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SHAFIULLAH versus MESSRS GLOBE TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI


Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 Section 25A & 37 (3) Appeal Word is used in section 25 which is applicable to the final decision of the Labor Court although not on merit but did not cover the labor court's mutual orders. It was said that the decision to dismiss the complaint could be dismissed as a decision to be dismissed. The decision to apply for rehabilitation is not a decision that cannot be made

1981 P L C 304

[Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind]

Present: Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal

SHAFIULLAH

Versus

MESSRS GLOBE TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI

Appeal No. KAR‑573 of 1980, decided on 15th September, 1980.

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑

--- Ss. 25‑A & 37(3)‑Appeal‑Word "decision" used in S.25‑A Applicable to final adjudication by Labour Court though not on merits‑Interlocutory order of Labour Court not covered‑Dismissal of grievance petition for default can be construed as a decision Dismissal of application for restoration‑Not a decision hence not appealable.

Mirza Muhammad Kazim for Appellant.

DECISION

The issue which falls to be considered in the instant case is whether an order by a Labour Court dismissing an application to restore a grievance petition under section 25‑A. I. R. O., is appealable to this Tribunal.

2. The circumstances which have given rise to this appeal, shortly stated, are that on 17‑6‑1980 the appellant filed a grievance petition under section 25‑A, I. R. O., against the termination of his services by his employer, the respon dents herein. By an order, dated 24‑5‑1980, the appellant's grievance petition was dismissed because of the absence of the appellant and his representa tive. The appellant, on 27‑5‑80, filed an application for restoration of his grievance petition. The said restoration application was fixed for hearing on 13‑7‑1980 on which date both the appellant and his learned Representative were again absent and consequently the restoration application was also dismissed in default. The appellant has now came up in appeal against the order dismissing his restoration application.

3. Under subsection (3) of section 37, I. R. O., an appeal lies only against a decision given under section 25‑A, I. R. O., and not against every order made under the said section. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the impugned order is a "decision" for the purpose of section 25‑A, I. R. O. Subsection (4) of section 25‑A provides that upon a grievance petition being preferred before a Labour Court, it is required to give its decision thereon within seven days. Originally, the Labour Court was required to give an "award" as a grievance petition was to be dealt with as if it were an industrial dispute. However, by Act V of 1972 the expression "answered" was sub stituted by the word "decision". It would, thus, appear that the term "decision", as used in sections 25‑A and 37, I. R. O., is applicable to the final adjudication by the Labour Court of a grievance petition and not an interlocutory order or an order on a miscellaneous application. A decision' need not necessarily be on merits, for the other side may admit the claim of the aggrieved worker or the applicant/claimant may withdraw his claim or there may be a settlement or the grievance petition may be dismissed on technical grounds, including default by the worker or his counsel. The dismissal of a grievance petition by reason of default could thus be reasonably construed as a "decision" for the purpose of sections 25‑A and 37(3), I. R. O., as it disposes of the petition, so far as the Labour Court is concerned, and hence an appeal would lie against such dismissal. However, I am inclined to the view that the same reasoning would not apply to orders passed on a restoration application. In my opinion, an order dismissing a restora tion application cannot be construed as a "decision" for the grievance petition already stands dismissed and it is the dismissal of the grievance petition which amounts to a decision. As such, while the appellant could have preferred an appeal against the order, dated 24‑5‑1980, dismissing the grievance petition, which was not challenged, no appeal lies against the impugned order.

4. For the reasons discussed by me above, the appeal is dismissed on the ground that it does not lie. The impugned order is only subject to suo motu revisional powers of this Tribunal, as provided in subsection (3‑a) of section 38. However, there appears to me no valid grounds for the exercise of such powers, particularly on the basis of a memo. of appeal by an aggrieved party.

Appeal dismissed.

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