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Constitutional Petitions Nos. 393 to 396 of 1974, decided on 24th February 1975.

S. 25‑A and West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S. O. 18 ‑Section 25 of Ordinance XXIII of 1969 in pari materia with S. 18 of Ordinance VI of 1968‑Both are ‑special statutes and should be strictly construed Statutes prospective in operation‑Court has no power to give retrospective effect beyond time of limitation‑Labour Court directing workers to be treated as permanent employees from inception of their employment about 20 to 25 years prior to date dispute was brought before Labour Court‑Order of Labour Court, held, void ab initio.

M. M. Ispahani Ltd. v. Ispahani Company Office Employees' Association,. 4 Chittagong and others P L D 1960 S C 151 ; Messrs Saleemsons Ltd. v. The Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi and another P L D 1973 Kar. 1 and Wasim Silk Industries v. Fifth Sind Labour Court etc. P L 11974 Kar.. 80 ref.

R. F. Virji for Petitioner.

Aziz Qureshy for Respondents.

Date of hearing : 24th February 1975.

The petitioners Messrs British India Engineering Works, a partnership firm, oat West Wharf, Karachi has filed these four Constitutional Petitions, under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Nos. 393/74, 394/74, 395/74 and 396/74, against common orders of Junior Labour Court at Karachi dated 31‑12‑1973, as well as appellate order of Second Sind Labour Court at Karachi dated I6‑3‑1974, whereby the workmen‑respondents Mohd. Ismail, Umar, Lal Muhammad, Haroon and Khamosh Soomar were held to be treated as permanent employees of the petitioner from the beginning of their employment, that is about 20 to 25 years prior to the dispute brought before the Labour Court with further direction that they are entitled to gratuity and other benefits as such. As the petitioner is the same in all the petitions so are the. impugned orders, although respondents are different but the legal point involved is the same, I, therefore, propose to dispose of all these petitions by this single judgment.

2. The facts briefly are that the respondents‑workmen issued a strike notice through the trade union to the petitioner and after conciliation .,proceedings a settlement was 'reached between the parties on 25th February 1969, Exh. A, according to terms of which 14 casual workers including :present respondents were taken by the petitioner on Permanent Roll w. e. f. 1st February 1969, and their rates have been increased from the same date, as well as special Bonus equivalent to 30 days' basic wages has been paid on 5th February 1969, to cover these items and this agreement was to remain valid up to 31st July 1970.

3. Sometime in November 1973, a grievance notice under section 25‑A .of I. R 0.,1969, was moved before the Labour Court wherein it was contended that the petitioner may be ordered to allow the full service of the applicant .of 28 years from the date of his joining service ‑as well as rates of gratuity ;,and other necessary benefits instead of 1st February 1969; as per settlement.

4. I have heard Mr. R. F. Virji, Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Azeez Qureshi, Advocate for respondent‑workmen. Learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the impugned order of the Court below mainly on the ground that the respondents were legally bound by their settlement reached on 25^th February 1969, under section 39 of I. R. O as such . They have been given all the benefits including the gratuity from the date of settlement i.e 1-2-1969 and the workmen are still in service and will get all the future benefits including the gratuity and the impugned orders were bad in law because the application under section 25-A I. R. O. 1969, was barred by limitation and the Courts were not within its jurisdiction to extend the settlement referred to earlier, In this regard he relied in M. M. Ispahani Co. Office Employees Association, Chittagong and others ( P L D 1960 S C 151) wherein it was held that the agreement entered into between the parties under section 18 of lrndustrial Disputes Act, 1947, was binding on the emp loyers and employees. Learned counsel next relied on Messrs Saleem sons Ltd. v. The Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi and another (P L D 1973 Kar. 1), wherein it was held that section 18 of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, being a special statute must be interpreted strictly therefore, no application under section 18 would lie unless the applicant strictly com plies with its requirements. And there is no dispute that I. R. O , 1969, is also a special Statute and within its context has to be interpreted strictly and that plea includes of limitation as well. He next relied on Nasim Silk industries v. Fifth Sind Labour Court etc. (P L 11974 Kar. 80), wherein it was held that section 25‑A, I. R. O. 1969, is in pari materia' with section 18 of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Establishments (Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 as well as statute presumed to be prospective unless otherwise provided. In other words, the Court has no power to give retrospective effect beyond the time of limitation as has been done in this case.

4‑A. Counsel for the respondent, when faced with this situation, failed to cite any case law on the subject in reply to the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner. He, however, in the first instance attempted to argue that respondent‑workmen were not a party to this settlement of 25^th February 1969, therefore, the Courts below could grant relief i e., they should be treated as permanent from the start of their service i.e., 20 to 25 years earlier than the date of application under section 2‑‑A of I. R. O. 1969, made by them. But this argument he could not substantiate when it was pointed out to him that the very grievance notice Exh. 'D' dated 30th November 1973 is clear and implicit whereby the respondent‑workman do refer to the settlement and, in fact, they derived benefit of gratuity and other benefits, of service from the 1st of February 1969, as per the settlement referred to earlier. Over and above this objection has no force at all as it has not been, taken before the Court below and, in fact, the entire case of the respondent is built upon the very settlement upon which the Courts attempted to give them benefit for the last 20 to 25 years. Therefore, his arguments are not only untenable on factual grounds but legally have no basis to stand upon. When it was put to him by me, that assuming. that the respondent was not a party in the settlement still law of limitation does apply in this case ' under the I. R. O. 1969, as the grievance has to be brought within three months. Therefore how he can support the impugned orders when the application was entertained with back date of 20 to 25 years, the counsel failed to give any worthwhile reply and at the same time he did concede that the law of limitation does apply in these proceedings. In that sense the application is belated.

5. For the reasons given above, I am of the confirmed opinion the there is sufficient force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and impugned order has been passed without jurisdiction, hence void ab initio as the Courts could not go beyond the agreed settlement between g the parties nor could is entertain an application giving it retrospective effect when the statute does not provide any such remedy with regard to limitation. I accept these: petitions and set aside the impugned orders of the Courts below, but make no order as to costs for the respondents are workmen.

K. B. A. Petitions accepted.

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