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Second Appeal No. 168 of 1953, decided on 5th January, 1955 from the decree of the Court of Muhammad Rafiq, District Judge, Rawalpindi, dated the 28th February, 1953, affirming that of Abdus Samad Khan, Senior Civil Judge, Rawalpindi, dated the 24th December, 1951.
S. 100‑Second appeal‑‑Finding of fact arrived at after ignoring completely oral evidence and holding documentary evidence unreliable on untenable ground; finding based partly on inadmissible evidence‑Finding .set aside.
The finding of fact of the lower appellate Court was that two of the plaintiffs were not the uterine sisters of one S in whose estate they claimed a share in accordance with Muhammadan Law.
It appeared that the lower appellate Court had not applied its mind to oral evidence produced by the plaintiffs, which was of importance in cases involving a question of relationship. As for documentary evidence, while discrediting the entry in the marriage register produced by the plaintiffs on the ground that it did not tally with the Kulliat register the lower appellate Court did not take into consideration the fact that the Kulliat register was not a verbatim copy of the marriage register. Moreover, the Court admitted oral evidence as to the contents of a public document, viz. the Kulliat register which could be proved only by providing the register itself or a certified copy thereof.
The High Court set aside the finding of fact which was not valid in law.
A I R 1923 Lahore 152 ref.
O. XLI, r. 27 (1)(b) ‑Appellate Court may admit document to enable it to pronounce judgment.
A certain document, viz., a certified copy of an entry in a Court register showing an execution having been taken out ill a decree of dower by one R against her husband G, was rejected by the trial Court as having been produced too late. The High Court admitted the document in appeal in order that the question of relationship in issue in the suit might be decided one way or the other.
S.3‑Female limited owner acquiring three limited estates from three full owners‑Succession to each estate to be determined with reference to heirs of the respective full owner‑Succession in event of death of such heirs in the meantime.
If a female holding a limited estate under custom dies, the estate held by her is to devolve on all those persons who would have been entitled to inherit the property at the time of the death of the last full owner according to Shariat.
The property in dispute in this case had belonged to three persons, and in accordance with section 3 heirs of these three persons should be found out in order to fix succession to the respective estates of each of these persons.
By no canon of interpretation can "the last full owner" mean "the person from whom inheritance would be reckoned in accordance with the provisions of agricultural custom".
We are not to import considerations of Customary Law when interpreting the phrase "last full owner" in section 3.
There is no indication in the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act as to the reason why the heir who has died in the meantime is supposed to have died at the termi nation of limited interest of the female though in fact he died much earlier. One would have expected this Act to provide that on the termination of the limited interest of a female the property would go to all the persons who would inherit it if inheritance was governed at the time of the death of the last male holder and in all subsequent stages by Muslim Law. That, however, is not the effect of section 3 in cases where the heirs who existed at the time of his death have died in the meantime. The death of such persons is presumed to have taken place at the termination of the limited interest. The devolution of property is affected by this supposition in cases where the heirs of such persons have died in the meantime. One is unable to think of any reason for 'this interference with the devolution of property.
S. A. Karim, for Appellant.
Jamil Husain Rizvi, for Respondents 1 to 5 (except Kazim Ali).
‑The dispute in the suit out of which this second appeal arises relates to property which was held in life estate under custom by one Mst. Nasiban who died in 1949. As to who are the heirs is to be decided in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act. The pedigree‑table of the parties is as follows:‑
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FAZAL ________________________ ________________________________
Jamal Din. Ibrahim.Shamas Din. Nathu. _________ _______ ________ _________ Ilam Nizam Din Din. = Saif Ali Ghulam Ali Mst. Nur Jan. died in died in 1908=
1907=Mst. Mst. Nasiban _______ ______ Ghulam Bi died in 1931. Muhammad Sharif _________ Shafi defendant __________ ___________ defendantNo. 2. No. 3. Amir Alam Ghulam Hasan died 1923.died 1914.
_________ ___________ Sher Ali died 1924. Mst. Nur Jan Sajawal defendant No. 5. defendant No. 4. __________________________________________ _____________ ________________________
Mst. Ghulam BiSaid WaliMuhammad (married to died 1931.Wali died 1914. Ghulam Ali). Kazim Ali. Muhammad Hasan.
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The property in dispute belonged at one time to Shamas Din who died in 1880 and on his death his property was mutated in the names of Saif Ali and Ghulam Ali, his sons. Saif Ali died in 1907 leaving behind him a widow Mst. Ghulam Bi in whose name his property was entered. Ghulam Ali died in 1908 and his property went to Ghulam Hasan and Amir Alain, his sons. Ghulam Hassan died in 1914 and his property devolved on Sher Ali, his son. Amir Alain died in the year 1923 and his property was entered in the name of his mother Mst Nasiban. Sher Ali died in 1924 and the property standing iii his name was entered in the name of Mst. Nasiban who was his step grand‑mother, i.e., she was the real mother of Amir Alam, his uncle, and the step‑mother of Ghulam Hasan his father. Mst. Ghulam Bi, widow of Saif Ali died in the year 1932 and the property standing in her name was also entered in the name of Mst. Nasiban. Mst. Nasiban died in the year 1949. The present suit was filed by Muhammaci Hasan son of Muhammad Wali, Mst. Khudeja and Mst. Makhni, daughters of Raja and Mst. Bibi Ji widow of Qamar Din. Muhammad Hasan claimed that he was preferential heir to the descendants of Ibrahim and Jamal Din because his grandfather Nathu and Shamas Din were real brothers, sons of the same mother, whereas Ibrahim and Jamal Din, the ancestors of the defendants, were from a different mother. Mst. Khudeja and Mst. Makhni claimed that they were the uterine sisters of Sher Al, being the daughters of Mst. Rasul Bibi, the mother of Sher Ali who after the death of her husband Ghularr. Hasan had married Raja, their father. Mst. Bibi Ji claimed as the mother of Mst. Rasul Bibi, i. e., the maternal grandmother of Sher Ali. The defendants in the suit are, as will appear from the pedigree‑table, the sons of Ibrahim and the son and grandsons of Jamal Din. The widow of Nizam Din son o:; Jamal Din is also one of the defendants. Kazim Ali son of Said Wali has the same interest as the plaintiff but he has been joined as a pro forma defendant.
The defendants denied that the plaintiffs Mst. Khudeja and Mst. Makhni were the uterine sisters of Sher Ali or that Mst. Bibi Ji was the maternal grandmother of Sher Ali. They did not accept that Mst. Rasul Bibi was the mother of Sher Ali at all. So far as the claim of Muhammad Hasan was concerned they accepted that he was decendant of Nathu shown in the pedigree‑table but denied that Fazal, the common ancestor, had more than one wife or that Ibrahim and Jamal Din were the step‑brothers of Shamas Din. They pleaded that they were near heirs of Sher Ali under the Muhammadan Law and therefore Muhammad Hasan was not entitled to any part of the property.
The trial Court came to the conclusion that there was no proof of Ibrahim and Jamal Din being the step‑brothers of Shamas Din. It also reached the conclusion that in accordance with the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act inheritance was to be reckoned not from the last maleholder but from the husband of Mst. Nasiban who should be deemed to be the last male holder for the purposes of section 3 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act. It found that the defendants were nearer heirs to Ghulam Ali than Muhammad Hasan plaintiff. So far as the female plaintiffs are concerned, the trial Court reached the conclusion that they were not proved to be related to Sher Ali as they claimed. On these findings it dismissed the suit. These findings were affirmed on appeal by the learned District Judge.
Points urged before me in this appeal are (1) that the finding of fact of the learned District judge with respect to relationship of the female plaintiffs is vitiated by errors of law and (2) that the interpretation put upon section 3 of the Muslim Persona Law (Shariat) Application Act by the lower Courts is wrong and that inheritance has to be reckoned from the last full owner of the property.
As regards the first point, there are two main attacks on the judgment of the learned District Judge. The first is that tic has nor in his judgment considered the oral evidence at all although the oral evidence was important in this case, and the second that while reaching a conclusion as to a particular register being of a doubtful character there were some facts which he has not taken into consideration and has also relied upon inadmissible evidence.
In order to appreciate the argument whether the judgment of the learned District judge on the question of fact is vitiated by some error of law, it is necessary to refer.to the evidence in some detail. The case of the plaintiffs was that Mst. Rasul Bibi was the wife of Ghulam Hasan and the mother of Sher Ale and that after the death of Ghulam Hasan in 1914 she married Raja, the father of plaintiffs Mst. Khudeja and Mst. Makhm. In support of this the plaintiffs produced Ghulam Sarwar, the brother of Mst. Bibi Ji, Ali Akbar son of Muhammad Hasan plaintiff, Hayat All and Fazal Elahi. Mst. Bibi Ji's statement was also recorded, on commission. They all deposed to the fact that Mst. Rasul Bibi, the daughter of Mst. Bibi Ji was the mother of Sher Ali as well as of the plaintiffs Mst. Khudeja and Mst. Makhni. Of these Hayat Ali and Fazal Elahi are Rajputs of the village of the parties which is Bijnial and they are apparently independent witnesses. In addition to this oral evidence the plaintiffs got produced the marriage register of the village containing the marriage entry of Mst. Rasul Bibi with Raja, the father of plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3. The Nikah Khawan who made entries in this register had died and the register was produced by his son who identified his father's handwriting. In this register there is a column (No. 2) in which it is to be entered whether the woman who is being married is a virgin a widow or a divorced woman. Column No. 10 is entitled "kaifiyyat zaroori nisbat aurat muta allaqa waghaira". In column No. 2 of the entry relating to Mst. Rasul Bibi's marriage with Raja the entry is " Bewa Ghulam Hasan wald Ghulam Ali, Qaum Awan, Sakna Kotla". (It may be explained that Ghulam Hasan admittedly belonged originally to Kotla but lived at Bijnial). In column No. 10 the entry is "This woman was at first the wife of Ghulam Hasan son of Ghulam Ali. After his death she has, in accordance with her own desire, married Raja mentioned in column No. 1". The learned District judge did not refer to the oral evidence at all in his judgment. So far as the register of Nikah Khawani is concerned, he refused to rely on it accepting the evidence of Sultan Ahmad, a clerk of the District Board Office, who stated that in the Kulliat register which was a copy of the register of Nikah Khawani the only entry in column No. 2 was of "widow" and the entry in column No. 10 did not exist. It may be explained here that the register of Nikah Khawani is kept in duplicate, one part is kept by the Nikah Khawan and the other is despatched to the District Board Office. The District Board not only keeps a collection of those parts but also maintains a Kulliat register in which the entries from the original parts are copied. Sultan Ahmad, who has appeared as a witness for the defendants, produced the Kulliat register and stated that the register of Nikah Khawani which should have been in the District Board Office and of which the Kulliat register was a copy was not available. When Sultan Ahmad was cross examined as to other entries in the marriage register of Bijnial it was found that some other entries in the register had not been copied verbatim in the Kulliat register. There was another case where the entry in Kulliat register was simply "Mutaallaqa" whereas the entry 'in the register of Nikah Khawani stated that the woman had been divorced by one Shah Nawaz and had now married Karam Elahi. The learned District judge made no reference to this evidence. It appears to me that the finding of fact in the present case is not valid in law. I would set it aside for three reasons. The first is that there is no indication at all that the learned judge applied his mind to the oral evidence which in such cases is of importance. He nowhere refers to it. Even if he had said that he did not rely upon this evidence, as it was oral, that might have shown that he had applied his mind and discredited it. The second reason is that while discrediting the entry in the marriage register produced by the plaintiffs on the ground that it did not tally with the Kulliat register he did not take into considera tion the fact that the Kulliat regiter is not a verbatim copy of the register. A clear instance had been pointed out wherein the whole entry from the register had not been copied into the Kulliat register. No evidence had been produced before the learned trial judge that a Kulliat register is to be a verbatim copy. On the other hand, it appears from the statement of Sultan Ahmad D. W. that there are only ten columns in the Kulliat register whereas there are as many as 14 columns in the marriage register. The third reason is that truly the evidence of Sultan Ahmad as to the contents of Kulliat Register is not admissible in his evidence. When a public document is in existence it can only be proved either by the production of the original or its certified copy. In the present case Sultan Ahmad has given oral evidence as to the contents of a public document. A I R 1923 Lahore 152 is a similar case where a Qanungo had made oral statement in the witness‑box in res pect of entries in the revenue records and the evidence was held to be inadmissible.
I may here refer to another fact in connection with the production of the documentary evidence. The plaintiffs had put in an application on the 9th of August 1951 for the recep tion in evidence of an entry in the Kulliat Diwani showing the execution of a decree for dower in favour of Mst. Rasul Bibi against Ghulam Hasan. The evidence of the parties had been closed on the same date on which this application had been put in. The learned trial Judge issued notice of this application to the defendants for 14th November, 1951, the date fixed for arguments. On that date he rejected the application of the plaintiffs for reception of this document into evidence on the ground that the evidence of the parties had been closed and there would be no opportunity for rebuttal to the defendants. In the grounds of appeal in the lower appellate Court this order of the learned trial Judge was attacked and the copy which had been returned by the trial Court was attached to the petition of appeal. The judgment, however, does not refer to this document or to the grounds of appeal. Learned counsel for the respondents urges that this point should be presumed not to have been urged before the learned District judge, a his judgment is silent about it. Ordinarily I would make such a presumption but I am unable to make the presumption in this case as the learned Judge has not dealt even with the oral evidence and I have no reason to presume that the oral evidence was not relied upon.
Considering the evidence on the record as also the state ment of Muhammad Sharif defendant whom I have myself examined, to which statement I will presently refer, I have no doubt left that the allegation of the plaintiffs that Mst. Rasul Bibi, the mother of Mst. Khudeja and Mst. Makhni, was also the mother of Sher Ali deceased is correct. I had directed learned counsel for the respondent to produce one of the defendants because I found the record wanting as to the exact position of the defendants with respect to the mother of Sher Ali. Alam Din defendant, who had put himself in the witness box, had simply said that the mother of Sher All was one Mst. Kammon but he did not know even her caste and was not present at the time of her marriage. With respect to Mst. Rasul Bibi he had made no statement as to whether she was a widow at the time of her marriage with Rajwali and if she was a widow, whose widow she was. Tile marriage register shows that there was no doubt as to her being a widow and it should have been proper for the defendants to have taken up some position as to whose widow she was. To clear up all these points I had directed learned counsel for the respondents to produce one of the defendants and I have today recorded the statement of Muhammad Sharif defendant.
The witnesses produced in support of the allegation that Mst. Rasul Bibi was the mother of Sher Ali are Ghulam Sarwar (P. W. 1), Ali Akbar (P. W. 4), Hayat Ali (P. W. 5). Fazal Elahi (P. W. 6) and Mst. Bibi Ji plaintiff who has been examined on commission. Out of these Hayat Ali and Fazal Elahi are disinterested persons belonging to village Bijnial where Ghulam Hasan was residing, but in a matter of this nature I would even accept the evidence of relatives unless there be a counter theory with equal probabilities. As against this evidence there is the evidence only of D. W. 2 Mehrban who does not belong to village Bijnial and has apparently no connec tion with the parties, and Alam Din defendant himself. As already stated, Alain Din defendant does not state who this Mst. Kammon, whom he alleges to be the mother of Sher Ali, was, to which place she belonged and when he‑ marriage was performed with Ghulam Hasan. He also does not sad‑ whether Mst. Rasul Bibi was a widow or a virgin when she married Raja.
There is at the same time further evidence which there is no reason to doubt. In the fitst place there is the marriage register to which I have already referred and which has been rejected by the learned District Judge merely on, the ground that it does not tally with the Kull iat register. I have already stated that the Kulliat registrer is not a verbatim copy of the original and cannot be used to discredit entries in the original. Then there is a copy of the entry in the Kulliat Diwani showing an execution of a decree‑of dower in favour of Mst. Rasul Bibi against Ghulam Hasan. This was an important document which if accepted was almost conclusive of the marriage of Mst. Rasul Bibi with Ghulam Hasan. It had bee produced in the trial Court but in any case I would myself accept it in exercise of my powers under Order 41 rule 27 of the C. P. C., for I myself feel the need of some evidence which may settle the matter one way or the other.
In addition to all this, there is the admission of Muhammad Sharif defendant in the written statement which he filed in reply to the suit filed by Muhammad Hasan alone. In this written statement, a copy of which has been produced in this Court and marked Exh. C. A., he had admitted that Sher Ali was the son of Mst. Rasul Bibi. The certified copy is one of written statement but no objection was taken to the produc tion of a certified. copy in the absence of the original. (I do not concede that a certified copy would not by itself be admissible.) Muhammad Sharif was confronted with this statement and lie simply stated that he did not remember whether lie had made such a statement or not. Even if I were to exclude the other documentary evidence, this previous admission of the defendant along with the oral evidence would be sufficient in the circumstances of this case for reaching a finding that Mst. Rasul Bibi, the daughter of Mst. Bibi Ji plaintiff and the mother of Mst. Khudeja Bibi and Mst. Makhni, was the mother of Sher Ali deceased.
There is one other relationship about which I have to record a finding, because learned counsel for the respondents urges that that relationship too is not proved on the record. The wife of Saif Ali mentioned in the pedigree‑table was one Mst. Ghulam Bibi and this Mst, Ghulam Bibi, .as the pedigree table shows, was the daughter of Nathu. On the first hearing of the case when I took notes from the parties I understood that this relationship was not contested. Although it was contested on subsequent hearing, after going through the evidence I have no doubt that the relationship was correctly recorded in the pedigree‑table. There are some witnesses produced on behalf of the plaintiffs who deposed to the fact that this Mst. Ghulam Bibi, wife of Saif Ali, was the daughter of Nathu and the father's sister of Muhammad Hasan plaintiff. They are Ghulam Sarwar (P. W.1), Ali Akbar (P. W. 4) and Hayat Ali (P. W. 5) though the last one only says that Muhammad Hasan plaintiff is her brother's son and does not name her father. As against this there is only the statement of Mehrban (P. W. 2) and Alam Din defendant. Mehrban simply says that Said Wali and Muhammad Wali had no sister but does not refer to Mst. Ghulam Bibi. Alam Din's statement, however, instead of helping himself clinches the matter against him. While in examination‑in‑chief he said that Mst. Ghulam Bibi was not related to Muhammad Wali and Said Wali, he admitted in cross‑examination that Mst. Ghulam Bibi was the daughter of Nathu Learned counsel for the respondents urges that this may be another Nathu. No such case was put forward by the defendants either in the written statement or in evidence and in the context Nathu has reference to the particular Nathu mentioned in the pedigree‑table.
The nest point I have to consider is as to who would be entitled to the property in dispute if these relationships are held to be proved. The learned District judge had held that inheritance was to be reckoned in accordance with the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act not from the last full owner but from the husband of Mst. Nasiban. I do not see how such an interpretation can be placed on section 3 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act. According to that section if a female holding a limited estate under custom dies, the estate held by her is to devolve on all those persons who would have been entitled to inherit the property at the time of the death of the last full owner according to Shariat (in the event of the death of such person before the termina tion of the female's estate it would devolve upon his heirs but with that matter we are not here concerned). The property in dispute had belonged to three persons, Saif Ali, Amir Alam, and Sher Ali, and in accordance with that section 3 we should find out the heirs of these persons The learned District Judge has held that as Mst. Nasiban had come into possession of this property as the widow of Ghulam Ali, therefore Ghulam All should be considered to be the last full owner of the whole of this property. He relies for this proposition on the principle accepted in the Customary Law that when a mother inherits, she inherits as the widow of her husband, and when a widow inherits collaterally the estate which she inherits becomes an accretion to the estate of her husband and after her death goes to the heirs of her husband and not to those of the last male holder. That is a rule of custom which has nothing to do with section 3 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act. This section mentions the last full owner and by no canon of interpretation can "the last full owner" mean "the person from whom inheritance would be reckoned in accord ance with the provisions of agricultural custom". I may point out that even in the judgments upon which the learned District. Judge relies, i.e., those relating to collateral succession, it is stated that inheritance is to be reckoned not from the last male holder but from the husband of the widow. These Judg ments themselves recognise that the last male holder was different from the person from whom inheritance should be reckoned. They do not say that the widow's husband becomes' the last male holder. In any case we are not to import they considerations of Customary Law when interpreting the phrase "last full owner" in section 3. The result is that we will have to find separately the heirs of Saif Ali, Amir Alam and Sher Ali in order to determine who are the persons entitled to their estates at the death of Mst. Nasiban.
I will first take up the case of Muhammad Hasan plaintiff and see whether he is entitled to any share in the property. So far as the property held by Amir Alam and Sher Ali is concerned, he can have no share because defendants Nos. 4 and 5 are nearer residuaries under Muhammadan Law. He as well as defendants Nos. 4 and 5 are descendants of Fazal, the grandfather of Ghulam Ali, but defendants Nos. 4 and 5 are the grandsons of Fazal, whereas Muhammad has all is his great grandson. Under Muhammadan Law as between collaterals a. person nearer in degree calculated from the common ancestor will exclude a person remoter in degree. His father Muhammad Wali had died in 1914, while Amir Alain died in 1923 and Sher Ali in 1924. Had his father been alive when Amir Alam or Sher Ali died and entitled to succeed to them on account of the absence of any near heir from the lines of Ibrahim and Jamal Din then Muhammad Hasan would also have succeeded under section 3 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act. But Muhammad Wali having died earlier Muhammad Hasan plaintiff is not entitled to succeed in the presence of nearer collaterals. Of course, if Muhammad Hasan had succeeded in proving, as he alleged, that his grand father Nathu and Shamas Din were from the same mother, whereas Ibrahim and Jamal Din were from a different mother, he would be still entitled to succeed, but there is a finding of fact by both the Courts that there is no proof of this allegation and I have myself no hesitation in‑agreeing with that finding. The result is that qua the property of Amir Alam and Sher Ali, Muhammad Hasan has no claim.
With respect to the property of Saif Ali, Muhammad Hasan has again no claim as a collateral of Saif Ali. Saif‑ Ali died while his brother Ghulam Ali was alive. According to section 3 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, on the termination of the limited interest of a female governed by the Customary Law, the estate is to devolve on the persons who would have inherited it if the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act had been applied at the time of the death of such male holder and if in the meantime any of such persons has died the estate is to devolve on the heirs and successors of such person existing at the termination of the limited interest of the female as if such person had died at the termination of the limited interest. As Ghulam Ali had died in the meantime the property which was to devolve on him has to go to his heirs on the supposition that he died at the termi nation of the limited interest of Mst. Nasiban. Thus calculated the plaintiff cannot be an heir under Muslim Law to Ghulam Ali because, as already stated, the male descendants of the lines of Ibrahim and Jamal Din are nearer in degree and exclude him. I may point out here that there is no indication in the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act as to the reason why the heir who has died in the meantime is supposed to have died at the termination of limited interest of the female though in fact he died much earlier. One would have expected this Act to provide that on the termination of the limited interest of a female the property would go to all the persons who would inherit it if inheritance was governed at the time of the death of the last male holder and in al subsequent stages by Muslim Law. That, however, is not the effect of section 3 in cases where the heirs who existed at the tune of his death had died in the meantime. The death of such persons is resumed to have taken place at the termina tion of the limited interest. The devolution of property is affected by this supposition iii cases where the heirs of such persons have died in the meantime. I am unable to think of ‑any reason for this interference with the devolution of pro perty. We have, however, to take the law as it stands. The property of Saif Ali was to go, according to Muslim Personal; Law (Shariat) Application Act, 3/4ths to Ghulam Ali and one‑fourth to his widow Mst. Ghulam Bibi. Though Muhammad Hasan is not entitled to any share in that part of the property which was to go to Ghulam Ali, he is entitled to a share in that one‑fourth which was to go to Mst. Ghulam Bibi, for he is her brother's son. I have already held that this Mst. Ghulam Bibi is the daughter of Nathu and father's sister of Muhammad Hasan. The result is that to one‑half of that one‑fourth share of Saif All's estate to which Mst. Ghulam Bibi was an heir under Muslim Law, Muhammad Hasan plaintiff is entitled as one of the two heirs of Ghulam Bibi, the other being Kazim Ali defendant. Saif Ali had one‑half share in the total estate left by Shamas Din. Therefore, Muhammad Hasan would be entitled to one‑sixteenth in the whole.
So far as the female plaintiffs are concerned, they can have obviously no share in the property left by Amir Alam. Their remains the property of Sher Al:. In the estate of Sher Ali the two uterine sisters are entitled to one‑third and the maternal grandmother to one‑sixth. So together they are entitled to half of Sher Ali's estate. As Sher Ali held onefourth of the whole estate of Shamas Din, these plaintiffs will be entitled to 2/16th in the whole. Out of this 2/16th Mst. Khudeja Bibi and Mst. Makhni together get 1/12th while Mst. Bibi Ji gets 1/24th.
As a result this appeal succeeds in part. I set aside the decree of the learned District Judge and grant the plaintiffs a decree for possession of 3/16th share of the property in dispute, Muhammad Hasan plaintiff being entitled to 1/16th, Mst. Khudeja Bibi and Mst. Makhni to 1/12th each and Mst. Bibi Ji to 1/24th. In view of this partial success parties are left to bear their own costs throughout.
A. H. Appeal accepted.
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