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Appeal No. KAR‑212 of 1969, heard on 5th November 11969.

---S. 16 read with S. 2(a) & (f) ‑‑Appeal‑ Words "any matter relating thereto" in S. 2(a)‑Do not include an order refusing to restore application dismissed for default‑Order refusing to restore applica tion, held, not appealable under S. 16.

Relying on the definition of award in section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 it was contended that the order of Industrial Court refusing to restore an application dismissed for default is a matter relating to the industrial dispute and as such was appealable under section 16 of the Ordinance.

Held, it is not possible to give such a wide meaning to the words "any matter relating thereto" so as to include an order refusing to restore the application, The industrial dispute is also defied under section 2 of the Ordinance. It means any dispute or difference between the employer and workman. So far as the question of the restoration of an application is concerned, it cannot be said that it is an Industrial Dispute. It is not acceptable that the refusal to restore the application can be said to be a matter relating to Industrial Dispute.

Nayab Naqvi for Appellant.

Izat Puri for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 5th November 1966.

This is an appeal, under section 16 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968, (hereinafter called the Ordinance). The facts giving the rise to the appeal briefly put are these :‑

2. The appellant (hereinafter called the Labour Union), through its General Secretary made an application for adjudication of the dispute relating to the re‑instatement of two of the workmen of the respondent Management. The main application came before the learned Chairman of the Industrial Court on 26th August 1969. The Court dismissed the main application on the ground that the representative of the Union and the General Secretary were absent. Thereafter, on 27th August 1969, the General Secretary made an application for restoration of the main application. The application for restoration was dismissed on 8th September 1959, on the ground that the General Secretary was absent

2. The learned Chairman came to the following conclu sion :‑

"There is now no doubt that the applicant was given the charges levelled against him and that in the enquiry all witnesses were examined in his presence and that he was given full opportunity to cross‑examine them and to summon his own evidence but I am certainly not satisfied with the reasons given either by the Enquiry Officer or that by the District. Manager or that their attention was directed to the relevant aspect of the case whether it was established without any reasonable doubt that when Sharafat Hussain returned from duty his bus was without the cut‑out at the time he checked in. on the night of the 14th of August 1969, and he was therefore responsible for its loss on the night in question."

3. The learned Chairman after considering question as to whether the cut‑out was missing or not when the driver brought back the bus came to the conclusion that there was no evidence to support the fact that it was missing. The learned Chairman therefore set aside the order of the dismissal and ordered that the appellant to be re‑instated from the date that he passed the order.

4. Mr.Majeed, the learned representative for the appellant contended that the usual rule is that if the order of dismissal is set aside the person dismissed is to be re‑instated from the date that be was dismissed. The appellant therefore is entitled to the wages from the date that he was dismissed from service as a result of an illegal order. Under section 38 of the repealed Ordi nance, the application: of the workman is to be treated ‑as if it wets an Industrial Dispute under subsection (8) of section 6. The power of the Court under subsection (8) of section to, while, adjudicating an industrial dispute is very wide. In adjudicating the dispute the Court's discretion in refusing to award full back wages is not limited: The Court, no doubt, while, considering, the question as to whether the workman should be granted the full back wages or not is to be guided by the General Judicial Considerations, One of these considerations may be as to whether on the face of it the Department was justified in charge sheeting its employee and whether the workman was let off on technical ground. In the present case it seems to me that the Court purposely avoided to order the re‑instatement of the appellant from the date that he was dismissed from service. The learned Chairman for good reasons ordered the re‑instatement of the appellant only from the date that he passed the order. The Court has not given reasons for refusing to order the reinstatement from the date that the appellant was dismissed from service. I presume that the Court took into consideration the conduct of the appellant in not stopping the bus when asked by the Gate Watchman and indicating by gesture when asked that the cut‑out was there. No hard and fast rules can be laid down to the circumstances when the Court would grant wages from the date that the workman was dismissed from the order and refusing to reinstate him from the date that the appellant was dismissed from the service.

5. Mr. Majeed who supports the 'contention that‑ the appellant was entitled to the wages from the date that he was dismissed from service relied upon two cases reported in Divisional Superintendent, N. W. R. v., Muhammad Shareef (P L D 1963 S C 340) and the other Divisional Superintendent, N. W. R. v. Muhammad Shareef. (P L D 1966 Kan. 483). In the first case the Supreme Court allowed the salary to the Railway Employee who was illegally removed from service from the date that he was removed from service to the date that he was reinstated. The principle laid down in that case has no applica tion on the circumstances of the present case. In that case the removal of his service was held to be illegal and though the Railway Department under the rules had power to grant pay only in part did not exercise its discretion to do so. In the present case the learned, Court refused to grant wages from the date he was remove from service. Similarly the case Divisional Superintendent, N. W. R. v. Muhammad Shareef by the Karachi Bench, had no application to the circumstances of the present case. That was also a case of Railway servant who was dismissed illegally. . The Railway servant prayed for wages for the period that he was out of employment.

6. I have already observed that the learned Chairman of the Industrial Court has a wide discretion to order the re‑instatement of the appellant from the date that he considered just in the circumstances of the case.' I would maintained the order of the learned Chairman of the Industrial Court and dismiss the appeal.

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