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Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 734 of 1977, decided on 28th September 1978.

(On appeal from the judgment and order dated 19‑9‑1977 of the Lahore High Court passed in S. A. O. No. 80 of 1977).

(a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-----

-----Art. 179‑Limitation‑Article 179 deals with petitions for grant of certificates by High Courts for appeal to Supreme Court and not with petitions for leave to appeal filed directly before Supreme Court.

(b) Limitation Act (1X of 1908)‑

‑‑ Art. 5‑Condonation of delay‑Advice pleaded in excuse for delay in filing Petition for Special Leave to Supreme Court allegedly tendered by some lawyers of mofussil and such lawyers not consulting any standard work on law but limiting their research to some "Qanuni Diary"‑No certificate or affidavit of senior filed‑Petitioners not consulting Advocates of Supreme Court but consulting lawyers of District Courts and their exertions confined to looking at "Qanuni Diary"‑Petitioners, held, did not act with due diligence in moving Supreme Court‑Even otherwise ignorance of law no excuse‑Plea of mofussil Advocates having wrongly advised on question of period of limitation, hence, no sufficient cause for condoning delay.‑

Sh. Ghias Muhammad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court with Sh. Abdul Karim, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners.

Ch. Muhammad Aslam, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondents.

Date of hearing : 28th September 1978.

.‑This petition is barred by 21 days. In the application filed for condonation of the delay it is submitted that after the receipt of the copies of the judgment of the High Court by the petitioner, they consulted some local lawyers in Jhang including S. Akhlaq Hussain, a senior civil lawyer, and Mr. Muhammad Rafique Nasim, Advocate, to inquire as to the period of limitation prescribed for filing a petition for special leave to appeal in this Court. The said counsel are reported to have stated that the period of limitation for this purpose was ninety days and for giving this advice they consulted a "Qanuni Diary" of 1977. The delay in filing the petition for leave to appeal, it is said, occurred on account of the aforesaid erroneous advice given by the two Jhang lawyers with regard to the period of limitation.

In support of the above assertion 'a certificate purporting to be issued by Mr. Muhammad Rafique Nasim, Advocate, was shown to us at the hearing of the petition, which is to the effect that the petitioners did consult him about the question of limitation for petition for leave to appeal to be filed in the Supreme Court and that he had told them that according to Article 179 (presumably of the Limitation Act) it was ninety days. Learned counsel for the petitioners admitted before us that Article 179 of the Limitation Act deals with petitions for grant of certificates by the High Court for appeal to the Supreme Court and has nothing to do with petition for leave to appeal to be filed directly before the Supreme Court. Reliance on the aforesaid provision of law is wholly inapt.

After hearing Sh. Ghias Muhammad, learned counsel for the petitioners, we do not think that any case has been made out for condonation of delay. The advice pleaded in excuse of the delay was allegedly tendered by some lawyers of hang who did not consult any standard work on law and limited their research to some "Qanuni Diary". Moreover, no certificate or affidavit of the senior counsel, namely S. Akhlaq Hussain, has been filed and the only certificate issued by Mr. Muhammad Rafique Nasim, which has been brought to our attention, is not at all helpful to the petitioners. The petitioners do not appear to have been acting with due diligence in moving the Supreme Court. Otherwise, it is obvious that they would have consulted Advocates of this Court instead of District Court's lawyers whose exertions were confined to looking at the Qanuni Diary on which counsel note dates of hearing of their cases. Even otherwise, ignorance of law being no excuse, the plea that the Advocates at Jhang had wrongly advised the petitioners on the question of the period of limitation cannot be considered to be a sufficient cause for condoning the delay. By the efflux of time a valuable right has, in the meanwhile, accrued to the respondents which cannot be put into jeopardy on the basis of the flimsy explanation advanced by the petitioners in support of their plea for condonation of delay. The prayer for condonation of delay, therefore, fails. This petition, being barred by time, is accordingly dismissed.

Petition dismissed.

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