Find a Lawyer

Every Lawyer listed in this directory is verified by SJP verification Team

✓ Free WhatsApp lawyer help
Need to speak to a lawyer now?

Chat with us free on WhatsApp — tell us your city and legal matter and our team connects you with the right lawyer. No form, no fee.

💬 Instant WhatsApp chat ⚖ Verified lawyer directory ⏰ Replies in minutes

THAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY versus KHALAS KHAN


The land read with Section 36 Land Acquisition Act (1st of 1894) has been acquired and given by the TDA for development, however, it has failed to provide possession to the TDA, to return the property to the owner. The question does not arise, in which case the landowner does not have the right to demand Section 36 permanently. The land acquired by the TDA for the development of the land read with the Land Acquisition Act (I9 1894), however, does not raise the question of returning the property to the owner if it fails to provide possession to the TDA. happens. If the landowner does not have the right to seek a permanent injunction restraining, section 36 is read with the Land Acquisition Act (I9 1894). The developed land is given to the TDA and, although failing to provide possession to the TDA, the owner is not born in such a case, the landowner is not entitled to ask for a permanent order.

P L D 1979 Lahore 834

Before Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Khan Lodhi, J

THAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY-Petitioner

versus

KHALAS KHAN ETC.-Respondents

Civil Revision No. 937 of 1975, decided on 19th December, 1977.

Thal Development Authority Act (XV of 1949)-

--.-- S. 36 read with Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-Land acquired and given to T. D. A. for development-Owner of land, however, failing to deliver possession to T. D. A.-Question of returning

property to owner does not arise in such case-Owner of land, held, not entitled to ask for perpetual injunction.

Aftab Iqbal Chaudhary for Petitioner.

Azmat Dad Khan for Respondents.

J UDGMSNT

The revision arises from the judgment and decree dated 1-4-1975 of the learned District Judge, Mianwali who accepted the appeal of the respondents and setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Civil Judge, Second Class, Bhakkar, decreed the suit of the respondents.

2. The facts of the case are that Dost Muhammad was the owner of the property in dispute, who sold it to the respondents, but since mutations were not sanctioned, they could not take possession. Therefore, they brought a suit for possession, which was decreed, and on the basis of the decree, Mutations Nos. 1496 and 1486 were sanctioned on 21-8-55 and 13-5-55 respectively. During the pendency of the suit, the Thal Development

Authority Bhakkar acquired other property alongwith 67 kanals and 9 marlas purchased by the respondents from Dost Muhammad. The Thal Development Authority, however, was not impleaded as a party to the suit after the acquisition of the land. Since the respondents were not given any land in lieu of the land acquired, nor any compensation, they made an application to the Colonization Officer, who decided in their favour directing that re-distribution of the property be made. When the petitioner tried to interfere in the possession of the respondents, the latter on the basis of the order of the Colonization Officer brought a suit for perpetual injunction for restraining the petitioner from interfering in their possession. From the decision of the said suit, this revision arises.

3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned trial Judge found issue No. 4 against the respondents, but the learned District Judge, while setting aside the finding of the learned trial Judge in said issue decreed the suit of the respondents which could not be done. Issue No. 4 is to the effect "whether the Thal Development Authority is not bound by the decree, dated 6-10-54 If so, what is its effect " This is that decree which was obtained by the respondents against Dost Muhammad on the strength of registered sale-deed.

4. The Thal Development Authority is not interested as to who is the owner of the property, and it can acquire any property which is required by it for development. The payment of compensation is to be made to the owner. If there is any decree in favour of a person about the ownership of a land, the That Development Authority is not interested to refuse compensation to him. Thus it cannot be said that the Thal Development Authority is not bound by the decree. The Thal Development Authority is not a necessary party in this case. Obviously, the Thal Development Authority cannot come forward with a plea that the land belongs to it. This is not the case of the petitioner that he recognised Dost Muhammad as the owner and had paid or wanted to pay compensation to him in cash or in the shape of land. Only the decree-holder can claim the property. In the present case, only the respondents were entitled to get compensation in cash or in the shape of land particularly when this is not the case of any party that Dost Muhammad had come forward to claim compensation. Since an objection was raised that is why the issue was framed, otherwise the point is not very material.

5. The ground for which the decree of the District Judge is liable to be set aside and the suit liable to ask for perpetual injunction. According to section 36 of the Thal Development Act, the owner of the property, which has been acquired, is to be given possession by the Collector for the implementation of the scheme. Even the Land Acquisition Act, under which the acquisition is made, authorises the Collector to take A possession of the land even before payment of the compensation. Since admittedly the property in dispute was acquired and given to the petitioner for development, the petitioner was entitled to be put in possession under the Land Acquisition Act as well as under section 36 of the Thal Development Act, and the respondents could, after delivering possession claim either compensation or some portion of the same land, or some, by return after the expiry of time, other land in lieu of acquisition. The question of returning of land arises only after the land is relinquished on the expiry of five years under subsections (4) and (5) of section 36 but in the present case, since the respondents did not deliver possession, no question of returning the property arises. The respondents could ask for the allotment of some other land in lieu of the land acquired, or for re-distribution of the property as ordered by the Colonization Officer, but could not ask for perpetual injunction because as observed supra, the petitioner was entitled to be put in possession under section 36 of the Thal Development Act. The order of the Colonization Officer is not to the effect that till some other land is allotted to the respondents, they shall not be dispossessed of the land in dispute. So the said order of the Colonization Officer did not entitle the respondents to ask for perpetual injunction. If there had been any such direction in the said order, the same, being against the Land Acquisition Act and section 36 of the Thal Development Act, could not have helped the respondents.

6. As a result of the observations made above, the revision is accepted, and setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned first appellate Court, the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court is restored. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

s. Q. Revision accepted.

Find a Lawyer Near You

Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.

🔍 Find a Lawyer
Popular cities: Lahore· Karachi· Islamabad· Rawalpindi· Multan· Faisalabad
us immigration advocates from Doaaba lawyer

SJP Lawyers DirectorySJP Lawyers Directory

Pakistan's leading legal-technology platform and verified lawyer directory — connecting clients, lawyers, law firms and Bar Associations across the country.

Get in Touch

© 2018–2027 SJP Legnocrats (SMC-Private) Limited. All rights reserved.
Talk to a Lawyer Free · replies in minutes
👋 Need a lawyer? Chat with us free on WhatsApp now.