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Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. Q‑7 of 1978, decided on 6th August 1979.

(On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Baluchistan, Quetta in S. A. O. No. 25,/77, passed on 24‑5‑1977).

(a) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)‑

---S. 2(c)‑V4'ord "landlord" as contained in Rent Ordinance VI of 1959‑Very widely defined in Ordinance‑Not only owner entitled to receive rent a landlord under Ordinance but person competent to' receive rent on behalf, or for benefit of owner also a landlord.‑[Words and phrases].

Luck v. Inland Revenue Commissioner (1963) 1,All E R 655 ref.

(b) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)‑‑

‑‑ S. 13(2) (vi) read with Ss. 2(c) & 13 (5‑B)‑Ejectment‑Construction of building‑Respondent stating to have been recovering rent from petitioner on behalf of his sons and relying upon necessary sanction for construction of building obtained by his sons (owners of property) in their own names‑No contravention of provisions of Ordinance in circumstances spelt out‑Petitioner's apprehension of being not protected under S. 13(5‑Bl in case of default on part of respondent in erecting building‑Held, unfounded and same undoubtedly available to petitioners in case of default.

Talmiz S. Burney, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Ahmadullah Faruqi, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.

S. M. Abbas, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent No. 1.

Nemo for Respondent No. 2.

Date of hearing : 6th August 1979.

‑‑This petition for leave to appeal arises out of the dismissal of the second appeal by a learned Single Judge of the Baluchistan High Court, whereby the order of eviction of the petitioner from plot of land' passed by the lower appellate Court was upheld.

The property in question was taken .on rent by the petitioner through a lease deed dated 17‑3‑1965. Admittedly it was owned by Abdur Rahim and Abdul Ghafoor sons of Haji Abdur Rehman, respondent No. 1, but the lease deed was signed on their behalf by their father. The owners filed an eviction application against the petitioner, but it was dismissed on the ground, as stated by the learned counsel, that they were not the landlords. Although the copy of the order stated to have been passed on 4‑4‑1968 has not ‑ been placed on record, it is not denied that the petitioner had taken the stand that on account of the execution of the lease deed by the respondent No. 1, his sons could not be treated as landlords. The second eviction application was then filed by the respondent No. 1. Two grounds were taken : one of subletting and other of bona fide requirement of the landlord for the erection of a building. This application was dismissed by the learned Rent Controller on 31st of May, 1977. With regard to the ground of construction it was observed by the learned Rent Controller that the requisite sanction in this behalf had been obtained by the sons of the respondent. And as it was not in his name, therefore, the condition. laid down in section 13(2) (vi) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 was not satisfied. The issue of subletting, it appears, was not seriously pressed. The respondents filed an appeal which was allowed. The view taken by the first appellate Court on the question whether the plan should have been sanctioned in the name of the respondent was that "in case it is held that necessary sanction for erection of the building must be in the name of the landlord, then in certain cases if the landlord who is not the owner cannot file eviction application on the ground of reconstruction, or erection of a new building, against his tenant as sanction is always given by the Municipal Committee, etc. to the owner of a building or a rented land". On merits after taking note of the evidence led in this behalf the learned Judge held that the landlord's requirement was reasonable and in good faith. On petitioner's second appeal the learned in the High Court after taking note of the provisions contained in sec tion 13(2) (vi) of the Ordinance, made reference to the definition of land lord' contained in section 2(c) thereof and held that the respondent would fall within the said definition as he was entitled to receive rent on behalf of his sons. The learned Judge also took note of the fact that the sanction to erect a budding is ordinarily granted by the Municipal authorities to an owner and that "literal and strict construction of the above provision of the Ordinance would lead to a wholly unreasonable result. In cases of this nature therefore it would become impossible for the landlords to obtain eviction of the tenants where the premises are required for reconstruction, or erection of a new building". The learned Judge has also held that the intention of the Legislature in enacting the condition in section 13(2)(vi) is that the Rent Controller is to be satisfied that building or rented land will be reasonably and in good faith required for reconstruction or erection and for that purpose an additional burden has been put on landlord "to produce necessary sanction from the Municipal Committee'". Accordingly, relying upon the Judgment in Luck v. Inland Revenue Commissioner ((1963) 1 All E R 655.) the learned Judge observed that it was not necessary to give literal meaning to the word landlord' as defined in the Ordinance, when interpreting sec tion 13(2) (vi); and that being so on the independent finding that that the landlord had shown ' reasonableness and good faith" qua his requirement for erection of a new building and having produced the necessary sanction from the local authorities, he was entitled to the relief prayed for. Thus the judgment of the, lower appellate Court directing the eviction of petitioner was affirmed.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the respondent had failed. to establish bona fides in seeking eviction on the above‑stated ground ; the petitioner would be deprived of the protection contained in section 13 (5‑B) of the Ordinance in case the building is not erected. In fact, it is the extension of the argument advanced before tile High Court that, the eviction application has not been moved by the owners who had obtained the sanction for erection of the building in their own name, therefore, the condition contained in section 13(2) (vi) has not been satisfied; and that property in question does not fall within the definition of rented land as contained in section 2(f).

The first point raised by the learned counsel regarding the bona fide requirement stands concluded by the finding of fact by two learned Courts below, and no justification has been shown to disturb the same. Regarding) the second point which undoubtedly is a, technical one, it needs to be observed that in addition to the considerations which weighed with the learned lower appellate Courts, it cannot be ignored that the definition of landlord contained in section 2(c) of the Ordinance is very wide. An owner who is entitled to receive rent would undoubtedly be a landlord under the said Ordinance, but a person mentioned in the definition who is competent to receive rent on behalf or for the benefit, of the aforementioned landlord would also be the landlord. There is a peculiar feature of this case. On the petitioner's objection that the owners were not the landlords their application was earlier dismissed as incompetent. It cannot be said that this approach, in the first round of litigation, regarding definition of land lord, was correct. , The respondent then filed the eviction application. He wits constrained to

do so notwithstanding tile tact that as already noted, hey had only signed the lease deed on behalf of his sons. It needs to be mentioned at this stage that in his deposition as well, the respondent had stated that he was recovering the rent from the present petitioner on behalf of his sons. In this background if the respondent relied upon

the necessary sanction which was obtained by his sons, the owners of the property in their own name, this would not mean a contravention of the provisions often the Ordinance contained in section 13(2,) (vi) read with section 2(c), as analysed above. The apprehension of the petitioner expressed by risk learned counsel that in case of default on the part of the respondent in erecting the building, he would not be protected under section 13 (5‑B) of the Ordinance, is unfounded. The protection in case of default would undoubtedly be available to him. There is no force in the second contention of the learned counsel either. The third point raised by him, which was put in issue in the lower forums was not urged even before the learned Single Judge in the High Court. We have gone through the evidence in this behalf. It does not lend support to the assertion of the learned counsel that the land was not rented out principally for trade or business, so as to exclude it from the definition of rented land'. None of the arguments raised by the learned counsel has any force. This petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. However, the petitioner is allowed three months time to vacate the premises.

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