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Suit No. 250 of 1951, decided‑on 4th May, 1953.

, S. 3 read with S. 2 ( f )‑Providing accommodation for a Government servant‑Held to be public purpose.

The word "Central Government" in section 2 (f) of the Act is used in its general sense, meaning thereby the entire body of officials who are charged with the duty of governing the country or a portion of the country. An officer of the Central Government would therefore be included in the word "Central Government."

An order for requisition of a house for the Assistant Financial Adviser to the Government of Pakistan passed by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the Administrator, Karachi was not ultra vires in view of the provisions of section 3 and section 2 (f), Sind Requisition of Land Act (XLVI of 1947).

, O. I, r. 8‑Suit by Secretary of unregistered club‑Plaintiff directed by Court to get notices published in newspapers to all members of club‑Direction not carried out‑Suit, held, incompetent. In a suit by the Secretary of a Club, the plaintiff applied for permission to sue on behalf of all members of the Club in accordance with the provisions of O. I, r. 8, C. P. C. Permis sion was granted and the. Court directed notices to be published in newspapers for the information of all members of the Club.

Notices, however, were not published due to failure of plaintiff to deposit the expenses. Held, that provisions of O. I, r. 8, C. P. C. had not been complied with and the suit was incompetent.

Grant of, dependent on setting aside an order which is a nullity in law‑Plaintiff need not specifically include prayer for setting aside the order.

An order which is a nullity in law, need not be set aside. It can be ignored, and a party can Claim relief which he is entitled to on the basis that the order impugned has got no existence in law.

H. P. Minwalla, for Plaintiffs.

S. Jamil Alain, for Defendant.

--‑This is a suit by Tattersalls Club against S. M. Suleman, Assistant Financial Adviser to the Government of Pakistan, for a declaration that the flat in question shall continue to be lawfully occupied by the plaintiffs without any interference by the defendant, and for an injunction restrain ing the defendant from occupying three rooms in the flat requisitioned in his favour.

Allegations disclosed by the plaint are that the plaintiffs are in occupation of the premises described in para. 1 of the plaint, as a tenant from the landlord of the premises on payment of a monthly rental of Rs. 123 ; that the premises were repaired and renovated at a cost of about Rs. 6,500 ; that the Rent Controller, Karachi, at the request of the joint Estate Officer requisitioned the premises by his order dated 8th February, 1951 for the occupation of the defendant; that the plaintiffs filed an appeal against the Order of the Rent Controller to the Administrator of Karachi, who by his order dated 3rd April, 1951 confirmed the order of Requisition in respect of 3 rooms only and derequisitioned other rooms in the premises; and that the order of the Administrator was without jurisdiction.

The defendant filed the written statement, in which he contended that the order of the Administrator, Karachi, was not without jurisdiction, and further alleged that the plaintiffs were not a registered body, and could not sue. The defendant took a further plea that the suit was barred by section 13 of the Sind Requisition of Land Act 1947.

The following issues were framed :‑

(1) Is the order of the Administrator of Karachi dated 3rd April 1951, ultra vires and not binding on the plaintiffs

(2) Are the plaintiffs entitled to sue

(3) Are the plaintiffs entitled to any of the reliefs asked for by them without having declared the order of the Rent Controller requisitioning the flat in suit as a nullity in law

(4) Can this Hon'ble Court grant any of the reliefs as framed to the plaintiffs

(5) Is the suit as framed entertainable by this Hon'ble Court

(6) Is the suit barred by section 13 of the Sind (Requisi tion of Land) Act 1947

(7) To what reliefs, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled

(8) General.

Issue No. 1.‑--Is the order of the Administrator of Karachi dated 3rd April, 1951 ultra vices and not binding on the plaintiffs

The contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs is that, providing accommodation for a Government servant is not a 'public purpose', and consequently the Rent Controller or the Administrator of Karachi could not requisition the premises under the powers conferred by the Sind Act No. XLVI of 1947. The learned counsel, apart from making the assertion, did not try to place before me the relevant provisions or case law on the point. In view of the importance of the point, however, I have gone through the law on the point, and propose to discuss the question in a little detail. Section 3 of the Act says "If in the opinion of the Controller it is necessary to requisition any property, movable or immovable, for any public purpose, he may make an order in writing to that effect"

The "public purpose" is defined in section 2 (f) as follows :‑

"Public purpose" means any purpose connected with the securing of accommodation for the Constituent Assembly and the Central Government of Pakistan or the Provincial Government.

The word "Central Government" or the "Provincial Govern ment" has not been defined in the Act, and it is for this Court to determine what the word "Central Government" means, and whether an Officer of the Central. Government also comes within the purview of "Central Government of Pakistan" or not. The word "Central Government" has been defined in the General Clauses Act read with the Pakistan (Adaptation of Laws) Order 1947, as the "Governor‑General". Obviously, the word "Central Government" in this section of the Act did not mean merely the Governor‑General. No accommodation is required for the Governor‑General person ally. He has got his own residence known as the "Governor General House". Some light no doubt is thrown on what is meant by the "Central Government" by a Perusal of the Government of India Act 1935. It is pertinent to note that the Government of India Act deals with the constitution of the Federal Executive, Federal Legislature, Federal Judiciary, Provincial Executive, Provincial Legislature and Provincial Judiciary, and the services in the employment of the Central as well as Provincial Governments. The very fact that the entire Act is known as the "Government of India Act" and along with other matters deals with services in the employment of the Central and Provincial Governments shows that the idea of Government includes officers subordinate to the Governor‑General or the Governor, as the case may be.

The dictionary meaning of the word "Government" is "Governing power in a State" or the "Body of persons charged with the duty of governing". In the absence of anything to the contrary, there is no reason why a different meaning should be given to the word "Government" and used in section 2 of the Act.

The words "Government established by law" have been defined in section 17 of the P. P. C. which runs as follows :‑

"The word 'Government' denotes the person or person authorised by law to administer executive government in the province or any province or in any part thereof".

This section has been the subject of interpretation by various High Courts. The earliest case that I could lay m5, hands on is that of Mrs. Annie Besant v. Emperor (39 I L R Mad. 1085.). Officiating Chief Justice Sir Abdur Rahim observed as follows :‑

"A question has been raised as to the meaning of the phrase" the Government established by law In British India. Government denotes an established authority entitled and able to administer the public affairs of the country".

A full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in a case reported in I L R 42 All. 233, observed as follows ‑

"We are of the opinion that the phrase 'Government established by law in British India' means the established authority which governs the country and administers its public affairs and includes the representatives to whom the task of Government is entrusted."

Lastly, I may refer to a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in A I R 1932 Cal. 547. Their Lordships observed at page 548 "It appears to us that the 'Government established by law in British India' includes the executive power in action."

Some light is also thrown on the point by some provisions of the Government of India Act; section 7 says:

"Subject to the provisions of this Act, the executive authority of the Federation shall be exercised by the Governor‑General, either directly or through officers sub ordinate to him"

I have already dealt with the scheme of the Government of India Act.

After a careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that the word "Central Government" in the Act is used in its general sense, meaning thereby the entire body of officials who are charged with the duty of governing the country or a portion of the country. In this view of the matter, an officer of the Central Government would be included in the word "Central Government."

It has been held in some cases that housing of a Govern ment servant is a public purpose. I may refer to the case of East Punjab reported in A I R 1952 at p. 55, Their Lord ships approvingly referred to earlier unreported cases in which it has been held that providing residential accommodation to a Professor of a Government College and to a Subordinate judge was a public purpose. It may, however, be noted that in the corresponding Acts in force in various provinces in India, there is no definition of a "public purpose."

The Order of Requisition in this case was passed by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the Administrator of Karachi in order to provide accommodation to Assistant Financial Adviser, to the Government of Pakistan. I, there fore, hold that the order of the Administrator, Karachi, dated 3rd April, 1951, is not ultra vires and is binding on the plaintiffs.

I may note that this issue does not refer to the order of the Rent Controller, although, in fact, it is his order that is the basis of the suit. The Administrator of Karachi derequisi tioned some of the rooms in favour of the plaintiffs. But ignoring the phraseology of the issue, I have dealt with the order which really gave rise to this suit.

Issue No. 2.‑"Are the plaintiffs entitled to sue"

Issue No. 5.‑"Is the suit as framed entertainable by this Honourable Court

The plaintiffs are a Club, which is not registered. Order I rule 8, C. P. C. is, therefore, applicable; it says

"Where there are numerous persons having the same in terest in one suit, one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend, in such suit, on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested. But the Court shall in such case give, at the plaintiff's expense notice of the institution of the suit to all such persons either by personal service, or, where from the number of persons or any other cause such service is not reasonably practicable by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct."

The suit was filed through the Secretary of the Club, who put in an application for permission under Order I, rule 8, Q. P. C. The application came up before the Registrar who passed an order to .the effect that notices be published in the "Dawn" and the "Civil and Military Gazette." The plaintiffs, however, did not deposit the expenses and notices could not be published. When the case came up before me for final hearing on 19th March, 1953, the plaintiff's counsel made a fresh application under Order I rule 8 C. P. C. By my order of the same date, I rejected the application on the basis of the grounds mentioned therein. The result is that no action contemplated by Order I rule 8, C. P. C. has been given. The position, therefore, is that the suit has been filed by the Secretary on behalf of an unregistered Tattersalls Club, and the provisions of Order I‑rule 8 have not been complied with. In this state of things, the suit is incompetent. The issues are decided accordingly.

Issue No. 3.‑"Are the plaintiffs entitled to any of the reliefs asked for by them without having declared the order of the Rent Controller requisitioning the flat in suit as a nullity in law

The issue as it stands must be answered in the affirmative. An order which is a nullity in law, need not be set aside. It can merely be ignored, and a party can Claim relief which he is entitled to on the basis that the order impugned has got no existence in law. I have already held under issue No. 1 that: the order of Rent Controller was perfectly competent and binding on the plaintiffs.

Issue No. 6.‑"Is the suit barred by section 13 of the Sind (Requisition of Land) Act 1947 "

Section 13 of the Act runs as follows :‑

"No order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court."

So long an order of the Rent Controller or that of Administra tor of Karachi as an appellate authority is within the scope of his authority, it cannot be questioned because of this section. Having held that the orders of the Rent Controller and the Administrator of Karachi were intra vires, I cannot but hold that the suit is barred by section 13 of the Sind (Requisition of Land) Act 1947.

Issue No. 4‑"Can this Hon'ble Court grant any of the reliefs as framed to the plaintiffs "

Issue No. 7.‑"To what reliefs if any, are the plaintiffs entitled " '

Issue No. 8.‑"General".

In view of my findings under issues No. 1 and 6, the suit must fail and the plaintiffs are not entitled to any of the reliefs Claimed. I accordingly dismiss the suit with costs.

A. H. Suit dismissed.

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