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Criminal Revision Petition No. 395 of 1956, for revision under section 18 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, 1951.
, S. 10 read with S. 263, Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)‑Order not bad for mere brevity.
An order declaring a person a dangerous Goonda cannot be set aside on the ground of its mere brevity if it mentions the points for decision and the decision thereon.
, S. 14 (1) (2)‑"Dangerous Goonda" is a Goonda by implication ‑Orders competent against a "Goonda" are competent against a "dangerous Goonda."
A person who has been declared a dangerous Goonda has by implication been declared a Goonda, and, therefore, all orders which can be passed under subsection (1) or sub section (2) of section 14 of the Act may be passed against him. If the sureties ordered under subsection (1) of section 14 of the Act are not furnished, the District Tribunal, can, under subsection (3) of section 16 of the Act, commit the person called upon to furnish them to prison.
, S. 18 ‑Scope‑Not co‑extensive with S. 439, Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898).
Where the Tribunal had before it evidence which tended to show that the petitioner was a dangerous Goonda and if the High Court were to set aside the order of the Tribunal on the ground that the evidence on the record was not sufficient to justify it, it will be travelling beyond the jurisdic tion given to it by section 18 of the Act. It would have been different if it were a case of no evidence at all to justify the conclusions of the Tribunal.
Nor is a Tribunal appointed under the Act an inferior Criminal. Court contemplated by sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court therefore cannot invoke section 439 to set aside orders of the Tribunal on the ground that though there was evidence on which the Tribunal could act, the evidence was not strong enough.
Muhammad Ali v. The State P L D 1956 Lah. 698, ref.
, Ss. 14 (2) (a) and 17‑Order sending Goonda out of his district of residence‑Without jurisdiction.
The order of a District Tribunal restricting the move ments of a declared dangerous Goonda to a district other than the district of his residence is unjust and entirely without jurisdiction, unless it was meant to send him to Criminal Tribes Settlement. Rule 2 made under section 16 of Restric tion of Habitual Offenders (Punjab) Act, 1918 does not countenance such an order.
, S. 14 (2) (a) read with S. 18‑Order of restriction under S. 14 (2) not revisable under S. 18.
As section 18 of the Goondas Act does not allow the revision of an order under clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 14 of the Act the High Court is not justified in issuing the direction contemplated by section 18 of the Act, but the High Court might declare that it had no doubt that the Tribunal would bring the order of restriction in conformity with the provisions of the Act.
Jan Hussain for Petitioner.
Ahmad Saeed Kirmani for Advocate‑General for Res pondent.
Dates of hearing: 8th and 15th October, 1956.
This is a petition under section 18 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, 1951, (to be referred to in the sequel as "the Act"), for having the order of District Tribunal Gujranwala, comprised of Sheikh Inayat Ullah, District Magistrate, and Khan Bahadur Abdur Rashid, Superintendent of Police, set aside. The order under revision, which is very brief, reads as follows :‑
"We have gone through the prosecution evidence against the respondent recorded in open Court as well as in camera. We have also heard the arguments of the parties and gone through the defence evidence as well. After going through the record and the facts, we find that the respondent is of a desperate character and a bully. The general public is not safe from his hands. Hence we declare him as a dangerous Goonda under clause (12) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act of 1951. We, therefore, direct under section 14 (2) (a) of the said Act that the movements of the respondent shall be restrict ed to Sialkot. It is hereby ordered that‑--
(a) he should report his presence in the Police Station City, Sialkot. on every Thursday between 6 a.m. and 12 a. m.
(b) on some special occasion if he wants to visit a place outside Sialkot, he shall first have to obtain permission of the Tribunal.
(c) he shall execute a bond in the sum of Rs. 10,000 with two sureties in the like amount to be of good behaviour for a period of two years failing which he will undergo two years rigorous imprisonment."
The order is attacked on the grounds that it does not comply with section 263 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is, therefore, illegal, that it is not warranted by the evidence on the record, that section 14 (2) (a) of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act did not authorise the Tribunal to call upon a person declared to be a dangerous Goonda to furnish security and in default to undergo imprisonment and that the petitioner could not be restricted to the district of Sialkot.
The petitioner, who at the time of the report of the police against him as well as on the 20th of January 1956, when the order was passed against him, was residing in the city of Gujranwala, was, according to his counsel, carrying on business in that city.
Section 18 of the Act, under which this petition is lodged, authorises this Court to exercise powers of revision on the grounds mentioned in the section with regard to orders passed under section 5 or section 13 or section 16. Section 5 autho rises a Tribunal, appointed under the Act, to punish a person who has been guilty of contempt of its authority and to send him to jail for a period not exceeding three months. Section 16 of the Act deals with matters relating to bonds. Section 13 of the Act authorises the Tribunal to declare a person to be a Goonda or a dangerous Goonda. This section is divided into two subsections, the first authorising the Tribunal to declare a person to be a Goonda if all or any of the conditions mentioned in the five clauses of the subsection are fulfilled and the second authorising the Tribunal to declare a person to be a dangerous Goonda if all or any of the conditions mention ed in the eighteen clauses of the subsection are satisfied. Section 14 of the Act is also divided into two subsections. Subsection (1) lays down that when a person is declared a Goonda, the Tribunal may pass certain orders with regard to him, including the one that lie should furnish a bond, with one or more sureties, for such period not exceeding three years and for the amount fixed by the Tribunal, to be of good behaviour. Subsection (2) of section 14 authorises the Tribunal to pass certain orders with regard to persons who are declared dangerous Goondas and clause (a) of the sub section reads as follow :‑-
"It may direct that his movements shall be restricted to any area specified in the order, or may direct him to report himself at such times and places and in such mode as may be specified in the order, or it may make both the directions."
The first contention of the learned course for the peti tioner was that the order of the Tribunal did not mention the points for decision and the decision thereon and, therefore, contravened section 10 of the Act, which lays down that the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal in cases under the Act was to be that laid down by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for conducting trials and recording evidence in summary cases but was to be subject to the provisions of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that as section 263 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enjoins on Courts the duty of bringing out the points for decision and the decision thereon, the all‑brief impugned order could not be said to have complied with section 10 of the Act and must be set aside on that short ground. The order of the Tribunal is, no doubt, very, brief and could with advantage have been a little more detailed, but it appears to me that it cannot be set aside on the ground of its brevity because it cannot be said not to have mentioned the points for decision and the decision oil the Tribunal thereon. The point for decision before the Tribunal was whether or not the petitioner was a dangerous Goonda and it cannot be said that the order fails to mention that this was the point for decision. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Shahab Din v. Crown (P L D 1956 Lah. 235) for his contention that the order was defective, but after going through that decision I am of the view that it has no applica tion to the facts of the present case.
The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that as neither of the two clauses of sub section ( ) of section 14 of the Act mentions that a dangerous Goonda may be called upon to furnish security to be of good behaviour, the order calling upon the petitioner to furnish security after declaring him a dangerous Goonda was against law and ultra vires. This argument, in my view, has no substance. A person who has been declared a dangerous Goonda has by implication been declared a Goonda, and, therefore, all orders which can be passed under subsection (1) or subsection (2) of section 14 of the Act may be passed against him If the sureties ordered under subsection (1) of section 14 of the Act are not furnished, the District Tribunal, can, under subsection (3) of section 16 of the Act, commit the person called upon to furnish them to prison.
The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the evidence on the record did not justify the declaration of the petitioner as a dangerous Goonda under the Act and I should set aside that order in the exercise of my powers of revision. Section 18 of the Act is in the following terms :‑
.‑No appeal shall lie from any order made by a Tribunal, but in relation to any such order under section 5, or section 13, or section 16, the High Court may call for the record of the case, and if the Tribunal appears‑-
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law ;
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested ; or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally, the High Court may make such direction as it may deem sufficient for the rectification of the error or omission and the Tribunal shall conduct itself accordingly."
It will be noticed that the section authorises this Court to make suitable directions with regard to orders of the Tribunal passed under specified sections if the Tribunal has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally. It is undeniable that the Tribunal had before it evidence which tended to show that the petitioner was a dangerous Goonda and if this Court were to set aside the order of the Tribunal on the ground that the evidence on the record was not sufficient to justify it, it will be travelling beyond the jurisdiction given to it by section 18 of the Act. It would have been different if it were a case of no evidence at all to justify the conclusions of the Tribunal but in the present case there was evidence that the petitioner was a dangerous Goonda and that evidence the Tribunal has considered reliable. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that even though the powers of this Court under section 18 of the Act may be limited, yet it could exercise powers of revision under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and set aside the order if it were of the view that the evidence was not strong enough. It appears; to me, however, that a Tribunal appointed under the Act is not an inferior Criminal Court contemplated by sections 43 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, this 'Court cannot invoke section 439 to set aside orders of the Tribunal on the ground that though there was evidence on which the Tribunal could act, the evidence was not strong enough. I took a similar view with regard to the powers of revision of this Court in Muhammad Ali v. The State (P L D 1956 Lah, 698) and nothing that the learned counsel for the petitioner said has made me change that view.
It was then contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of the Tribunal restricting the move ments of the petitioner to the district of Sialkot was entirely without jurisdiction. On principle, it appears wrong that a Tribunal having powers within a district should be able to exclude a person living therein from that district and to direct him to remain in another district, but if a piece of legislation gave the Tribunal such a power, the law thus made would be valid, provided the authority which passed the law was com petent to pass it. The question, therefore, is whether that part of the order, by which the movements of the petitioner were restricted to the district of Sialkot though at all relevant times he was a resident of Gujranwala, can be brought within the four corners of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act. The relevant provisions in this respect are clause (a) of subsec tion (2) of section 14 which has been reproduced in an earlier part of this order, and section 17 of the Act. Section 17 reads as follows :‑-
.‑An order under clause (2) (a) of section 14 shall, so far as may be, conform to and its operation shall be governed so far as may be possible, by the rules made by the Provincial Government under section 16 of the Restriction of Habitual Offenders (Punjab) Act, 1918."
Rules under section 16 of the Restriction of Habitual Offenders (Punjab) Act, 1918, were made soon after coming into force of the Act and are to be found at page 343 of Part V of Punjab Gazette for the year 1918. Rule 2 is the relevant one and it reads as follows :‑
"The areas to which persons may be restricted by an order under this Act shall ordinarily be‑
(a) if the person resides in a village‑the area of the village, to which may be added at the discretion of the Court the areas of any contiguous villages in which the said person owns or occupies any immovable property or practices any trade or calling ;
(b) if the person resides in a town, the area of the town.
But in special cases the Court may fix a larger area.
(i) Unless the person restricted is an owner of land or an occupancy tenant, the Court may, if it is of opinion that restriction to the aforesaid areas is inexpedient, select any other village or town, as the case may be, in the district within which the person ordinarily resides.
(ii) If the person restricted has been twice convicted of offences under Chapter XVII of the Penal Code, and is not an owner of land or an occupancy tenant, the area of restric tion may be any settlement established under section 16 of the Criminal Tribes Act, 1911, but the Court must obtain the concurrence of the Deputy Commissioner for Criminal Tribes before restricting any person to such settlement."
It will be noticed that the rule contemplates that a person resident in a certain place shall not ordinarily be expelled therefrom. With regard to the residents of a town, the rule lays down that the movements of the person hit by it may be restricted to that town but in no case to a town outside the district in which the person resides. The learned counsel for the State contended that because the relevant rule provided that the area of restriction may be extended, the order which was attacked could not be said to violate the rule, but this argument overlooks the fact that the rule allows the extension of the area of restriction, i.e., it allows that the area of restric tion may extend beyond the town or village in which the person against whom the order is passed resides and does not allow the person to be sent out of the district. There is no doubt a provision in the rule that if a person had been con victed twice of offences under Chapter XVII of the Penal Code, he may be sent to a settlement established under sec tion 16 of the Criminal Tribes Act, 191, but before such an order could be passed the concurrence of the Deputy Commis sioner for Criminal Tribes was to be obtained. It is doubtful if in the circumstances now existing, that part of the rule which refers to the Deputy Commissioner for Criminal Tribes could be invoked, but even if it could be, I do not see how it could be made applicable to the petitioner because there is no proof that he was convicted of any offence much less proof that he was convicted twice of an offence falling under Chapter XVII of the Penal Code. At any rate, if the peti tioner could be excluded from the district in which he resided', he could be sent to a settlement established under section 16 of the Criminal Tribes Act, 1911, and to no other place. It will be a sad state of affairs if a District Tribunal of a district could dump all dangerous Goondas of its district in another district as the result would be that dangerous Goondas of one district will live in other districts. I have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that the order of the District Tribunal, Gujranwala, restricting the movements of the petitioner to the District of Sialkot was, in addition to being unjust, entirely without jurisdiction.
The question that now arises is whether this Court can grant the petitioner any relief against his eviction from the district of Gujranwala and if so what. The powers of this Court to give directions in revision with respect to the orders passed by a District Tribunal appointed under the Act are governed by section 18 of that Act which has been reproduced; earlier. Now that section gives this Court jurisdiction to exercise powers of revision with regard to orders passed under sections 5, 13 and 16 of the Act and on a plain reading of section 18, this Court could not exercise its powers of revision with regard to any other order passed by the District Tribunal. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as section 14 of the Act was for all practical purposes a part of section 13 of the Act an order passed under section 14 should be treated as one passed under the preceding section for the purposes of section 18 of the Act. I cannot accept this con tention, because 1t is clear from the language of subsection (2) of section 14 that it is not essential that an order under sub section (2) of section 14 must be passed against a person who has been declared a dangerous Goonda under subsection (2) of section 13 of the Act. Whatever weight the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that if an order under sec tion 13 of the Act is not followed by one under section 14, the order will be meaningless may have in respect of an order passed under subsection (1) of section 13, it has none if the order, as in the present case, is one under subsection (2) of section 13 of the Act, because in such a case section 19 of the Act which, read with the schedule to the Act, authorises the imposition of sentences severer than those prescribed for some offences by the Pakistan Penal Code, the Public Gambling Act, the Punjab Excise Act and the Opium Act if those offences be committed by a person who has been declared a dangerous Goonda will automatically come into play. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment in Criminal Revision No. 173 of 1956 by which a learned Single judge of this Court had exercised powers of revision in respect of an order under clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 14 of the Act, but as the scope of section 18 of the Act was not examined by the learned Judge, and the decision being by a learned Single judge is not binding on me, I am not prepared to follow the same course in spite of holding that the order restraining the petitioner to a district other than the one in which the District Tribunal appointed under the Act has jurisdiction, is without jurisdiction. If the question had arisen on the petitioner's trial under section 26 of the Act for breach of the order of restriction passed against him, I would have unhesitatingly held him to be innocent, because the order of restriction being without jurisdiction its breach could not entail penalties, but as section 18 of the Act does not allow the revision of an order under clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 14 of the Act by this Court, I do not consider myself F justified in issuing the direction contemplated by section 18 of the Act. I have considered it necessary to deal at some length with the point relating to the restriction of the move ments of dangerous Goondas because more than one order of exclusion of dangerous Goondas from the district in which they resided has come to my notice.
In view of what I have said, I dismiss the petition but have no doubt that the District Tribunal, Gujranwala, will at an early date bring the order of restriction in conformity with the provisions of the Act. If the District Tribunal does not act sou Motu, the petitioner may either apply to the District Tribunal for modification of the order or may disregard tile order restraining him to the district of Sialkot.
A. H. Petition dismissed.
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