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Constitutional Petition No. 1022 of 1974, decided on 31st January 1977.

Art. 199‑Court having jurisdiction to decide matter deciding same rightly or wrongly‑High Court, in exercise of constitutional jurisdic tion, would not interfere with such decision‑Lower Tribunal wrongly excluding a valid piece of evidence going to root of matter and in consequence coming to erroneous 'conclusion ‑High Court, held, entitled to interfere in such case.‑[Writ].

Commissioner v. Sher Mohammad 1972 S C M R 395 rel.

‑‑ S. 73‑Comparison of signatures‑Scope of S. 73‑Court, on comparison, coming to definite conclusion that signatures on disputed document and admitted signatures are identical‑Court can act on such conclusion though such course ordinarily may be unsatisfactory or even dangerous.

Malina Rani Das v. Province of East Pakistan P L D 1968 Dacca 167 ; Muhammad Mursaleen v. Noor Muhammad Hussaini P L D 1963 Kar. 263 and L. P. A. No. 109 of 1969 ref.

‑‑ Ss. 25‑A & 36‑D read with Evidence Act (I of 1972), S. 73‑Junior Labour Court comparing signature nn alleged resignation with other admitted signatures of workman ‑Exclusion of such comparison from consideration by Labour Court‑‑Held, clearly erroneous.

S. H. Rizvi for Petitioner.

Date of hearing : 31st January 1977.

This petition, by a Partnership Firm, through its partner, Muhammad Yasin son of Muhammad Yousaf, calls in question the decision delivered by the Sind Labour Court No. IV, Karachi, reversing the decision of the Junior Labour Court NO. III, Karachi,, and holding that respondent No. 2, Muhammad Mobin, has been illegally removed from the service of the petitioner‑firm.

2. The circumstances in which this petition has been filed are that respondent No. 2 submitted an application under section 25.A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, to the Junior Labour Court contending that he had been working as a Machineman in the factory of the petitioner heroin since 11‑11‑1969, on a monthly salary of Rs. 235, and that the petitioner. firm, on 20‑12‑73, without any charge‑sheet and without following the procedure prescribed in the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance‑, 1968, had orally terminated his services. The petitioner‑firm resisted the application of respondent No. 2 on the ground that the said respondent had worked for the firm only for a period of 19 days and thereafter, on 19‑12‑1913, had submitted his resigna tion, which was accepted. The main contest therefore, between the parties was whether respondent No. 2 had tendered his resignation or whether his services had been illegally terminated, as claimed by trim,

3. The Junior Labour Court came to the conclusion, on a comparison of an admitted signature of respondent No. 2 with the signature on the alleged resignation application that they tallied and consequently dismissed the application of respondent No. 2. It might be stated here that during the proceedings before the Junior Labour Court, the petitioner herein had applied to the said Court for referring the disputed resignation application to the Handwriting Expert for examination and report. Subsequently, however, this application was withdrawn on the ground that the Handwriting Expert was demanding a number of other specimens to compare with the disputed signatures and this would result in a very large fee having to be paid to the Handwriting Expert.

4. Respondent No. 2 appealed to the Labour Court against the decision of the Junior Labour Court. The Labour Court, on the basis of certain decisions from the Indian jurisdiction, held that "it is a settled practice of Courts not to base the findings merely on opinion under section 47 (73) of the Evidence Act", and, therefore, excluded the evidence in regard to comparison from consideration. Since there was no other material on record to show that respondent No. 2 bad in fact submitted his resignation, the Labour Court allowed the appeal, holding that the removal from service of respondent No. 2 was illegal.

5. Respondent No. 2 as well as respondent No. 1 have chosen to retrain absent and hence this petition is being decided without benefit of their contentions.

6. Mr. S. H. Rizvi, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has assailed the decision of the Labour Court on the short ground that he has totally misconceived the legal position in regard to the scope of section 73 of the Evidence Act. He submitted that by excluding valid from consideration, the Labour Court has fallen into error and, therefore, failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law.

7. No doubt, a Court having jurisdiction to decide a matter, is competent to decide it rightly or wrongly, whether on a point of a law or on facts, and the High Court, in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction would not interfere in such a decision, but where the lower Tribunal A wrongly excludes a valid piece of evidence, which goes to the root of the matter and in consequence comes to a wholly erroneous conclusion, the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction would be entitled to interfere. In support of this view, I would respectfully refer to the following observations of Anwarul Haq, J., in Commissioner v. Sher Muhammad (1972 S C M R 395)

"It is correct that ordinarily, the High Court is not entitled to investi gate disputed questions of fact in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, but it is well settled that a finding of fact can be interfered with if it is based on no evidence, or a misreading of evidence, or ignoring of material evidence, or taking into consideration inadmissible evidence."

8. The next question, which falls to be considered, is whether com parison of signatures by the Court itself is valid evidence. Section 73 of the Evidence Act empowers the Court to compare the signature on a disputed document with other admitted or proved signatures. If on such comparison, the Court comes definitely to the conclusion that the signature on the disputed' document and the admitted signatures are identical, it may act on such comparison, though such course ordinarily may be unsatisfactory or even dangerous. In support of this view, Mr. S. H. Rizvi, relied upon the decisions reported in P L D 1968 Dacca 167 and P L D 1968 Kar. 263. In a recent case, being L. P. A. No. 109/1969, to the decision whereof I was a party, we have held that comparison of signature on a disputed document with admitted or proved signatures of the party alleged to have signed the disputed document, in the presence and with the assistance of the Advocates of the parties, is one of the modes for establishing the genuineness or otherwise of the signatures on the disputed documents.

9. In view of the above authorities, the view of the learned Labour Court, excluding altogether from consideration the comparison by the Junior Labour Court of the signature on the alleged resignation with other admitted signatures of respondent No. 2, was clearly erroneous as by doing so h excluded from consideration evidence which was legally valid.

10. Since the alleged resignation of the respondent No. 2 and his admitted or proved signatures are not before me, it is not possible, not oven it is desirable for me to compare the said signatures. Mr. S H. Rizvi conceded that in these circumstances the only appropriate course would be to remand the case to the Labour Court to rehear the appeal, in the light of the directions given by this Court.

11. I accordingly quash the impugned order of the Labour Court, remand the appeal back to him and direct that it should rehear the same, keeping in view the observations of this Court 9n regard to the scope of section 73 of the Evidence Act.

S. Q. Case remanded.

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