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First Appeal from Order No. 394 of 1964, decided on 9th October 1968.

Ss. 2 (12) & 30‑Expression "business premises" used in S. 2(12) connotes land as well and covers open plot which is used for business‑Evacuee land utilised for purpose of business (tethering cattle and running fuel‑wood business) ‑ Covered by definition "shop" for purposes of S. 30‑West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959), S. 13.

Where the question was whether the provisions of section 30 of the Displaced Person (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 applied to an "open plot"

Held, in the beginning of section 2 (12) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 the expres sion used is "evacuee business premises" while later on, reference has been made to "building or premises". It, therefore, requires no argument to hold that the word "premises" has been used by the Legislature as a word of wider import than a building but capable of being used for expressing the idea of building also. This use of the word "premises" is not open to any objection either. The word "premises" has been defined in the Wharton's Law Lexicon, Fourteenth Edn., p. 791, as "it is, however, often used as meaning land or houses".

The expression "premises" also connotes land and would, therefore, cover an open plot, unless the statute, in which it is being used, treats it as a word of art and it goes without saying that in such a case the interpretation clause of such statute will; state the meaning with which it is to be clothed in that statute. The word "premises" does not find any mention in section 2, which is the interpretation section of the Displaced Persons (Com pensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. It is, therefore, proper that it should be given the meaning which it has in common, acceptation.

A property other than a building, which is otherwise covered by the definition given in section 2 (12), would not be excluded from the definition of a shop for the purposes of section 30, simply because it is not a building.

The word "premises", unless used as a term of art in a, statute, is to be understood as including land whether as a part of a building or independently of it. Word "premises" has not been used as a term or art in section 2(12) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and there fore, evacuee land, which is being utillsed as business premises and has been acquired under section 3 of the Act, is covered by the definition "shop" for the purposes of section 30 of the said Act.

Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., 791; Dee D. Benjamin Hamming v. Thomas Willetts (1849) 7 G B 709; Metro politan Water Board v. Paine (1907) 1 K B 285 and Gardiner v. Sevenoaks Rural District Council (1950) 2 A E R 84 rel.

---Ss. 13 & 2 (f)‑"Rented land"‑Open piece of land trans ferred under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 used by occupant for tethering cattle and running a fuel wood business‑A "rented land" and hence provisions of Ordinance attracted.

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--‑Words used in statute, unless statute itself uses them as words of art should be given meaning which they have in common acceptation.

Jarman's Treatise on Wills, 7th Edn. (1930), Vol. II, p. 1257 and Craies on Statute Law 6th Edn., p. 162 rel.

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--Word "premises"‑Includes land.

Ch. Inayat Hussain for Appellant.

Zakiuddin Paul for Respondent.

Date of hearing : 9th October 1968.

This is a second appeal under section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Restriction Ordinance, 1959, against the order dated 2nd September 1964 passed by Mr. Muhammad Daud Khan, Additional District Judge, Lahore, dismissing the appeal of the present appellant under Order XLI, rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure for his default in depositing the process‑fee as directed by the Court, and thus affirming the order of Mr. Ausaf Ali Khan, Rent Controller, Lahore, dated 26^th May 1964 whereby he accepted the application of Sheikh Abdul Hamid, the present respondent, for the eviction of Shaukat Ali from the property in dispute and directed the present appellant to deliver possession of the premises in dispute in one month.

2. This case was admitted by my learned brother Feroze Nana Ghulamally, J. to consider only one contention, i.e., whether the provisions of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 apply to an open plot.

3. Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, covers the case of evacuee houses or shops in "possession" of a person and of industrial concerns, Cinema Houses or Printing Presses which have been transferred to a person other than the one who has been declared "before the 20th of December 1958, by a Custodian to have tenancy rights from a date prior to the 14th day of August 1947 . . . . ." The word "open‑plot" or "land" has not been specifically used in this connection and It shall, therefore, fall for determination whether with the help of other provisions of this Act it is possible to hold that the section covers open plots also.

4. It is admitted that the property in dispute, which is a plot of land, is a part of a bigger plot measuring eleven Marlas and seventy‑five feet, and the present appellant is in occupation of three‑fourths of it, on a part of which is. situated a Chhappar for tethering cattle while on the remaining he is running a fuel‑wood business. There is, therefore, no controversy about the fact that the property in dispute is being. utilised for carrying on business.

5. Section 2(12) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, defines "shop" as‑

"'shop' means evacuee business premises of any value in an urban area or of the value of ten thousand rupees or more in a rural area together with godowns or store‑houses, if any, attached or appurtenant to such premises, but does not include any budding situated within the premises of an Industrial concern, or a building or premises declared to be a Big Mansion or hotel or such class of business pre mises in a rural area as may be declared by the Central Government, by notification in the official Gazette not to be shops within the meaning of this clause:

Provided that where any building or premises not so declared consist of more than one business unit, and such units are in the possession of several persons, then unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner orders otherwise, the whole of such building or premises shall be deemed to be a shop:

Provided further that where any such building or premises, consists, of both Residential and business units, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, may order that the whole of such building or premises, or such part or parts thereof as may be specified to the order shall be deemed to be a shop or a house."

It is significant that the property, which can constitute a shop under that section, has been divided into two clauses,. i.e.

(i) building, or

(ii) premises.

In the beginning of the section the expression used in "evacuee business premises" while later on, reference has been made to "building or premises". It, therefore, requires no argument to hold that the word "premises" has been used by the Legislature as a word of wider import than a building but capable of being used for expressing the idea of building, also. This use of the word "premises" is not open to any objection either.

6. The word "premises" has been defined in the Wharton's Law Lexicon, Fourteenth Edition, page 791, as "it is, however, often used as meaning land or houses".

7. This expression also fell for interpretation in Dee D. Benjamin Hemming v. Thomas Willetts ((1849) 7 C B 709), reported in 137 H. R. C. P., page 280, and at page 283 Wilde, C. J., observed that .‑

"The word premises' is commonly used as comprising land and houses and other matter. Either tenements' or 'premises' would be sufficient to include the land."

In still another case Metropolitan Water Board v. Paine ((1907) 1 K B 285) Ridley, J. found that the word 'premises' in the popular sense may 'include the word land as is stated in the dictionaries'. In still another case, and, of course, much nearer in point of time, i.e., Gardiner v. Sevenoaks Rural District Council ((1950) 2 All E R 84) Goddard, C. J., observed at page 85 of the report :‑

"'premises' is, no doubt, a word which is capable of many meanings. How it originally became applied to property is, I think,, generally known. It was from the habit of conveyances when they were drawing deeds of conveyance referring to property and speaking of 'parcels.' They set out the parcels in the early part of the deed, and later they would refer to 'the said premises', meaning strictly that which had gone before, and gradually by common acceptance 'premises' became applied, as it generally is now, to houses, land, shops, or whatever it may be, so that the word has come to mean generally real property of one sort or another."

8. Similarly, Jarman in his Treatise on Mills, seventh Edition (1930) Volume II, observes at page 1257 :‑

"But the word is constantly used, not only in popular language but also in modern Acts of Parliament without reference to what is before mentioned, in the general sense of houses, land and the like . . . . ."

It is, therefore, not necessary to stretch etymoligy or imagination for the purpose of holding that the expression "premises" also connotes land and would, therefore, cover and open plot, unless the statute, in which it is being used treats it as word of art and it goes without saying that in such a case the interpretation clause of such statute will a state the meaning with which it is to be clothed in that Statute. The word "premises" does not find any mention in section 2, which is the interpretation section of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. It is therefore, proper that it should be given the meaning which it hag in common acceptation.

9. If there be any need of authority for this proposition .it is not far to find, for Craies in Sixth Edition of his Book, Statute Law, quoted at page 162 the following observation from Attorney‑General v. Winstantley ((1831) 2 B & Cl. 302) :‑

"the words of an Act of Parliament which are not applied to any particular science or art' are to be construed as they are understood in common language'."

10. It follows, therefore, that a property other than a building, which is otherwise covered by the definition quoted above, would not be excluded from the definition of a shop for the purposes of section 30, simply because it is not a building.

11. The property in dispute is partly an open plot and partly built up in so far as it has a chhappar, allegedly constructed by the appellant, upon it. It would, therefore, be covered by the word "premises" and fall within the four corners of the scope of section 30 of the Act.

12. As far the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, goes, suffice it to say, that "rented land" is specifically mentioned in it and, therefore, there is no difficulty in applying this Ordinance to cases concerning ejectment from open land as such.

13. My conclusions, therefore, are :‑

(a) the word "premises", unless used as a term of art in a Statute, is to be understood as including land whether as a part of a building or independently of it ;

(b) that this word has not been used as a term of art in section 2(12) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 ; and therefore,

(c) evacuee land, which is being utilised as business pre mises and has been acquired under section 3 of the Act, is covered by the definition "shop" for the purposes of section 30 of the said Act.

14. This appeal is dismissed and the appellant is directed to put the respondent is possession of the property in dispute forthwith. The appellant shall bear the costs throughout.

A. E. Appeal dismissed.

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