Thus it is to see what the nature of this case is if it claims some kind of relief, even if the result of a declaration is assisted with or without consequence. Deserves to know what is the real article behind it. Relief is sought primarily, and if the court is satisfied that it is sufficient relief, the purpose of which, as in this case, it may demand a reasonable court fee, may be imposed by the plaintiff. Ignoring the price, Patna 17 of 1944, Air 1937 certificate 241; Air 1932 all 485 1939 Nag 50; and relied on 1941 certificate 154 1941 Lahore 284, distinguished.
P. L. D. 1949 Baluchistan 1 Single Bench A. R. Khan, J. C. SHARKAT‑E‑PUSHTOON LIMITED‑Plaintiffs‑Appellants Versus THE SECRETARY OF STATE‑Defendant‑Respondent Civil Appeals Nos, 33 and 34 of 1946, decided on 25th October, 1948, from the order of the District judge, dated 12th April, 1948. This appeal came for haring for the first time before C. S Searle, J.C. on 8th August, 1947, who remanded the case to the District judge for giving his finding on the question of valuation of the suit for purposes of Court‑fee and jurisdiction. (a) Court Fee Act, 1870, S. 7 iv (c)‑Art. 17 (iii)‑‑Question of Court‑fee to be determined not on the form of suit, but on the real substance of relief. As a rule the Court‑fee is dependent not on the form of the pleadings, but on the real substance of the relief claimed. A suit though cast in the form of a declaratory relief only but in substance aiming at some substance relief, is, in my opinion, governed by section 7 iv (c) and not by Art. 17 (iii), Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. (b) Suits Valuation Act, 1887, S. 8‑Suit falls under S. 7 iv (c) ‑Value for Court‑fees and jurisdiction must be the same. It is true that under the concluding part of paragraph IV of section 7 it is open to the plaintiff to value hi; suit as he likes for purposes of Court‑fees, and this value, according to section 8 of Suits Valuation Act must be the same for purposes of jurisdiction. (c) Civil Procedure Code, 1908, O. VII, R. 11 (b)‑Suit valued under section 7 iv (c) of Court Fees Act and arbitrary Court‑fee paid‑The Court can demand proper Court‑fee on real relief of the suit. It is thus open to this Court to see what the nature of the suit is. If a substantive relief is claimed, though disguised in the garb of a declaratory decree with or without consequential relief, the Court is en titled to see what the real subject behind the relief ostensibly sought is, and if the Court is satisfied that it is a substantive relief which is aimed at, as in this case it' can demand proper Court‑fee on that relief, disregarding the valuation put on it by the plaintiff arbitrarily. A I R 1944 Patna 17, A I R 1937 Sind 241; A I R. 1932 All. 485 1939 Nag. 50; and 1941 Sind 154 Relied on. 1941 Lahore 284, distinguished. . Muhammad Arif and Muhammad Nawaz Ahmad, for the Appellants Muhammad Ashraf, for the Respondent. A. R. Khan J. C ---‑The suit was valued at Rs. 10‑ for purposes court‑fees and jurisdiction and a court‑fee of Rs. 1/2 was paid in the original court and also in the two appellants courts including the High Court. The plaintiff‑appellants counsel contends that the plaintiff seeks two separate reliefs, namely :‑ (a) a declaration to the effect that assessment of income‑tax for the year 1935‑36, 1936‑37 and 1937‑38 by the Income‑Tax authorities was illegal, wrong and ultra vires, and (b) a permanent injunction restraining the defendant and his officers from making further assessments of income‑tax in future. and urges that claim (a) in which no consequential relief is prayed for in express terms falls within the purview of Article 17 (iii), Schedule II of the Court Fees Act and that relief (b) is covered by clause (d) of para graph (iv) of section 7 of the same Act. He points out that the plaintiff has a right to put his own valuation on the relief sought by him and that the court has no power to require him to correct the valuation, The learned counsel in support of this view relies mainly on 165 Indian Cases 106 and A I R 1941 Lah. 284. It may, however, be noted here that the ruling given in the case reported in 165 1. C. 106, a Single Bench ruling of the Nagpur High Court was over‑ruled subsequently by a Full Bench of the same High Court in the case reported A I R 1939 Nagpur 50, wherein the principle laid down goes directly against the view taken by the learned Counsel before me. After discussing the all case‑law relevant to the point, then the Hon'ble Judges of the Nagpur High Court definitely came to the conclusion, that it was fully within the competence of the Court to interfere with and revise the value of a relief sought by the plaintiff if the valuation so fixed by the plaintiff appeared to be arbi trary and unreasonable. The second case cited by the learned Counsel namely A I R 1941 Lah.284 is riot on all fours with the one now before me. It can hardly be disputed that by seeking a declaration to the effect that the assessment of income‑tax by the Income Tax Authorities against the plaintiff for the years 1935.36, 1936‑37 and 1937‑38 was illegal and ultra vires the plaintiff really wants to get back the amount of income‑tax recovered from him for these years, as he admits that this amount was paid by him under protest and duress. It appears to me, this as the real object of this suit. The consequential relief that will follow in the wake of the declaration sought will unquestionably involve the cancellation of the income‑tax demand levied or the plaintiff. The Counsel for the respondent maintains that Article 1, Schedule I of the Court‑Fees Act is applicable to this case and not section 7 (iv) (c). I find that under both these provisions of law ad valorem, court fee is payable but the basis of valuation is not the same. Under section 7 (iv) (c) ad valorem, court‑fee is to be paid on the amount at which the relief sought is valued by the plaintiff while under Art. I, Schedule 1, court‑fee is payable on ad valorem basis on the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute. As the plaintiff has put his own valuation on the relief claimed by him, the case does not obviously fall within the purview of Article I, Schedule I of the Court‑Fees Act. The question for consideration now is, whether the reliefs sought fall under section 7 (iv) (c), or under Article 17 (iii), Schedule II of the Court Fees Act to obtain a declaratory decree without a consequential relief, as the learned Counsel for the appellant has attempted to argue. As a rule, the Court‑fee is dependent not on the form of the plead ings, but on the real substance of 'lip relief claimed. A suit though cast in the form of a declaratory relief only but in substance aiming at some substantive relief is in my opinion governed by section 7 (iv) and not by Article 17 (iii) Schedule II of the Court Fees Act.
I have now to consider whether the valuation put on the reliefs arbitrarily by the plaintiff can be revised by the Court. It is true that under the concluding part of paragraph (iv) of section 7 it is open to the plaintiff to value his suit, as he likes for purposes of Court Fees; and this value according to section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, must be the same for purposes of jurisdiction. A question now arises whether the Court is bound by the valuation put on his suit by the plaintiff, however, arbitrary or unreasonable that valuation may be or the Court can revise that valuation and require the plaintiff to correct it.
In my opinion, the provision of paragraph (iv) of section 7 of the Court-Fees Act should be reads with Order VII Rule, II (b) of the Civil Proceeding Code, which empowers Courts to check the valuation of a suit as fixed by the plaintiff and to demand correction of that valuation if the suit is found to be under-valued and also along with the provisions of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act which require that valuation of a suit under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act for purposes of Court-fee shall be the same as for jurisdiction. It is thus open to this Court to see what the nature of the suit is if a substantive relief is claimed, though disguised in the garb of a declaratory decree with or without consequential relief, the Court is entitled to see what the real object behind the relief ostensibly sought is and if the Court is satisfied that it is a substantive relied which is aimed at as in this case it can demand proper Court-fee on that relief disregarding the valuation put on it by the plaintiff arbitrarily. The substantive relief that will follow the declaration sought of this case is quite capable of being determined definitely. I am fortified in the view taken by me above by the Full Bench rulings as reported in AIR (31) (1944) Patna 17, AIR 1937 Sind 241 followed in 1941 Sind 154, AIR 1932 All 485 and AIR 1939 Nagpur 50.
In view of what I have stated above, I agree with the finding of the learned District Judge and direct that the appellant shall be pay a sum of Rs. 1792-8-0 representing court Fees on Rs. 54,724.4 the amount of income-tax assessed for the years 1935-36 1936-37 and 1937-38, in each of the three Courts, namely the Sub-Judge Quetta, the District Judge in Baluchistan and the High Court. The amount of income-tax for the years 1935,36, 193637 and 1937-38 comes to Rs. 54,724-4-0 according to a certificate file din this Court on behalf of the Income-Tax Officer B Division Quetta and not to Rs 52,621-4-3 as stated by the District Judge.
The appellants have already paid a total sum of Rs. 3-6-0 in these Courts. I allow them a month s time form to day s date to deposit the balance of Rs. 5,374-2-0 in this Court. The appeal shall proceed on merits after the aforesaid Court-fee has been paid within the time allowed.
Before closing I may observe that although the appellant has valued his suit at Rs. 10 only for purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction he has failed to show how a second appeal in this Court under section 32 (b) (ii) of the British Baluchistan Courts Regulation 1939, will be competent tin view of the valuation stated by him.
K.M.A Order accordingly.
