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(On review from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Lahore, dated the 8th October 1970, in Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 182 of 1970).

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908).

S. 100‑Question of fact‑Division of village into Tarafs or sub‑divisions‑Concurrent findings of Courts below‑Could not be interfered with on mere ground that Kafiat‑e‑Deh was not filed and therefore in absence of such evidence no reliance could be placed on oral evidence.

Parbhu v. Shamsuddin and another A I R 1948 Lah. 199 distinguished.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1962),

Art. 62 & Supreme Court Rules, 1956, O. XXVI‑Review ‑Particular point not pressed at original hearings‑Review cannot be granted merely to afford counsel opportunity to argue such point.

A review cannot be granted on the ground that the counsel appearing at the original hearing did not argue or press a particular point which was available to him then and could have been found out with a little amount of diligence. This would really amount to granting a re‑hearing of a matter merely to make good the failure on the part of counsel to argue all the points that could have been argued. This cannot furnish an adequate ground for review.

Mian Muhammad Shafi, Senior Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Abdul Karim, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners.

Nemo for Respondents.

Date of hearing : 22nd February 1971.

HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.‑

This is a petition for the review of an order passed by this Court on the 8th of October 1970, dismissing a petition for special leave to appeal from a judg ment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, in a regular second appeal.

The question that arose in the appeal was as to whether the right to pre‑empt, which was claimed by the respondent -pre‑emptors, who are Jat‑Gorayas by caste, on the basis of their being co‑owners in the sub‑division of the village, known as Taraf Goraya, as a preferential right. They claimed that the Mauza Batala Sharam Singh, Tehsil and District Gujranwala, where the land was situated, was divided into two tarafs or sub‑divisions ; namely, Taraf Goraya and Taraf Virk. The petitioners, who are Jat Virks by caste, resisted the claim on the ground that they being co‑sharers in the village itself had an equal right and that the sub‑division of the village had not been established.

The High Court, upon the evidence adduced, came to the conclusion that the parties had gone to trial on the clear understanding that there were two distinct sub‑divisions in the village even though in the pleadings there was no such clear averment. This was, according to the High Court, also supported by the unrebutted evidence of the Patwari, who had clearly stated that there were two such subdivisions in the village.

A prayer for leading additional evidence by the production of certain revenue records to contradict the Patwari was also refused by the High Court and the appeal was dismissed.

This Court refused leave, because, in its opinion, the question as to whether there was a sub‑division or not in the village was a pure question of fact which had been concurrently determined by all the Courts below in one way.

Learned counsel now seeks to contend that the only evidence relevant in law for the purpose of establishing such a sub division was the Kaifiat‑e‑Deh, and since no such Kaifiat had been filed in Courts below they had erred in law in relying upon the oral evidence as to the subsequent history of ownership of the land. This was wholly irrelevant and, therefore, the Courts below had failed to apply correct principles in determin ing this question. This finding could, as such, he challenged in second appeal. In support of this contention reliance has also been placed on a decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of Parbhu v. Shamsuddin and another (A I R 1948 Lah. 199). In that case the Kaifiyat‑e‑Dehi had been filed but the lower appellate Court did not take into consideration. In those circumstances the High Court held that a finding arrived at without taking into consideration "the only material document that was produced in the case" could be interfered with in second appeal. In the present case, as already pointed out, no Kalfiat‑e‑Dehi was filed. Hence the decision relied upon is of no assistance.

Besides the learned counsel, appearing in support of the review petition, has conceded that this point was not raised at the original hearing of the petition for special leave in this Court nor was any such objection taken at any earlier stage either in the High Court or in the Courts below the High Court. In the circumstances, we are unable to allow the learned counsel to raise this question for the first time in review.

A review cannot be granted on the ground that the learned counsel appearing at the original hearing did not argue or press a particular point which was available to him then and could have been found out with a little amount of diligence. This would really amount to granting a re‑hearing of a matter merely to make good the failure on the part of counsel to argue all the points that could have been argued. This cannot furnish an adequate ground for review. This petition for review accordingly, dismissed.

Petition dismissed.

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