Find a Lawyer

Appeal No. KAR‑747 of 1980, decided on 10th February, 1981.

West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)‑‑

‑‑‑‑‑‑ S. O. 12 (1), (3) & 14‑‑Workman appointed on temporary basis for purely temporary job likely to be finished within 3 months‑‑Cannot be deemed to be a permanent worker‑Not entitl ed to benefit of S. O. 12 (I)‑Protection of S. O. 12 (3), however, available‑Services terminated in writing stating that such worker alongwith other employed for such temporary job rendered sur plus‑‑Action, in circumstances, held, not objectionable‑‑Employer having no job vacancy of similar job offering appointment on job with lesser pay‑‑Workmen, in circumstances, held, not entitled to claim higher pay.

Pakistan International Airlines v. Sind Labour Court No. V P L D 1980 S C 323 ref.

Mirza Muhammad Kazim for Appellant.

Date of hearing: 10th February, 1981.

The services of the appellant, who is said to have been appointed as Rigger on a temporary basis in the respondent‑Company, were termina ted along with the services of several other riggers on or about 16th December, 1979. It appears that the appellant complained against the termination of his services, both to the Joint Director, Labour, as also the Martial Law Authorities. In pursuance of the intervention of the Joint Director, Labour, the respondent‑Company offered to the retrenched riggers to accept appointments of helpers labourers; on the wages of Rs. 6 per day as against the wages of Rs. 12 per day, which were paid to riggers. It appears that the appellant was willing to accept the appoint ment as helper but demanded the same salary as he had been receiving as a rigger and declined the wages offered by the respondent‑Company. The appellant accordingly challenged the orders of termination of his services by way of a grievance petition before the learned IVth Labour Court, after serving the requisite grievance notice upon the employer. The learned Labour Court dismissed the appellant's grievance petition on the ground that he had been appointed on a temporary basis, that by reason of the completion of the work of riggers in the project in which the appel lant was employed, the services of the appellant and other riggers working with him were terminated, and that since the respondent‑Company did not have any vacancy of a rigger, even in any other project on which it was engaged, the appellant could not be employed as rigger. Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant has come up in appeal to this Tribunal.

2. It is not disputed that the respondent‑Company is a Construction Company and that it had taken up a construction project for the Steel Mills in Port Muhammad Bin Qasim area. The project upon which the respondent was engaged was clearly of a temporary duration and it appears that substantial part of the project was completed even before the appel lant filed his grievance petition before the learned Labour Court. Accor ding to the appellant's letter of appointment, which was produced by the respondent‑Company before the learned Labour Court, he was appointed as rigger II at the R. M. P. P. Project of Pakistan Steel Mills, Pipri, with effect from 14th April, 1979. Paragraph 3 of the said appointment letter specifically states that his appointment was on temporary basis on purely temporary job which was likely to be finished within 3 months. As such, in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan International Airlines v. Sind Labour Court No. V (PLD 1980 SC 323), that a person is to be deemed to be a permanent workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders only if he is employed on a work of permanent nature and that persons employed on a contract of limited duration cannot be considered to be employed on permanent basis and hence are no permanent workmen, the appellant cannot be deemed to be permanent workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders, ant hence would not be entitled to the benefit of clause (1) of Standing Order 12. However, he would still be entitled to the protection if clause (3) of Standing Order 12. The said clause provides that terms nation of a workman must be by an order in writing and that further such order must specify the reasons for the termination of services. In the instant case, both the requirements of clause (3) of Standing Order 12 have been complied with. It has been established that on 15th December, 1979, an order was passed by the respondent‑Company to the effect that since the workers, whose names were shown in the list appended to the notice have become surplus to the requirement of the Steel Structure Erection Project, Bin Qasim, with effect from' 16tb December, 1979, they would be paid off accordingly. This list accompanying the notice men tioned the names of 50 riggers including the appellant. This notice accordingly to the respondent‑Company, was pasted on the Notice Board of the company and was also sent individually to each of the affected workers. The said notice clearly establishes that the respondent‑Company no longer required the services of riggers and the services of all the riggers were terminated.

3. No doubt, under Standing Order 14‑A a retrenched workman is to be given preference by his employer for employment in any other Simi lar work undertaken by him within a period of one year from the date of such terminations but it has not been shown that the respondent‑Company required the services of any rigger on any other project within a period of one year from date of the termination of services of the appellant. As the respondent‑Company did not have a vacancy of rigger, they offered the appellant the lower post of helper on wages of Rs. 6 per day, but the, appellant was not willing to accept such wages. Obviously for the work of the helper, which required lower qualifications, the respondent‑Com pany could not pay the wages of Rs. 12 per day, admissible to a rigger. The demand of the appellant for higher wages for a work of lower order was not justified. The respondent‑Company obviously could not comply, with his demand nor it can be compelled to do so.

4. For the reasons discussed by me above, I would concur in the view taken by the learned Labour Court that there was no substance in the grievance petition of the appellant. I would accordingly dismiss the same in limine.

Appeals dismissed.

Find a Lawyer Near You

Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.