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Review Petition No. 13 of 1955 decided on 3rd November, 1955 under O. XLVII, Rule 1 and section 151, C. P. C. for review of the order, dated the 28th June 1955, passed by Muhammad Yaqub Ali Khan, J. in Regular Second Appeal No. 241 of 1955.

Schd II, Art. 8‑"House" includes shop.

In Article 8 of Schedule II to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act the word "house" has been used by Legislature in contradistinction to 'land'‑and as such a suit for the recovery of shop rent is a suit cognizable by a Small Cause Court.

Matwal Das v. Nand Lal A I R 1928 Lah. 284, Daniel v. Coulsting 14 L J C P 70, Mst. Ahmadi Begum v. Cirraj Kishore A I R 1927 All. 194, Nathu v. Sonasa A I R 1922 Nag. 15 and Nathu Ram v. Uttam Chand A I R 1939 Pesh. 14 ref.

Said Akbar for Petitioner.

Muhammad Akram for Respondent.

.‑The petitioner filed a suit for recovery of Rs.195 as arrears of rent of a shop situated in Gujrat. The suit was dismissed by the two Courts below and aggrieved by it he came up in second appeal before this Court, being R. S. A. No. 241 of 1951. This appeal was dismissed by me in limine on 28th of June 1955 on the ground that the suit being of a nature cognizable by a Small Cause Court, no second appeal was competent under section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff‑appellant has applied for review of that order and I issued notice in this application on the contention of Raja Said Akbar, learned counsel for the petitioner, that a suit for recovery of rent of a shop was excluded from the jurisdiction of a Small Cause Court under Article 8 of the Second Schedule x to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. At the hearing of, this petition Mr. Muhammad Akram, learned counsel for the respondent, has cited a number of authorities, including Matwal Das v. Nand Lal (A I R 1928 Lah. 284) in which it has been held that the words "house rent" used in the aforementioned Article would cover and include shop rent. The leading authority on this point is Nga Kan v. Mimya (4 1 C 822) in which it was laid down that a stall in a market, which was sometimes used as a dwelling place, was also a house within the ambit of Article 8. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge referred to the dictionary meaning of the word "house" in Webster's, Wharton's Law Lexicon, Stroud's Law Lexicon and Tomlins's Law Dictionary. In Stroud's Law Lexicon, the word "house" is defined as "a structure of a permanent character structurally severed from other tenements (and usually but not necessarily under its own separate roof), that is used or may be used, for the habitation of man, and of which the holding (as distinct from lodgings) is independent". It goes on: "It is not neces sary that a house, if adapted for residential purposes, should be actually dwelt in." The authority cited for the last statement is Daniel v. Coulsting (14LJCP70). In Oxford Dictionary, Vol. V, 1901 Edition besides a number of other definitions of the word "house", it is described as a building for human occupation, for some purpose other than that of an ordinary dwelling ; also as a place of business, a business establishment, a mercan tile firm. It is common knowledge that in this Province some times a shop‑keeper also deals in the shop. Some of the other authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the respond ent are Mst. Ahmadi Begum v. Cirraj Kishore (AIR1927All.194), Nathu v. Sonasa (A I R 1922 Nag. 15) and Nathu Ram v. Uttam Chand (A I R 1939 Pesh. 14). In Mst. Ahmadi Begum v. Cirraj Kishore Iqbal Ahmad J. referred to pages 401 and 402 of Vol. XXIII of Halsbury's Laws of England in order to show that the word "house" has been used in the English statutes as meaning not only dwelling houses but including schools, factories and other buildings in which persons are employed. According to the learned judge, the fact that the word "house" has not been used in a restricted sense in the Small Cause Courts Act in Article 8 is also shown by a consideration of the provisions of clause (v) of section 7 of the Court‑fees Act. By section 7 of the Court‑fees Act, the Court‑fee payable in respect of particular classes of suits have been provided for, and by clause (v) provision is made for suits for possession of land, houses and gardens There also the word "house" has been used as including buildings of every description, for there is no provision anywhere in the Act prescribing any particular amount of Court‑fee with respect to suits for possession of shops as distinguished from houses. From this, the learned judge concluded that if the legislature wanted to distinguish shops from houses one would have expected some provision being made in the Court‑fees Act for suits for possession of shops as distinguished from houses.

I find myself in respectful agreement with the interpreta tion of the word "house" in the aforementioned authorities and hold that in Article 8 of Schedule II to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act the word "house" has been used by Legislature in contradistinction to 'land'‑and as such a suit for the recovery of shop rent is a suit cognizable by a Small Cause Court. I therefore find no merit in this petition ands dismiss it with costs.

A. H. Application dismissed.

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