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Second Appeal from Original Order No. 199 of 1979, decided on 7th April 1979.

--S. 13(4)-Ejectment petition-Non-suiting of landlord on ground that he had filed two other ejectment applications in respect of shops other than shop in question, held, not just and proper-Inference against bona fide need also not justified in circumstances.

Malik A. R. Arshad for Appellant.

This is a second appeal against an order for the ejectment of the appel lant, Master Chiragh Din from a shop belonging to the respondent, Mran Anwar Rashid.

2. The appellant's ejectment was ordered by a Rent Controller on the ground of personal need of the respondent. Thereupon, the appellant went in appeal before an Additional District 'Judge but that was dismissed. He has, therefore, come up in second appeal to this Court.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent had not been able to prove that he required the shop in dispute, in good faith, for his own occupation. The respondent examined two witnesses and also himself went into the witness-box to show that the shop ill question was need ed by him for doing business. In rebuttal, there are the statements of three witnesses, including that of the appellant. They endeavored to show that the ejectment proceedings were aimed at securing increase in the rent. The learned Additional District Judge did not rely on the testimony of the appellant's witnesses for the reason that "they have not referred to any occa sion when he (respondent) or anybody on his behalf demanded enhanced rent." Learned counsel for the appellant has not pointed out anything in their statements to enable me to take a different view. 1, therefore, agree with the learned Additional District Judge that the appellant had failed to show that the respondent took out ejectment proceedings against the appellant for the purpose of enhancing rent of the premises in dispute.

4. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent had some other shops and, therefore, his need for the shop in ques tion was not bona fide. It was not denied that the other shops are now occupied by the other tenants. Learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention to the statement of the respondent in which he had disclosed that he had filed ejectment applications against two other tenants also. The mere filing of these applications does not mean that the shops to which they relate are immediately available for occupation by the respondent. It cannot be said, with certainty, that he will succeed in the other two ejectment applications. If in each of the three ejectment applications, including the one giving rise to the present appeal, it is held that his requirement is not bona fide because he has filed two other applications, will close all of them and thus he will not, be able to get possession of any of the shops for his own occupation. In view of the conditions prevailing in our country we know that the civil cases, including' the rent cases, take years, if not decades, before they are finally concluded. If the appellant had proceeded against only one tenant by leaving the others untouched but had, after litigating for about ten years, failed to eject him, and had then repeated that exercise against other tenants, one after the other, he may not have been able to secure possession of any of the shops even after thirty years. It is, therefore, not just and proper to non-suit him on the ground that he had filed two other ejectment applications in respect of shops other than the shop in question. If he ultimately succeeds in getting possession of any of the other shops and consequently he does not occupy the. shop in dispute on its vacation, the appellant will be able to regain its posses sion by pressing into service the provisions of subsection (4) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. In the circum stances, the other ejectment proceedings initiated by the appellant do not justify an inference that his need for the shop in dispute is not bona fide.

5. In my view, there is no merit in' this appeal. It is, therefore, dis missed in limine. The appellant is, however, allowed four months' time to vacate the premises in dispute.

M. A. K. Petition dismissed.

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