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Civil Revision No. 440 of 1969, decided on 7th November 1969.

, S. 7(iv)(f)‑Suit for disso lution of partnership and rendition of accounts‑Fact that averment made in plaint that plaintiff" contributed a particular sum as capital‑Held, would not take case beyond purview of S. 7(iv)(f) Plaintiff" in such a case can fix value of suit for purposes of court- fee and jurisdiction In his discretion under S. 7(iv)(f ) and not what he thinks may be awarded to him.

In the present case the suit was framed as one for disso lution of partnership and rendition of accounts. Such a suit cannot be equated with a suit for declaration that a decree obtained against the plaintiff was null and void and not binding on him as it was procured by fraud, with the consequential relief in the form of an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the decree against him.

The fact that an averment is made in the plaint that the plaintiff has contributed a particular sum as capital, though the suit in fact is for dissolution of partnership and for distribution of profits and assets of the partnership, would not take the case beyond the purview of section 7(iv)(f) under which a plaintiff can value the suit as he pleases and there is no likelihood of loss of revenue, as the exact fees due have to be paid later on.

The partnership between the parties is dissolved on the date of the plaint and there is nothing for the Court to do in that respect except to declare that all the relief which the Court is called upon to give is solely to order the taking of accounts. The defendant in a suit for accounts can plead that money would be due to him on taking accounts and can also ask for a decree in his favour, for such amount as may be found due to him on enquiry.

The Court Fees Act does not draw any distinction between suit for accounts in which the plaintiff claims that a sum of money is due to him and a case where the claim is that a sum of money is due from the plaintiff to the defendant. Just as it is not necessary in such cases for the defendant to pay court‑fee on the written statement filed by him, similarly the plaintiff cannot be insisted upon to value the suit for the purposes of court‑fee and jurisdiction on any amount which he may think may be due to him. He can fix the value for the purposes of court‑fee and jurisdiction in his discretion under section 7(iv) (f) and not what he thinks that the same may be awarded to him. Whether or not any amount is due to him will depend on the rendition of accounts. The suit being for accounts and not for payment of money, the plaintiff if he fixes any court‑fee in his discretion cannot legally be asked to value the suit in any other manner. If in a particular case the amount decreed is in excess of the amount at which the plaintiff values his suit, the deficiency in court‑fee can be recovered as provided in section 11 of the Act.

The suit was governed by section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act and it was within the discretion of the plaintiff to fix the value of the suit.

Muhammad Siddiq v. Haji Ahmed & Co. P L D 1967 Kar. 468; S. Zafar Ahmad v. Abdul Khaliq P L D 1964 Kar. 386; Mian Karam Ilahi v. Muhammad Bashir and others P L D 1949 Lah. 8; Ghulam Qadir v. Bulaqi Mal & Sons P L D 1949 Lah. 461 and Lakhomal Deepchand v. Deepchand Tolaram A I R 1937 Sind 241 distinguished.

Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor‑General‑in‑Council P L D 1947 P C 19; Tarif Singh v. Kanshi Ram A I R 1936 Lah. 458; Faizullah v. Mauladad A I R 1929 P C 147; Sita Ram v. Hanuman Prasad A I R 1927 Pat. 413; Rangaswami Chetti v. Gopala Chettiar A I R 1936 Mad. 562 and Ram Charon v. Bulaqi A I R 1924 All. 854 ref.

‑ Valuation ‑ Determination of nature of suit‑Sub stance of plaint rather than form to be looked into for purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction. It is well established that for determining the nature of a suit it is the substance of the plaint rather than the form in which the relief is couched which is to be looked into for the purposes of court‑fee and jurisdiction.

Z. U. Ahmed for Petitioner.

Date of hearing : 7th November 1969.

The respondent‑plaintiff instituted a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts. It was averred in the plaint that the parties entered into a partnership arrangement on the 28th of July 1966, the respondent paid a sum of Rs. 1,00,000.00 and the petitioner's contribution was Rs. 28,000.00. The terms of the partnership were incorporated in the deed and according to that the petitioner was the accounting party. The petitioner -defendant did not render the accounts for the year ending the 30th of June 1967 and the respondent, therefore, appointed one Muhammad Aslam as her Attorney to take accounts from the petitioner. On the failure of her attorney to have the accounts rendered by the petitioner and on further information laid by the said attorney that he did not find the stocks of business except 100 to 125 empty drums on the place of business, the respondent instituted the suit. The suit was valued for the purposes of dis solution of partnership at Rs. 200.00 and for the purposes of rendi tion of accounts at Rs. 10,000.00. The defendant objected to the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and pleaded that in view of the averments of the plaintiff in paragraph 5 of the plaint, viz.. . . the plaintiff is entitled to receive her share profits and of capital and assets of the partnership business", the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and court‑fee was rupees one lac, the said amount being the capital which she alleged to have contributed. The learned Civil Judge accepted the plea of the petitioner and held that the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction should have been fixed at Rs. 1,00,000.00 and he, therefore, directed that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff respondent for presentation to the Court of competent jurisdiction. The respondent preferred an appeal which was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge by his order dated the 7th of October 1969. He held that the suit for the dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts had to be valued under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act for the pur poses of court‑fee and the same was the value for the purposes of jurisdiction. He further held that the plaintiff had a discretion to put his own valuation in such a suit. This is the revision petition.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the suit of the plaintiff in substance was for the recovery of her contribu tion towards the capital sum of rupees one lac plus the profits, and that the plaintiff, therefore, should have valued the suit accordingly on the basis of the amount which she had claimed. He further argues that since she had unmistakably averred that she had invested rupees one lac, the value of the suit for purposes of court‑fee and jurisdiction could be no other amount except the sum so stated. He relied on Muhammad Siddiq v. Haji Ahmed & Co. (P L D 1967 Kar. 468) where in a suit for a declaration to avoid a decree which was for a sum of Rs. 1,60,000.00 it was held by referring to clause 4(2) of the Karachi Courts Order, 1956 and section 24(2‑A) of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 that the suit should have been valued for the purposes of jurisdiction with reference to the decretal amount. The same view was taken earlier in S. Zajar Ahmad v. Abdul Khaliq (P L D 1964 Kar. 386). The learned Judge noticed the Full Bench cases of Lahore High Court reported as Mian Karam 1lahi v. Muhammad Bashir and others (P L D 1949 Lah. 8) and Ghulam Qadir v. Bulaqi Mal & Sons (P L D 1949 Lah. 461) where it was held that under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, the plaintiff has an abso lute discretion to put his own valuation on the relief that he claims and the Court has no jurisdiction to question the valuation however arbitrary it may be. The learned Judge, however, by observing that in that region till then the Full Bench decision of the Sind Court reported in Lakhomal Deepchand v. Deepchand Tolaram (A I R 237 Sind 241) was followed, he declined to review the case‑law on the subject and disturb the view which had been followed by that Court. In Lakhomal Deepchand v. Deepchand Tolaram where the suit was to set aside the decree and also for a consequential relief by way of injunction restraining the decree‑holder from enforcing the decree, it was held that it was not "open to the plaintiff to put any arbitrary value upon the injunction sought and pay court‑fee on such value". It was observed in the context "that the question as to what is a proper valuation depends upon the circumstances of each suit, and the judicial discretion of the Court. In certain cases there would appear no difficulty in saying the relief claimed in a suit was undervalued".

In all these cases the suits were for declaration to have the decree awarded by the Court set aside. None of them was for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts. In the present case the suit is framed as one for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts. Such a suit cannot be equated with a suit for declaration that a decree obtained against the plaintiff was null and void and not binding on him as it was procured by fraud, with the consequential relief in the form of an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the decree against him. I, therefore, do not propose to go into the question whether the view taken by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court, in the circumstances, should be preferred to that of the Sind Chief Court which was followed in the judgments noted above, or that the view taken earlier in this region should not be disturbed. Even according to the Full Bench of the Sind Chief Court the valuation depends upon the circumstances of the suit and the judicial discretion of the Court.

The case of the petitioner is that although the suit is framed to be one for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts, yet it is a suit to obtain a decree for her share of capital, profits and assets. It is well established that for determining the nature of a suit it is the substance of the plaint rather than the form in which the relief is couched which is to be looked into for the purposes of court‑fee and jurisdiction. In Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor‑General‑in‑Council (P L D 1947 P Q 19) the suit was for decla ration that certain provisions of the Income‑tax Act were ultra vires the powers of the Federal Legislature and that the assessment made under those provisions was illegal, with a consequential relief restraining the respondent from making assessments in future years under the said provisions. It was held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee: "In form the relief claimed does not profess to modify or set aside the assessment. In sub stances it does, for repayment of part of the sum due by virtue of the notice of demand could not be ordered so long as the assess ment stood. Further, the claim for the declaration cannot be rationally regarded as having any relevance except as leading up to the claim for repayment, and the claim for injunction is merely verbiage. The cloud of words fails to obscure the point of the suit".

I have carefully gone through the plaint and find no indica tion from its tenor that the plaintiff had instituted the suit for the recovery of any specific amount. She has neither expressly nor impliedly alleged that she was entitled to recover in all circum stances a sum of rupees one lac which she had contributed. She admits in the plaint that she entered into a partnership arrangement with the petitioner‑defendant. She also admits that the profits and losses were to be borne by the parties in equal shares. She further asserts that the petitioner‑defendant was the accounting party and that she was entitled to have the accounts rendered. The averments in the plaint leave no doubt whatever that it is in fact a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts. The fact that an averment is made in the plaint that the plaintiff has contributed a particular sum as capital, though the suit in fact is for dissolution of partnership and for distribu tion of profits and assets of the partnership, would not take c the case beyond the purview of section 7(iv)(f) under which a plaintiff can value the suit as he pleases and there is no likelihood of loss of revenue, as the exact fees due have to be paid later on. Tarif Singh v. Kanshi Ram (A I R 1936 Lah. 45) is a decision on all fours. It was held in that case that where the plaintiff provides all the capital for the business of the firm, it is not necessary for him to pay a court‑fee stamp on the whole amount, which he claims should be taken into account in adjusting the final accounts between the parties. He can value the relief in his discretion under section 7(iv)(f) and pay the court‑fee on that basis.

The partnership between the parties is dissolved on the date of the plaint and there is nothing for the Court to do in that respect except to declare that all the relief which the Court is called upon to give is solely to order the taking of accounts. The defendant in a suit for accounts can plead that money would be due to him on taking accounts and can also ask for a decree in his favour, for such amount as may be found due to him on enquiry. In Faizullah v. Mauladad (A I R 1929 P C 147) it was held that under section 7 the amount of court‑fee is to be computed, in the suits for accounts, according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or the memorandum of appeal. Earlier in Sita Ram v. Hanuman Prasad (A I R 1927 Pat. 413) it was observed that the plaintiff was to "give an estimate of the amount at which he values the relief for account and pay whatever court‑fee is legally pay able thereon". In Rangaswami Chetti v. Gopala Chettiar (A I R 1936 Mad. 562) it was held that the Court cannot refuse to accept the plaintiff's valuation even on the ground that it is arbitrary. Ram Charan v. Bulaqi (A I R 1924 All. 854) is a case where it was ruled that in a suit for accounts a decree can, if necessary, be given in favour of the defendant on payment of the necessary court‑fee.

The Court Fees Act does not draw any distinction between suit for accounts in which the plaintiff claims that a sum of money is due to him and a case where the claim is that a sum of money is due from the plaintiff to the defendant. Just as it is not necessary in such cases for the defendant to pay court‑fee on the written statement filed by him, similarly the plaintiff cannot be insisted upon to value the suit for the purposes of court‑fee and jurisdiction on any amount which he may think may be due to him. He can fix the value for the purposes of court‑fee and jurisdiction in his discretion under section 7(iv)(f) and not what he thinks that the same may be awarded to him. Whether or not any amount is due to him will depend on the rendition of accounts.

The suit being for accounts and not for payment of money, the plaintiff if he fixes any court‑fee in his discretion cannot legally be asked to value the suit in any other manner. If in a particular case the amount decreed is in excess of the amount at which the plaintiff values his suit, the deficiency in court‑fee can be recovered as provided in section 11 of the Act.

The suit was governed by section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act and it was within the discretion of the plaintiff to fix the value of the suit. The order of the learned District Judge is not exceptionable. The revision petition has no merit and is dis missed in limine.

S. Q. Petition dismissed.

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