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3. It is contended by the learned counsel firstly, that as the petitioner was not heard, the impugned order is without lawful authority. Secondly, he challenges the vires of rule 13 referred to above and the power of respondent No. 1 to, refuse the approval. It is contended that as no such power has been conferred on the Federal Government under the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979, no rule embodying such a power could be made. In the alternative it is submitted that as the respondents have allowed lengths between 14500 feet and 16000 feet to six other producers as mentioned in para. 5 of his petition, the refusal in the case of the petitioner without a valid cause was arbitrary and hence void.

4. Section 4 of the Censorship of Films Act, 1963, did provide for fixing length of the films. It was repealed by Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979. Admittedly, no such provision has been made in the succeeding enactment. The learned Deputy Attorney-General also could not refer to any specific provision but relied on section 10 of the Motion Pictures Ordinance to support his plea indirectly. He also referred to section 19 (1) to say that the general power mentioned therein would be presumed to empower the Federal Government to frame rules providing for length of film strips.

5. Section 4 (1) of the 1963 Act, referred to above reads as under :

"4.-(1) No authority shall accept any feature film not being a foreign film, for the purpose of examining its suitability for public exhibition if the total length thereof exceeds 12 thousand feet, except where, on a request from the film producer, the Provincial Government has, for any special reason, previously agreed to relax the said limit."

Admittedly, there is no such specific provision in the succeeding Ordinance XLIII of 1979, referred to above. The effect of an omission of such a nature was considered in Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Karachi Municipal Corporation (PLD1967SC241) at page 248 where the Court held as follows :-

" . . . .The conscious deletion of the provisions contained in section 96 of the Act of 1933, relating to the imposition of terminal tax, and its deliberate exclusion from the Third Schedule, appended to the Ordinance, clearly manifest an intention on the part of the law-giver to exclude the terminal tax from the category of taxes which can be levied by a municipal authority functioning under the Ordinance. A Legislature is deemed to be aware of the previous state of the law and if knowing this it makes a change when repealing it and re-enacting some of its provisions the intention is clearly to effect a change. It follows, therefore, that the previous provisions relating to the imposition of a terminal tax were deliberately removed to denude the Municipal Authorities of this power . . . . : '

It was held in Hakimuddin v. Government of West Pakistan (P L D 1960 Lah. 109) that the omission made by the Legislature cannot be supplied by rule-making authority.

6. The Federal Court in Muhammad Maroon v. Crown (P L D 1951 F C 118) Held that in order to construe an amending statute it is not only legitimate but highly convenient to refer both to the former act and the evils which it gave rise to and the latter Act which provided the remedy. In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Kruddesoas (P L D 1967 Kar. 358) the Court observed that it is a well-recognised principle of interpretation of statutes that effect is to be given to the plain language of the statute. The words which do not occur in the statute cannot be added, as that would tantamount to reconstruction of the statute rather than considering the statute itself. In Maltmood Alam v. Mehdi Hussain (, P L D 1970 Lab. 6) the Court observed that it is not for the Courts to fill in lacuna or remove. the defects in enactments. Rather it is for the Legislature to look into the matter to remove the same.

7. In Dacca Picture Palace Ltd. v. Pakistan (P L D 1969 Dacca 1) at pages 18 and 38 a Full Bench of that Court held as under:

"A Legislature can make law and leave it to a delegate to complete the legislation by supplying the details keeping in view the limits laid down by a particular statute. It, therefore, presupposes that limits and guidance must be indicated in the statute.

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Thus we see from a discussion of the relevant cases that' it is not permissible for the Legislature to delegate its essential legislative function to an extraneous authority. It could lay down the policy or the standard and leave the details to be worked out by an extraneous authority as it is not possible for the Legislature itself to provide for all the details. The tendency of modern legislation is to cave more power to the executive to work out the details as it would be cumbersome for the members of the Legislature to do so but that does not mean that the Legislature can efface itself . . . . . . . . :'

It .is thus quite clear from the case-law discussed above that the Legislature by omitting to repeat a similar provision in the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979, intended without doubt not to place such a restriction. It appears to have been done wisely to avoid placing arbitrary powers in the hands of executive authority particularly when principles of guidance in certifying films, fit for exhibition, had been lucidly given in section 6.

8. Section 10, referred to by the learned counsel, on the other hand, provides that any person who delivers any certified film to any distributor or exhibitor, shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, notify to the distributor or exhibitor, as the case may be, the title, the length of the film, then the number and nature of the certificate granted in respect thereof and the conditions, if any, subject to which it was granted and any such particulars, as may be prescribed. As is quite clear, this provision casts a duty on any person not necessarily the producer, to furnish all the particulars and information to the distributor and exhibitor and not the Board, who are to certify the film. Rather, it is to be done after the film has been certified for exhibition.

9. Section 19 (1) confers a general rule-making power for carrying out the purposes of the Act. As no such specific purpose has been mentioned in the Motion Picturcs Ordinance, 1979, the rule-making authority travelled beyond the scope of the Ordinance and the purposes of law, to make rule 13, which is as under :-