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Supreme Court Rules, 1956,

O. XIII, r. 1‑Petition for Special Leave toAppea6‑Limitation‑Regular First Appeal dismissed by High Court and petition for grant of certificate under Ss. 109 & 110, C. P. C. also dismissed‑Petition for Special Leave to Appeal there after filed after lapse of 29 days‑No application for condonation of delay filed but petitioner pleading that time spent in pursuing applica tion under Ss. 109 & 110, C. P. C. should be excluded and period of 60 days be computed from date certificate refused‑Held: Time spent in pursuing application for grant of certificate under Ss. 109 & 110, C. P. C. could only be excluded under O. XIII, r. 1, Supreme Court Rules, 1956 on sufficient cause but person could not claim exclusion of such period as of right‑Petition dismissed as barred by time‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 14.

Ihsanul Huq, Advocate Supreme Court (Zamir Ahmad Khan, Advocate Supreme Court with him) instructed by Wali Muhammad Khawaja, Senior Attorney for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondents. .

Date of hearing : 10th February 1971.

MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI, J.

‑C. P. S. L. A. No. 273 of 1969 was barred by 115 days and no application for condonation of delay was filed. At the hearing of the petition it was stated that on the dismissal of R. F. A. by a Division Bench, the petitioner had filed an application in the High Court for grant of a certificate under sections 109 and 110, C. P. C. which was dismissed on the 2nd .July 1969. ‑The petition for leave to appeal was, however, filed after, the lapse of another 29 days on the 31st July 1969. Excluding the time spent in pursuing the application for grant of certificate; the period of 60 days for filing petition for special leave to appeal provided in Order XIII, rule 1, having already expired, there was no explanation for the delay of 29 days. The petition was, accordingly, dismissed as barred by time.

Maulvi Ehsanul Huq appearing in support of the petition for review vehemently urged that the time spent in pursuing the application for grant of a certificate in the High Court was to be excluded by which he meant that the period was to be added to 60 days and in that case the petition for leave to appeal was filed.

There is no warrant for this view. The time started to run on 11‑11‑1968 when the R. F. A. preferred by the petitioner was dismissed. The time spent in pursuing the application for grant of certificate could only be excluded under Order XIII, rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules as a sufficient cause but this did not mean that the petitioner was entitled to compute the period of limitation by excluding the period between 17th December 1968 and 2nd July 1969, as of right, such as, is the case under section 14 of the Limitation Act.

The period of limitation having already expired it was the duty of the petitioner to move this Court for leave to appeal as soon as the certificate was refused by the High Court. A valuable property right having come to be vested in the respondent, it was for the petitioner to explain delay for each day, but as mentioned above, no application for condonation of delay was even filed.

In the circumstances, we see no ground for reviewing the order of the Court dated the 6th November 1969, whereby the C. P. S. L. A. No. 273 of 1969 was dismissed as barred by time.

Petition dismissed.

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