned counsel for the parties'. The learned Judge has then recited the terms of the compromise and disposed of the appeal accordingly. It will be seen therefore, e that the counsel on both sides were clearly acting under instructions of their respective clients, as otherwise it could not have been recorded that the parties have entered into a lawful compromise. According to the learned Judge of the High Court, the desire for compromise had been expressed by the parties even on the date when the appeal was admitted to a full hearing by the High Court. In the circumstances, we are not prepared to accept this submission that the compromise was without the consent of the petitioner.

In any case, Mr. Talib Hussain Rizvi, having been authorized by the petitioner to act for him in this case, clearly had full authority to enter into a lawful compromise, and the said compromise cannot be repudiated or rejected on the ground of any alleged want of authority in the petitioner's counsel. In the power-of-attorney executed by the petitioner in favour of Mr. Talib Hussain Rizvi, Advocate, in the High Court, there is no reservation to the effect that the counsel would not be able to enter into a compromise or to settle the matter otherwise. It is a clear authority to plead and act for the petitioner, which would include the authority to enter into a compromise.

As to the contention that the compromise violates the provisions of Order XXIII, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code read with the relevant provision of the Rent Restriction Ordinance the argument of the learned counsel is that one of the grounds urged for the ejectment of the petitioner was that the respondents wanted to re-construct the building, but the plan sanctioned by the Municipal Committee related only to an alteration in the building, with the result that a compromise entered on the basis of re construction of the building would be unlawful, as it went beyond the claim made in the suit.

The argument is clearly misconceived, as the claim made in the ejectment application filed by the respondents was that they need-.d the building, inter alia, for reconstruction, and the compromise is based on this need as asserted in the application. The fact that in a document filed with the application the plan was for alteration of the building would not lead to the inference that the claim was not for reconstruction. The respondents claim was for reconstruction and by entering into a compromise on that basis the petitioner had conceded that' claim. We do not see how such a com promise can be said to be beyond the frame of the suit, and for that reason unlawful in terms of rule 3 of Order XXIII, of the Civil Procedure Code.

On this view of the matter, it appears to us that no exception ca be taken to the disposal of the petitioner's appeal by the High Court on the basis of the compromise entered into on his behalf by Mr. Talib Hussain Rizvi, Advocate.

The petition, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed.

Find a Lawyer Near You

Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.