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Review Application No LBR. 210 of 1969, heard on 44 Vovember‑1969.

---r.26‑Award‑ Power of Court to give award effective from previous date --Discretionary‑--No hart and fast rule‑Demand in respect of pay scales granted with effect of date of strike notice raising such demand‑Award, in circumstances, held, not without Jurisdic tion.

The award of Industrial Appellate Tribunal given in June 1969, was sought to be reviewed on the grounds that since it had been made effective with effect from date of strike notice raising the demand (5eptember 1966), the Management was deprived of its right to terminate the award under section 19(7) of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968, by giving a notice:

Held, it is true that the Department has lost its right to terminate the award after the expiry of two years. The question, however, is as to whether the order was without jurisdiction or in ignorance of any law. The mere, fact that the Department has lost its right to terminate the award after the expiry of the period of two years, would not mean that the order was without jurisdiction. The accepted position in law is that as a rule a party is entitled to the relief it has claimed from the date that the claim was preferred There may be cases where the Court may not grant the demand from the date that it was raised, but from some date subsequent to that the demand was raised. No hard and fast rule can be laid down, so as to limit the power of the Court to grant a demand from a particular date: It will depend upon the circumstances of each case as to whether the demand should be granted from the date that it was raised or from some date subsequent to that.

There is a distinction between the date when the order will become effective and the date from which a relief is granted. A party would be bound to comply with the order of the Court only from the date that it, has become effective. In other words, the party will have to comply with the order on or after the date on which the order was passed ordering that a certain pay--scale should be, given from a date prior to the date when the order was passed. Rule 26 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1960, does not, in any way, limits the power of the Court to give an award, so as to order a party to make certain payment from a date prior to the date whets the award was given.

---S. 19(x‑Award‑Continues to be effective as contract till displaced by fresh contract even after expiry of two months' notice of intention to terminate it.

Even if an award had ceased to be in operation or in force under section 19(7) of the Ordinance of 1968, after the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of the intention to terminate the award is given by open of the parties to the other party, it will continue to have its effect as a contract between the parties, which has been made by the industrial adjudication till this new contract is displaced by a fresh contract.

South Indian Bunk Ltd. v. A. R. Chacko A I R 1964 S C 1522 rel.

M. N. K. Durrani for Applicants.

Ahmed Ali, General Secretary for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 4th November 1969.

This is an application dated 8th September 1969, to revise my order dated 21st June 1969, so as to implement the order in respect of the Scale of Pay of Stores Assistant Jamadars from the date on which I passed the order. The application does not mention any provision of law under which I could revise my order dated 21st June 1969. A perusal of the application, however, would indicate that the object of the Management is that I should review my order. The facts giving rise to this application briefly put are these.

2. The General Secretary, P. W. R. Sores Union, Moghalpura Lahore, gave a strike notice on 8th December 19()4, whereby he raised 11 demands. On failure of the conciliation proceedings, the Provincial Government made a reference to the Industrial Court, in respect of 3 demands only, for adjudication. The Industrial Court gave its award and the Union challenged it in respect of Demands Nos. 2, 6(a), (c) (d) and (e) only. In the present application I am concerned only with Demknd No. 6(e), whereby the Union ;demanded the same Scale of Pay for Stores Assistant Jamadars as that of workshop Assistant Jamadars. After considering the demand of the Union in some detail, I passed the following order :‑

"The learned Advocate, who appeared for the Department; was unable to give me any ground for distinction in pay of Stores Assistant Jamadars and that of Workshop Assistant Jamadars. In the interest of harmony and peace of working in the Department, it is necessary that the workmen should be treated fairly. I would, for the reasons given shave, accept the demand and order that the Stores Assistant Jamadars should be given the same pay as Workshop Assistant Jamadars, from the date of strike notice raising the demand in question. The arrears to be paid in two instalments, if the Department so desires."

3. In the application for review of my order it is stated that

"This appears to be either a typographical or clerical error, as the award should have taken effect from the date the decision has been given by the Tribunal, as is done in cases of other Industrial Court Awards:"

The ground for the conclusion, that there is a clerical mistake in the award. is that under section 19(5) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968, the decision of the Tribunal would be effective only for two years and if the decision was given effect to from 8th September 1964, the period would end sometime in December 1966. The suggestion is that the Management would be deprived of the right that the law confers on it under section 19(7) of the Ordinance of 1968, to terminate the award by giving a notice. The award after the notice and after the expiry of two months from the date of notice would cease to have binding effect on the Management.

4. Mr. M. N. K. Durrani, who represents the Administration has very strenuously contended that the Department would be very much prejudiced if the award was given effect to from the date that the strike notice was given, as it cannot avail of the right that the law confers on it to terminate the award in December 1966. It is true that the Department has lost its right to ‑terminate the award after the expiry of two years. The question, however, is as to whether the order that I passed was without jurisdiction or in ignorance of any law. I am of the view that by the mere fact that the Department has lost its right to terminate the award after the expiry of the period of two years, would not mean that my order was without jurisdiction. The accepted ‑position in law is that as a rule party is entitled to the relief it has claimed from the date that the claim was preferred. There may be cases where that Court may not grant the demand from the date that it was raised, but from some date subsequent to that the demand was raised. No hard and fast rule can be laid down, so as to limit the power of the Court to grant a demand from a particular date. It will depend upon the circumstances of each case as to whether the demand should be granted from the date that it was raised or from some date subsequent to that. In the present case, I am satisfied, after considering the, demand, that it should be given effect to from the date that it was raised, i.e. from the date when the strike notice was given.

5. Even if an award had ceased to be in operation or i; force under section 19(7) of the Ordinance of 1968, after the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the award is given by one of the parties to the other party, it will continue to have its effect as a contract between the parties, which has been made by the Industrial adjudication till this new contract is displaced by a fresh contract. In this connection reference may be made to the case South Indian Bank Limited v. A. R. Chacko (A I R 1904 S C 1522). I have no doubt that the Management would not have considered it advisable in December 1966, even if the award had come to an end in that year, to change the contract introduced by the Industrial Court, so as to give the same Scale of Pay, which the Stores Assistant Jamadars were drawing prior to December 1964. This would have led to industrial conflict and strike.

Mr Durrani, the learned Representative for the Depart ment has relied on rule 26 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1960, in support of his contention that this Court should have granted the relief from the date that it gave its decision. Rule 26 reads as under:‑

"(1) The award of the Court shall be deemed to have been made on the date on which it is published in the official Gazette under subsection (2) of section 12.

(2) The decision of the Court shall be deemed to have been given on the date on which it is communicated to the parties under rule 25.

(3)

7. There is a distinction between the date when ‑the order will become effective and the date from which a relief is granted. A party would be bound to comply with the order of the Court only from the date that it has become effective. In other words, the party will have to comply with the order on or after the date on which the order was passed ordering that a certain pay scale should be given from a date prior to the date when the order was pissed. Rule 26, does not, in any way, limits the power of the Court to give an award, so as to order a party to make certain payment from a date prior to the date when the award was given.

8. Mr. Durrani also submitted that there will be anomaly as to the date from which the payment is to be made to the workmen. He submitted that in some cases the Industrial Courts have, ordered that the demand is to be given effect from the date that it passed the order. I am not concerned with what the Industrial Court did in the case before it. In the present case, as I have already said, it was just and fair that the Stores Assistant Jamadars should be given the same Scale of Pay as that of the Workshop Assistant Jamadars from the date that the strike notice was given.

9. Lastly, Mr. Durrani submitted that another opportunity may be given to the Administration to engage some Advocate. In the first place, it is a very belated request. 1n the second place, X doubt if any Advocate could do anything better than what Mr. Durrani has done.

For the reasons given above, I would dismissed the applica tion.

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