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Second Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1968, decided on 23rd May 1975.
S. 13 read with Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabili tation) Act (XXVIII of 1958), S. 30‑'Transferee under Act XXVIII of 1958 entitled to demand, from occupant of property transferred, rent on basis of latest assessment by Municipality or local authority‑Mere fact that an appeal preferred against assessment by occupant, would not absolve him from paying rent at assessed rate.
According to proviso (a) to section 30(1) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, the landlord was entitled to charge the rent "on the basis of the latest assessment carried out by the Municipality or local authority, as the case may, . . . . . ".
The landlord was entitled to demand rent at the rate assessed by the Municipality and the fact that an appeal against these assessments had been preferred by the tenants did not absolve them from f paying the rent yet the assessed rate.
Malik Abdul Aziz v. West Pakistan Publishing Company Limited P L D 1965 Lah. 82 distinguished.
Abdul Rashid v. Abdul Qadir Shah P L D 1966 Pesh. 89 not applicable.
Mohammad Khan and another v. Mst. Sakinabai 1967 S C M R 435 and Abdul Bashir v. Mohammad Rafiq Khan Sherwani P L D 1974 Kar. 451 ref.
0. XLI, r. 22‑Appeal‑Respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred separate appeal.
When an appeal is preferred, the appellant, is, generally speaking, seeking to get rid of an adverse decision, adverse to him wholly or in part, which means that the opposite‑party had succeeded wholly or in part. That success might be the result of a decision in his favour on one or some only of several grounds urged by him; the Court negativing the other or others. As regards these latter grounds, he cannot and need not appeal, however, erroneous the decision, because there is no right of appeal to a party, who has succeed ed. But when the opposite‑party prefers an appeal, he may find himself in a difficult situation if he is obliged‑ to remain content with supporting the decision on the only point or points on which he had succeeded without resorting to the others on which he had failed. For instance it may turn out on examination that some or all of these other grounds are good, while those accepted by the lower Court are unsubstantial. It is to provide for such a contingency, and to avoid injustice to the respondent in such a case the rule has been enacted giving him liberty to support the decree if necessary by relying on any of the grounds decided against him in the Court below. The use of the word support' makes it plain that the right given is limited to the sustaining of the decree in so far as it is in his favour, and does not extend beyond so as to enable him to obtain an alteration, giving him a further advantage. This he‑can secure only by an appeal or cross‑objection.
Robert Cotton Association Ltd. v. Firm Inayatullah & Company, Gujranwala P L D 1959 Lah. 178 and Venkatta Rao v. Satyanarayanmurthi A I R 1943 Mad. 698 ref.
Akhtar Mahmood for Appellant.
Ismail Munshi for Respondent.
Date of hearing: 7th May 1975.
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