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Appeals Nos. KAR‑504 and 505 of 1980, heard on 28th August, 1980.

West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)‑

‑‑S. 2 (i) and S. O. 12 (3)‑‑" Workman"‑‑Inspector required to send daily report to Resident Engineer in respect of progress of work indicating number of workmen and labourers and daily progress of work‑‑‑Duties supervisory in nature involving no manual or clerical work ‑ Sub‑Inspector, held, not workman ‑‑ Mention in appointment letter that provisions of Ordinance applied to him, held, would not entitle him to statutory safeguards against termina tion of service‑Such employees, held further, not being workmen not entitled to challenge termination order under S. O. 12 (3) by a grievance petition before Labour Court ‑‑ Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), S. 25‑A.

Faiz Ahmad v. Registrar, Co‑operative Societies P L D 1962 S C 315 rel.

Yousuf Khan for Appellants.

Abdul Hafeez for Respondents.

Date of hearing : 28th August, 1980.

The common issue which falls to be considered in these 2 appeals is whether the appellants, who were employed by the 1st respondent as Inspectors in their Expansion Project, are workmen' for the purposes of the Standing Orders and are entitled to maintain grievance petitions under section 25‑A, I. R. O.

2. The services of the appellants, who were appointed as Inspectors on work‑charged staff in the Expansion Project of the INCEM by identical letters of appointment, dated 1st November, 1977, were terminated with effect from 16th March, 1979, on the ground that their services have become surplus as the Project work of INCEM, on which they were appointed, was nearing completion. The appellants challenged the orders of termination of their services by way of grievance petitions under section 25‑A, I. R. O., before the learned Labour Court, which has taken the view that the appellants were not workmen, as they were performing duties of a supervisory nature, and consequently dismissed the appellants' grievance petitions.

3. An examination u: the record, particularly the evidence of the appel lants recorded by the learned Labour Court, inclines me to concur in the view taken by the learned Labour Court that the appellants are not work men for the purposes of the Standing Orders. In order that a person should be deemed to be a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders, he should be employed to perform work of manual or clerical nature, whether skilled or unskilled. It is an admitted position that both the appellants were employed by the respondent‑Company as Inspectors. In fact both the appellants, in their grievance petitions, have not even claimed that they were workmen of the respondent‑Company, preferring the use of the term 'employee', suggesting thereby that they did not consider themselves to be workmen. Furthermore, their work did not involve performance of manual work or clerical duties. All that they were required to do was to submit their daily reports to the Resident Engineer of the Project in respect of the progress of work in their charge. These are short reports, showing number of workmen or labourers in each category as also the work on which they were engaged and the progress in the work during the course of the day under review. It is thus clear that both the appellants were engaged in work of supervisory nature and were not required to do any manual or clerical work, whether skilled or unskilled. Mr. Yousuf Khan, the learned Representative for the appellants, has invited my attentions to the letters of appointment of the appellants according to which they were to be governed by the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The contention was that since the application of the Standing Orders was specifically made under the terms of appointment of the appellants, they are entitled to alt the benefits admissible to the workmen under Standing Orders, and thus could enforce these benefits and rights by means of a grievance petition under section 25‑A, I. R. O. The contention of Mr. Yousuf Khan is correct to the extent that if the appellants were denied any rights or benefits admissible to workmen under the Standing Orders, they could enforce these rights and obtain the benefits by means of proceedings under section 25‑A, I. R. O. However, proceedings under the said section can only be instituted by a 'worker' as defined in the I. R. O. The definition covers only those persons who are employed in an establishment against which the grievance is made, and includes, for the purposes of an industrial dispute, workmen who have been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid‑off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or in consequence of that dispute or the dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay‑off or removal has led to an industrial dispute. It is not claimed that the termination of services of the 2 appel lants was in a consequence of, in relation to or has led to an industrial dispute. The appellants thus are not entitled to file grievance peti tions under section 25‑A, I. R. O. They are also not entitled to file grievance petitions under clause (3) of Standing Order 12 read with section 25‑A, I. R. O., as they are not workmen for the purposes of the Standing Orders. The mere fact that by the letters of appointment the Standing Orders were adopted in respect of them does not mean that they are entitled to the statutory safeguards against termination of services provided under clause (3) of Standing Order 12. I am fortified in my view by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Faiz Ahmad v. Registrar, Co‑operative Societies (PLD 1962 S C 315). In that case the facts were that a Co‑operative Bank, by its bye‑laws, had adopted the procedure of the Government Service Rules for the taking of disciplinary action against its employees. It was contended before their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the orders of dismissal of the appellant by the Bank were invalid, firstly, because no second show‑cause notice, as required by the Government Rules, was issued to him, and secondly, he was entitled to the protection under section 240 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Repelling these contentions, their Lordships observed as follows :‑

"This argument in effect, assumes that because the Co‑operative Bank concerned in the present case had by its own bye‑laws adopted the procedure of the Government Service Rules for the taking of disciplinary action against its employees, such employees, were also entitled to the protection given to Government servants under section 240 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. This assumption, however, is totally unwarranted, for, the Civil Services Rules were made applicable to the case of the appellant not by virtue of any statutory provision but purely by the adoption thereof under the bye‑laws of the Co‑operative Bank, which were no more than the rules laid down for the guidance of the Bank itself. These rules, therefore, did not create any right in the appellant to hold his office in accordance with them, nor did the said rules auto matically extend the protection given to a Government servant under the constitutional provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the late Constitution, to persons employed in non‑Governmental institutions of concerns. Even if the adoption of the Government Service Rules could be interpreted as amounting to the adoption of also the guarantees of the kind given to public servants by the aforesaid constitutional provisions, they would have no statutory force behind them and would, therefore, accord ing to the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Venkata Rao v. The Secretary of State for India‑in‑Council (61 I A 55) be no more than mere violations of rules or regulations which would not entitle the appellant to have the performance of the rules, enforced by action."

4. As already pointed out, the appellants were employed in the Expansion Project of the respondent‑Company. That project has long since been completed and hence there is no post in the Project to which the appellants could be appointed. On either view of the matter, therefore, the appellants' case cannot succeed. I would accordingly dismiss these appeals.

Appeal dismissed.

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