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Review Side No, 15 of 1953‑54, decided on 22nd June, 1955, District R. T. A., Lahore.
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---‑Review by Appellate authority of own order‑Competent‑Condition : former order, abuse of process of Court.
The appellate authority under the Motor Vehicles Act may review its own order where the order obtained was an abuse of process of Court.
In this case an order was obtained from the Financial Commissioner in appeal granting to the appellant one permit on a certain route. This order was passed in the absence of the petitioner company which was already plying on part of the route but which was not impleaded in appeal.
Held, (on objection that a petition for review was not provided by the Act): Exceptional circumstances exist in this case as the petitioners who were a necessary party having objected to the grant of the permit in the proceedings before the R. T. A. were not impleaded in appeal and the order was passed without issuing them a notice. They have had thus no opportunity to present their case.
Moreover, the order was without jurisdiction inasmuch as part of the route lay in the jurisdiction of another R. T. A. which had not countersigned the permit and such a permit was not valid under section 63.
Ch. Muhammad Afzal v. Mst. Sardar Begum and others A I R 1949 Lah. 69=P L D 1949 Lah. 16. Bhagat Singh Bugga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhney A I R 1941 Cal. 670 and Anantharaju Shetly v. Appu Hagade A I R 1919 Mad. 244 ref.
Khwaja Abdur Rahim, for Petitioners.
Abdul Qayum Khan, Mahmood Ali Qasuri, and Shamim Hussain Qadri, for Respondent.
‑The facts which have led to this application for review may be stated. An application was made by the Pakistan Transport Company Limited Jhang to the R. T. A. Lahore for a stage carriage permit to ply between Jhang and Burewala via Toba Tek Singh and Chichawatni. The applicant company were already plying along a part of this road namely between Jhang and Toba Tek Singh. The Authority in their meeting held on 27th February, 1st and 5th March, 1954 passed the following laconic order on the application 'No case rejected'. On appeal my learned brother I. U. Khan, F. C. intervened on the ground that providing a direct service between two important places like Jhang and Burewala deserved consideration. In view, however, of the fact that the United Hansi Transport Company was already plying between Chichawatni and Burewala on one side and upto Toba Tek Singh on the other he allowed only one permit to the Company. An application for a review of this order dated 26th August, 1954 was made by the United Hansi Transport Company and admitted by I. U. Khan, F. C. on 2nd September, 1954. He heard a part of the argu ments which have been concluded before me.
The main argument which has been put forward is that the appellate order was obtained by the respondent company by a misrepresentation or at least a suppression of material facts and for that reason it should be reviewed under‑‑the internet powers which a Court has to undo a wrong and do the right. The facts in respect of which the alleged misrepresen tation or suppression took place are about the petitioner companies' existing permit to ply on a major part of the road. The petitioners were thus a necessary party but they were not impleaded in the appeal and no notice was issued to them. It is true that Mr. I. U. Khan has observed enpassent in his judgement that the petitioners are already plying along this route from T. T. Singh to Burewala and thus appear to have given some consideration to this fact; there is nevertheless no doubt that the petitioners were a necessary party and should have been impleaded in the appeal. In this connection my attention has been drawn to the objections dated 22nd November, 1952, filed by the petitioners in respect of certain applications including the one made by the respondents for the route in dispute. These objections related to more than one case and the application was placed by the R. T. A. on another file namely that which relates to the Al‑Kisan Transport Company Limited, Lyallpur. All the facts were thus not before the appellate Court and the argument which has been advanced in this behalf has therefore considerable force.
Here a point has been raised that there is no express provision in the Motor Vehicles Act granting powers of review to the R. T. A. or to the appellate authority. It is urged on the other hand that Courts have inherent powers, where there are no express provisions of the law, to interfere for the ends of justice, equity and good conscience. There will always be cases which are not covered by express provisions of law as all contingencies cannot be foreseen by the legislature and it would be unthinkable that in a case where the law is silent but a wrong has been committed or an injury has been do a and there are no specific provisions of law that the Courts should sit with folded hands and express their helpless ness to put matters right. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Ch. Muhammad Afzal v. Mst. Sardar Begum and others (A I R 1949 Lah. 69=P L D 1949 Lah.16) in which Cornelius J. of the Lahore High Court held that Courts have inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to prevent abuse of process. In an earlier case Bhagat Singh Bugga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhney (A I R 1941 Cal. 670) the Calcutta High Court interfered even when there was an express provision of law to the contrary on the ground that the circumstances warranted interference and necessities of the case required that real and substantial justice be done for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Reliance has been placed on the other hand on Anantharaju Shetly v. Appu Hegade (A I R 1919 Mad. 244). It was held in this ruling following a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council, that Civil Courts do not possess any inherent power to grant review of an order passed by them unless exceptional circumstances exist, as for example that the Court had no jurisdiction and the order passed was void or that the order was obtained by an abuse of the process of the Court. In the case under consideration before me exceptional circumstances do exist as the petitioners who were a necessary party having objected to the grant of the permit in the proceedings before the R. T. A. were not impleaded in appeal and the order was passed by I. U. A Khan, F. C. without issuing them a notice. They have had thus no opportunity to present their case. It is further argued that the road in question lies in two regions within the jurisdiction of R. T. A. Lahore and R. T. A. Multan and under section 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act a permit granted by one Authority for a route, a part of which falls in the jurisdiction of another R. T. A., is not valid unless it is countersigned by the latter. So far the R. T. A. Lahore have not had any chance to consider this case. The present case is thus clearly distinguished from the circumstances of the Madras case and its circumstances would justify the exercise of its inherent powers by the Court.
My attention has also been drawn to the practice of this Appellate Authority. My learned predecessors have sanctioned reviews in more than one case though this specific was not contested or argue at length.
As a result of the above reasoning, I would hold there has been an abuse of the process of the Court which would justify an exercise of inherent powers. The review application thus granted and the order passed by my learned predecessor is set aside the R. T. A. is directed to reconsider the case on merits in accordance with law and rules.
A. H. Petition accepted.
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