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First Appeal No. 276 of 1945, referred to Full Bench by a Division Bench (consisting of Sir‑Abdul Rashid, C. J. and Muhammad Jan, J.) on 14th October 1947, decided on 19th December 1947, from the order of Sub‑Judge, 1st Class, Lahore, dated 31st January 1945.
, S. 7 (iv) (c)‑Suit for declara tion that decrees were null and void and other consequential reliefs ‑‑Suit falls under section 7 (iv) (c).
In the present case the substantive relief claimed by the plaintiff is to have it declared that the preliminary and the final mortgage decrees were null and void and not binding on him as they were obtained by fraud. All other reliefs asked for flow from this substantive relief. If the decrees are to be declared to be null and void as against the plaintiff the sale held in pursuance of such decrees will have to be declared to be ineffectual as against the plaintiff and the injunction restraining defen dant No. 3 from obtaining possession of the house in dispute would be a consequential relief within the purview of section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court‑fees Act.
[Case‑law discussed]
, S. 9‑Rule 10 of the rules framed by the Lahore High Court‑Two different values for Court- fee and jurisdiction can be fixed.
Suits for cancellation of decrees are suits, the value of which cannot be satisfactorily ascertained under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act and therefore, different values can be fixed in respect of such a suit for purposes of Court‑fee and Suits Valuation Act.
Muhammad Fazil for Appellant.
Muhammad Akram for Respondents.
Order of Reference
---‑It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that AIR 1945 Lab, 13 does not lay down the law correctly. The learned counsel has urged that rule 10 of the rules framed by the High Court under the Suits Valuation Act, on the 2nd of December 1942, lays down that any suit in which the plaintiffs ask for the cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, shall be taken to be a suit of the type the value of the subject- matter of which cannot be satisfactorily determined, and that therefore, under this rule it is open to the plaintiffs to fix different value for the purposes of Court‑fees and jurisdiction. In this connection the learned counsel relies on the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of The Crown v. Rala Ram (1945 P L R 436). The rules referred to above were not brought to the notice of the learned judges in A I R 1945 Lah. 13, and it is for consideration whether the law as laid down in that ruling is unsound as being in direct contradiction to the rule alluded to above, As the validity of a Division Bench judgment has been called into question and as the matter is not free from difficulty, I would refer this case to a Full Bench for decision.
---‑ This is a first appeal from a decision of Mr. Jawala Das, Subordinate Judge, Lahore, rejecting the plaint under O. VII rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The material facts of the case may be shortly stated. The house in dispute was originally owned by B. Muhammad Abdullah and his wife Mst. Karam‑un‑Nisa. They mortgaged this house, together with other property belonging to them, in favour of Mst. Ganga Devi. defendant 1, and Ashni Kumar, defendant 2, for Rs. 6,000 by means of a registered mortgage deed dated the 30th September, 1918. Subsequently Mst. Karam‑un‑Nisa created a further mortgage on her share in favour of Messrs. Bulaqi Mal & Sons, defendant No. 3. Shortly after this mortgage Muhammad Abdullah was adjudged insolvent. The plaintiff Ghulam Qadir purchased his share in the equity of redemption of the house in dispute at an auction sale held by the official receiver. The plaintiff also purchased the share of Mst. Karam‑un-Nisa and thus became the owner of the house subject to the mortgages mentioned above. On the 30th of October, 1930, Mst. Ganga Devi and Ashni Kumar instituted a suit against the plaintiff and several others including defendant No. 3, on the basis of this mortgage deed. Mst. Ganga Devi and Ashni Kumar obtained a preliminary decree on the 31st of July, 1935. This decree was made final on the 1st of November. According to the plaint the present plaintiff was posted at Jhelum while the litigation on the basis of the mortgage deed was pending and he was kept in complete ignorance of the litigation. Mst. Ganga Devi and Ashni Kumar, according to the plaintiff, arranged that summonses should never actually issue to the plaintiff at Jhelum. The above mentioned decrees were secured against the plaintiff by fraud and were, therefore, not binding on him. The plaintiff further stated that the sale of the house in dispute, in execution of the decrees mentioned above, should be declared as null and void as he was kept in complete ignorance of the execution proceedings. He has also asked for an injunction, as a consequential relief, restraining Messrs. Bulaqi Mal & Sons from obtaining possession of the said house on the ground that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had assigned their decrees in their favour on the 29th of January 1938.
The plaintiff valued his suit for purposes of Court‑fee at Rs. 130. The value for purposes of jurisdiction was fixed at Rs. 8,890 as decree for that sum had been obtained by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of the mortgage deed dated the 30th of September 1918.
The suit was contested only by Messrs. Bulaqi Mal & Sons. It was of Court‑fee and jurisdiction should be the same and that Court‑fee was payable on the sum of Rs. 8,890.‑ The trial Court held that as the plain tiff had fixed the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction at the sum of Rs. 8,890, the suit must be valued for the purposes of Court‑fee at the same figure. The plaintiff was asked to make up the deficiency in the Court‑fee and as he refused to do so, his plaint was rejected under Order VII rule 11 of the Code o f Civil Procedure. Against this decision, as mentioned already, the present appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff.
It was contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the lower Court had erred in bolding that it was incumbent on the plaintiff to value his suit for purposes of Court‑fee at the same figure at which he had valued it for purposes of jurisdiction. It was maintained by the learned counsel that it was opera to the plaintiff to value his suit at Rs. 8,890 for purposes of jurisdiction under section 9 of the Suits Valua tion Act and the rules framed thereunder as this was the amount of the mortgage decree, and to value it at Rs. 130 for purposes of Court‑fee. Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act runs in the following terms :‑
when the subject‑matter of suits of arty class . . . . . . . , is such that in the opinion of the High Court it does not admit of being satisfactorily valued, the High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Provincial Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court‑fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject‑matter were of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf.
In the rules originally framed by the High Court under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, the present type of suits was not included. New rules were, however, framed by this Court on the 2nd December, 1942, for the purposes of determining the value of the subject‑matter of certain classes of suits which did not admit of being satisfactorily valued. Rule 10 of these rules is in the following terms :‑
"10. Suits in which the plaintiff asks for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document securing money or other property having such value‑
Value (a) for the purposes oil the Court‑fees Act, 1870, as determined by that Act.
(b) For the purposes of th4e Suits Valuation Act, 1887, and the Punjab Courts Act 1918, according to the value of the subject- matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be‑
(i) If the whole decree or ot9her document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or the value of the property for which the decree was passed or the other document executed ;
(81) If a part of the decreee or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property".
It is obvious from rule 10 that the rules framed by the High Court on the 2nd of December 1942 envisaged the fixing of different values for purposes of Court‑fees and for purposes of the Suits Valuation Act in respect of suits in which the plaintiff asks for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value. This is also apparent from rule 1, which deals with sits relating to alleged marriages or for restitution of conjugal rights. According to rule 1 such suits are to be valued at Rs. 200 for purposes of Court‑fees and at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of the Suits Valuation Act.
In brief the argument on behalf of the appellant was that suits for cancellation of money decrees and mortgage decrees were in the opinion of the High Court suits of a nature which did not admit of being satis factorily valued, and it was competent, therefore, for the High Court to fix the value of such suits for the purposes of the Court‑fees Act at one figure and for the purposes of the Suits Valuation Act at another figure by virtue of the powers conferred on the High Court by section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel in this connection on the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of The Crown v. Rala Ram (1). In this case it was held that in a suit for in junction for removal of a drain the plaintiff is bound under rule 4 framed under section 9, Suits Valuation Act, to put a value for purposes of jurisdiction at a figure above Rs. 100 and not exceeding Rs. 500 and for purposes of Court‑fee he can put any value that he honestly thinks proper. It was further held that section 9 is more than an exception to section 8. It is a separable provision dealing with quite different classes of cases. Section 8 applies to a case where the value of the subject matter is satisfactorily ascertainable. Section 9 applies to all cases in which the value of the subject‑matter cannot be satisfactorily ascertained. Section 8 has, therefore, no application to a large number of cases falling within the purview of section 9. In this case the learned judges dealt at length with the question whether different values could be fixed by a plaintiff for purposes of Court‑fee and for purposes of jurisdiction. The Bench came to the conclusion that the rules framed by the High Court on the 2nd of December 1942 were intra vires under section 9 and that it was open to the plaintiff in a suit falling under section 9 to value his suit differently for purposes of Court‑fee and jurisdiction. The following quotation from this judgment may be reproduced in extenso :‑
"I am of opinion that on first impression the language of the section ‑section 9‑does seem to indicate one value for all these purposes. But on further reading of the section I must respectfully disagree with the view that this is the only possible meaning of the words. On the other hand, the Rule itself which is cited above, seems clearly to indicate that different valuations were contemplated. In the same rules, Rule 1 has in fact itself fixed different values for Court‑fees and for jurisdiction, i.e., Rs. 200 and Rs. 1,000. The Chief Court, therefore, in framing these rules was clearly of opinion that different values could be fixed under section 9. The Committee of the High Court which framed the new rules pub lished in 1943 seems to have been of the same view , . . . The same proposition actually flows from Najm‑ud‑din v. Municipal Commit tee Delhi (6 P R 1904) where, though the Bench did hold that the value under Rule 4 (b) was to be taken as the value on which Court‑fee was to be assessed under sub‑rule (a), it did concede that separate values could be assessed under these rules. There is nothing to the contrary in Bariu v. Lachhman (111 P R 1943) where it was only held that the value competently fixed for Court‑fee was value which could have been fixed for jurisdiction under the Rule, and should there fore be taken as such value. Their view was clearly that ordinarily jurisdictional value follows Court‑fee value and not vice versa.
It seems to me, therefore, that section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act has no application to cases coming under rules framed under sec tion 9, that section 9 itself cannot be interpreted as necessarily meani ng that only one value must be fixed for all purposes, that the rules framed under this section have, in fact fixed different values, and the natural interpretation of Rule 4 is that it provides for a juris dictional value different from the Court‑fee value and not the contrary."
I am in respectful agreement with the observations of the Full Bench produced above. As suits of the nature with which we are dealing have been included in rule 10 "as suits the value of which cannot be satisfactorily ascertained", it is open to the plaintiff, therefore, to fix different values for purposes of Court‑fees and Suits Valuatiori Act.
It was held by a Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in the case of Khem Rai v. Durgi (A I R 1941 Rang. 187) that section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act does not apply to a suit for restitution of conjugal rights. In such a suit, therefore, the value as determinable for the computation of Court‑fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction are not necessarily the same. In a suit of such a nature the plaintiff is entitled for the purposes of jurisdiction to put any value he likes on the relief sought and thus determine the Court in which the suit is to be instituted, provided that the valuation is made bona fide and not in order to effect an impror purpose.
It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that all rules prescribing two values, one for the purposes of the Court‑fee and the other for the purposes of jurisdiction were ultra virs as they were inconsistent with sections 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. It was maintained that section 9 gives the High Court jurisdiction to frame rules in respect of suits the value of which cannot be satisfactorily ascertained but that the High Court has no right to frame rules fixing different values for Court‑fee and Suits Valuation Act, as section 9 lays down that the High Court may direct that certain suits shall "for the purposes of the Court‑fees Act, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject matter were of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf." The contention on behalf of the respondents was that as the Court‑fees Act, the Suits Valuation Act and all other enactments for the time being in force had been bracketed together in section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, the High Court could direct the fixing of the value for purposes of all these Acts but that the High Court could not frame rules fixing one value for purposes of Court‑fee and another value for purposes of Suits Valuation Act. Reliance was placed in this connection by the learned counsel on the case of Nanak v. Guranditta (63 P R 1902). It was held in this case that section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act so far governs section 7 (iv) of the Court‑fees Act as to indicate that it was not the intention of the Legislature that a purely arbitrary value should be fixed by the plaintiff, and that it follows from section 8 and the Rules under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, that in injunction suit, where no damages are claimed, the Court‑fee payable is on the jurisdictional value fixed by the plaintiff within the limits laid down by the Rule. This Ruling was, however, dissented from by a Full Bench of the Punjab Chief Court in the case of Barru v. Lachhman (3). The following observation from pages 418 and 419 of the report may be reproduced in extenso :‑
"In Nanak v. Guranditta (5) the suit one for relief by way of injunc tion and was valued by plaintiff for purposes of (a) Court‑fee at Rs. 30, and (b) jurisdiction at Rs. 320. It was held that the suit fell under section 7 (iv) of the Court‑fees Act and also under the rules made by the Chief Court under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, according to which the latter value (as damages were not claimed) must be such amount exceeding Rs. 100 and not exceeding Rs. 500 as the plaintiff may state in his plaint. The rule in question distinctly provides that the value of the suit for purposes of Court‑fee is to be determined by the provisions of the Court‑fees Act.
In the circumstances we are unable, with every defence, to accept the view of the learned judges, that, as the suit was valued for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 320 (an amount permissible under the rules) it was not open to the plaintiff to fix an arbitrary value of Rs. 30 upon the relief sought for the purposes of Court‑fee. In so holding, the learned Judges referred to section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, but clearly that section has no operation when the suit is of a class for which provision is expressly made by rules under section 9 of that Act. The decision that the Court‑fee is payable in an injunction suit (whereas in this case no damages are claimed) on the jurisdictional value fixed by the plaintiff within the limits (Rs. 100 to Rs. 500) laid down by the rule ; overlooks the explicit provision in the same rule that the value of such suit for the purposes of the Court‑fees Act is as deter mined by that Act (i.e., the Court‑fees Act and not the Suits Valuation Act). Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act has nothing to do with the fixing of values for purposes of Court‑fees, but merely provides that, as a general rule, the jurisdictional value of suits falling within its purview, shall be the same as the value put on the suit for purposes of Court‑fee. It a general rule and has no applicability to the special class of suits for which express provisions is made by sections 4 and 9 of the Act. In our opinion, the decision in this case was in contravention of rule 4 of the rules framed by this Court under the provisions of section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act and the ratio decidendi has, in any case, no direct relevancy to the question now before us."
Reliance was also placed by the learned Counsel for the respondent on the decision of Addison, J. in Civil Appeal No. 603 of 1931 and on a Division Bench ruling 'of this Court reported as A I R 1936 Lah. 990. In view of the Full Bench decision of this Court reported as 1945 P L R 436, the opinion of Addison, J., in Civil Appeal No, 603 of 1931 and the decision in A I R 1936 Lah. 990 to the effect that different values cannot be fixed for purposes of Court‑fee and jurisdiction for suits falling under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, cannot ''now be regarded as laying down the law correctly.
The next contention raised by the learned Counsel for the respond ents was that even if rule 10 is ultra vires and different values can be fixed for the purposes of Court‑fee and jurisdiction in the present suit, the plaintiff is liable to pay ad valorem Court‑fee on the sum of Rs. 8,890 as he has asked for the setting aside of the sale held in the execution of a mortgage decree the value of which is Rs. 8,890. The learned Counsel contended that the first relief prayed for by the plaintiff, i.e., that he may be granted a declaration that the preliminary and final decrees dated the 31st of July, 1931 and 1st of November 1931, are null and void and not binding on him as they Were obtained by fraud, is a declaratory relief. He, however, urged that the second relief prayed for, namely, that it may be declared that the sale of the house in execution of the decree is not binding on the plaintiff, is also a substantive relief and cannot be regarded as a consequential relief flowing from the previous declaration. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel in this connection on the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Mst. Zeb‑ul‑Nisa v. Din Muhammad (I L R 22 Lah, 451). The facts of this case were as follows :‑
A Muhammadan executed a family trust wakf‑alal‑aulad under Muhammadan Law in respect of his property. According to the deed he himself was to be the first mutwalli and his son was to succeed him as such after him. After his death his son repudiated the trust and along with his brother effected several alienation of the dedicated property. The plaintiffs (some of his descendants and relations) instituted the present suit for a declaration to the effect that the property was wakf and alienations thereof were null and void and ineffectual as against the wakf property. They valued the relief at rupees ten lacs for the purposes of jurisdiction and paid Rs. 10 for a declaration under clause (iii), Article 17, Sch. II of the Court‑fees Act. The points for decision in the case were : (i) what was the nature of the relief claimed in the suit and under what category of suits did it fall for the purposes of the Court- fees Act and (ii) how was the value to be computed. In these circum stances it was held that the true criterion for determining the question of Court‑fees in cases like the present is the substance of the relief as disclosed by the plaint and not merely the language of the form of the relief claimed therein. If the relief so disclosed is a declaration pure and simple involves no further relief, the suit would fall under clause (iii) of article 17 of Sch. II of the Court‑fees Act. If on the other hand, the declaratory relief involves a consequential relief within the meaning of section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court‑fees Act, the plaintiff has the option to state any value he likes on the relief for the purposes of Court‑fee. In this particular case the first part of the relief that the property is wakf is purely declaratory and does not involve any consequential relief and it would require Rs. 10 for the purposes of Court‑fee. The second part of the relief to have the alienations declared null and void and ineffectual as against the wakf property is tantamount to a substantive relief in the shape of the setting aside of cancellation of the alienations in question and cannot be treated as purely declaratory or as a declara tion with a consequential relief within the meaning of section 7 (iv) (e) of the Court‑fees Act and would require ad valorem Court‑fee on the value of the subject‑matter of the sales, viz, rupees ten lacs.
The decision of the Full Bench in Mst. Zeb‑ul‑Nisa's case is clearly distinguishable from the present case. It was assumed in Mst. Zeb‑ul -Nisa's case that it is not open to a plaintiff to put different values under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act for purposes of Court‑fee and for purposes of jurisdiction. It was further pointed out that no rules had been framed under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act to cover the type of case with which the learned judges were then dealing. This is apparent from the following quotation at p. 496 of the report.
"The above conclusion is based on the view that relief claimed in this case does not fall under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court‑fees Act. I may add, however, that even if the suit were held to fall under section 7 (iv) (c), it seems to me doubtful whether that would help the plaintiffs in this case. Section 7 (iv) (c), no doubt, lays down that the plaintiffs shall state the value of the relief in the plaint in such cases. In the present case, however, the plaintiffs have themselves valued the relief in the plaint at rupees ten lacs. They did so, no doubt, for purposes of jurisdiction. All that section 7 (iv) (c) requires, however, is that the plaintiff should state the value of the relief in the plaint. It could scarcely have been intended that the plaintiff should value the relief at one figure for jurisdiction and at another for Court‑fee. Sections 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act show that except when specific rules to the contrary have been framed under section 9, the value for purposes of Court‑fee and jurisdiction must be the same. The present case, even if it falls under section 7 (iv) (c), would not fall under the existing rules under section 9. In the present case, therefore, the plaintiffs were bound to fix the same value on the relief claimed for purposes of Court‑fee and jurisdiction."
The new rules framed under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, however, cover the case with which we are dealing. Rule 10 of the new rules specifically deals with cases wherein a plaintiff asks for the cancella tion of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document securing money or other property having such value. The insertion of rule 10 in the new rules completely alters the position and makes the decision in Mst. Zeb‑ul‑Nisa's case inapplicable to the present suit In the case of Harikrishen Lal v. Barkat Ali (A I R 1942 Lah. 209) it was laid down by a Division Bench of this Court that where it is open to the plaintiff to frame his suit in one of two ways, there is no obligation in law that he should frame his suit in any other way than he would choose to frame it. In other words, if it is open to the plaintiff to bring a suit for possession or to bring a suit for a declaration with consequential relief for possession, it is entirely for the plaintiff to choose in which form he brings the suit and to the results that may flow from his choice in the way of limitation or otherwise the question of Court‑fee payable is wholly irrelevant. The Court‑fee will be determined on the nature of the suit as framed at the choice of the plaintiff, always provided it is legally open to him to do so. It cannot be said that in all suits where possession is one of the reliefs claimed, the suit must of necessity fall within section 7 (v) any more than if the relief was not possession but was somewhere specifically provided for, say in Article 1 of the Schedule. the relief would necessarily fall within that Article. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether the relief by way of possession or any other relief claimed is or is not consequential on the declaration sought.
I am of the opinion that in the present case the substantive relief claimed by the plaintiff is to have it declared that the preliminary and the final mortgage decrees were null and void and not binding on him as they were obtained by fraud. All other reliefs asked for flow from this substantive relief. If the decrees are to be declared to be null and void as against the plaintiff the sale held in pursuance of such decrees will have to be declared to be ineffectual as against the plaintiff and the injunction restraining defendant No. 3 from obtaining possession of the house in dispute would be a consequential relief within the purview of section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court‑Fees Act.
In the case of Allah Yar v. Anjuman Imdad Qaraa, Basti Chah Kotwala Dakhli, Jalalpur (A I R 1941 Lah. 284), the facts were very similar to the present case. The plaintiff in the reported case had sued for a declaration that the order of the liquidator of the Co‑operative Society was null and void and was not executable against him and for an injunction restraining the defendant from executing the order. The amount which the liquidator had ordered the appellant to contribute to the assets of the Society was over Rs. 8,000. The suit, however, was valued for purposes of jurisdiction and Court‑fee at Rs. 10 and a stamp of annas twelve was affixed on the plaint. In these circumstances it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that when the plaintiff is a party to a decree or deed, the declaratory relief, if granted, necessarily relieves the plaintiff of his obligations under the decree or the deed, and hence in such cases the declaration involves consequential relief. Consequently, a suit for a declaration by the plaintiff that the order of the liquidator of the Co‑operative Society to which he was a party is null and void and is not executable against him and for an injunction restraining the defendant from executing the order, is a suit for declaration and consequential relief and, therefore, under section 7 (iv) (c) the plaintiff is entitled to fix any value he likes on the plaint. The plaintiff is the sole arbiter of this valuation and can fix it arbitrarily at any figure, however disproportionate it might be with the real value of the subject‑matter. By asking that the sale of the house in execution of the decree may be declared as not binding on the plaintiff, the plaintiff is merely claiming that the decree passed against him is inexecutable, which was the exact relief asked for by the plaintiff in A I R 1241 Lah. 284.
The only case which is against the plaintiff appellant is reported as A I R 1932 All. 485. It is a Full Bench decision and is entitled to the greatest respect. It was held in this case that a relief for the cancellation of a decree is not a declaratory relief only. The effect is to render the decree void and incapable of execution and to free the plaintiff from all further liability under it. Where the relief claimed is that the com promise, the preliminary decree and the absolute decree passed in a mortgage suit be cancelled, the suit falls under Schedule 1, Article 1. The cancellation of the compromise, the preliminary and final decree are not distinct subjects within section 17 and the Court‑fee is payable on the value of the final decree only. It does not appear that in the Allahabad High Court there is a rule similar to rule 10 of the rules framed by this Court laying down that suits for cancellation of decrees are suits, the value of which cannot be satisfactorily ascer tained under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act and that, therefore, different values can be fixed in respect of such a suit for purposes of Court‑fee and Suits Valuation Act. This makes the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court inapplicable to cases dealing with cancella tion of decrees in this Court. In any case, with all respect, I do not find myself in agreement with the observations of the learned judges in the Allahabad case. In my opinion they have given too restricted a meaning to the words "consequential relief" as used in section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court‑fees Act.
For the reasons given above I would accept this appeal and hold that the Court‑fee paid in the present case was sufficient. I would, consequently, set aside the order of the trial Court dated 'the 31st of January 1945, rejecting the plaint under Order VII rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and would remit the case to the trial Court for decision on the merits in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. The Court‑fee paid on the memorandum of appeal in this Court shall be refunded and the other costs will abide the result of litigation in the trial Court. Parties have been directed to appear in the trial Court on the 19th January 1948.
--‑ I agree entirely with my Lord the Chief Justice.
---‑ I agree.
K. M. A. Appeal accepted.
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