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Letters Patent Appeal No. 265 of 1967, decided on 29th November 1967.

S. 13 [as amended by West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance (XXI of 1966)]‑District Judge exercising appellate powers under S. 15(1) after its amendment‑Acts in his ordinary judicial capacity as Presiding Officer of principal Court in District and not as a "persona designata"‑Hence order passed by him is one within meaning of words " . . . . made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the . . . High Court" in clause 10 of Letters Patent (Lahore)‑Letters Patent appeal against order passed in second appeal under S. 15(4) of Ordinance by a Single Judge of High Court‑Not competent without fitness certificate required to be granted by Single Judge‑Argument that where application for ejectment had been filed before amendment of S. 15 (1), subsequent proceedings, viz., appeal, be governed by provisions of S. 15 (1) as it stood originally‑Held, untenable.

Khadim Mohyuddin and another v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagra and another P L D 1965 S C 459; Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell, 11^th Edn., p. 212 ; Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited v. Irving 1905 A C 369 ; Ghazi and others v. The State and another P L D 1962 Lab. 662 and Attorney‑General v. Vernazza 1960 A C 965 ref.

cl. 10‑Appeal under cl. 10‑Not an appeal in strict sense but merely an internal arrangement of High Court to review its own decisions Provisions of clause cannot be construed so as to confer on litigant a substantive right of appeal.

Sheikh Muzaffar Din v. Mst. Allah Vasai and others P L D 1953 Lab. 284 rel.

Sh. Aftab Hussain for Appellant.

Date of hearing : 14th November 1967.

On 29th April 1965, Saif‑ur‑Rehman respondent brought an application for the ejectment of Abdul Haq appellant from the house in question, under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959), inter alia, on the ground that he had wrongly sublet the premises and otherwise parted with its possession. On 6th March 1967, the Rent Controller, Lyallpur accepted the application and ordered the ejectment of the tenant from the premises finding against him on this issue. The tenant then filed an appeal against it on 20th April 1967 which was dismissed by the Addl. District Judge, Lyallpur on 26th July 1967, affirming the decision of the Rent Controller. The appellant also preferred a second appeal in this Court but that was dismissed in limine by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 6th November 1967, holding that the appeal was concluded by the concurrent findings of fact and as such there was no room for interference.

2. This has led to the present Letters Patent Appeal before us against the judgment dated 6th November 1967, delivered by the learned Single Judge. The Memorandum of Appeal is not accompanied by any declaration by the learned Single Judge to the effect that this is a fit case for appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of West Pakistan. However, the learned counsel for the appellant maintains that no such declaration is required under the law in this Letters Patent Appeal filed by him. In support of his arguments he has relied on the first part of clause 10 of the Letters Patent. This lays down that an appeal shall lie to the High Court "from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court . . . . . of one Judge of the said High Court . . . . ." The argument in brief is that in this case the learned Addl. District Judge, in his capacity as the appellate authority, under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 had passed the order the dated 26th July 1967 on the first appeal by the tenant, merely as a persona designata and not as a "Court" and as such under the first part of clause 10 of the Letters Patent, the appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court was competent as a matter of course without any certificate. In this connection, to support his contention that the learned Addl. District Judge had acted merely as a persona designata and not as a Court, the learned counsel has relied on the dictum in Khadim Mohyuddin and another v. Ch. Rehmat All Nagra and another (PLD 1965SC459). In the reported case the Supreme Court after reference to the then existing provisions in section 15 (1) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, observed :‑--

"Subsection (1) gives power to the Provincial Government to appoint such District Judges as it thinks fit' as appellate authority. Now the question is : is the District Judge as con templated in this section the District Judge in his judicial capacity as the Presiding Officer of the Principal Court in the District or a persona designata If the Legislative really wanted that the District Judges should hear the appeal as the Presiding Officer of the Principal Court in the District, it could have easily said so. The fact that the Provincial Government is given power to select for this purpose such District Judges as it thinks fit' indicates that the intention was not to confer appellate power on him as the Presiding Officer of the Principal Court in a District . . . . ."

3. But it appears to us that, with due deference to these observations by Supreme Court, this argument ceases to have any force and is not available after the recent amendment intro duced in subsection (1) of section 15 of the Ordinance introduced by the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance, 1966, promulgated on 11th May 1966. This has, inter alia, substituted subsection (1), in section 15 of the Ordinance with the following new provisions:‑--

"(1) Any party aggrieved by an order made by the Controller under section 4, section 10, section 12, or section 13, may, within thirty days of the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area where the building or rented land, in relation to which the order is passed, is situated.

(1‑A) On such appeal being preferred, the District Judge may himself hear it or refer it for disposal to an Additional District Judge having jurisdiction over the area where the building or rented land, in relation to which the order is passed, is situated.

(1‑B) The District Judge may recall an appeal made by him to Additional District Judge and either hear it himself or refer it for disposal to another Additional District Judge having jurisdiction as provided in subsection (1‑A); provided that the District Judge shall not so recall or make over an appeal which is part‑heard."

On a plain reading of this new provision of the law, it is evident that the appellate power under the Ordinance is now invested by the statute in the "District Judge having jurisdiction over the area" in his ordinary judicial capacity as the Presiding Officer of the principal Court in the District. He does not act as a persona designata in hearing the appeal under subsection (1) of section 15 of the Ordinance (as amended). The intention of the Legislature in this respect appears to be manifestly clear. In fact before us during the course of his arguments the learned counsel did not say anything against this interpretation placed on the newly‑inserted provisions in subsection (1) of section 15 of the Ordinance.

4. However, the only contention pressed before us by him was to the effect that the amendment in subsection(1) of section 15 of the Ordinance was introduced for the first time on 11th May 1966 and has no retrospective effect. So that, according to the learned counsel, his case instituted, as it was before the Rent Controller, on 29th April 1965, must be all along governed by the provisions of the law prevailing at that time and those provisions alone shall determine the course of all the subsequent proceedings taken in pursuance thereto. Developing his argument further, the learned counsel has asserted that the first appeal before the Addl. District Judge, Lyallpur, though filed on 20th April 1967 after the amendment in the law, must be considered to have been heard and disposed of by the appellate authority in his capacity as a persona designata and not as a Court, under the law as it existed prior to the amendment.

5. In support of his contention the learned counsel has referred us to page 212 of the Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell. 11^th Edn., to the effect that : "In general, when the .law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights." In this connection he has further relied on the oft quoted decision by the Privy Council in the Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited v. Irving (1905 A C 369) in which, although the right of appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland to His Majesty‑in‑Council given by the Order in Council had been taken away by the Australian Commonwealth Judiciary Act, 1903, it was held that the Act was not retrospective, and a right .of appeal to the King‑in‑Council in a suit pending when the Act was passed was not taken away. Similarly in Ghazi and others v. The State and another (P L D 1962 Lah.662) a Full Bench of this Court has held that a right of appeal existing on a day on which a proceeding or lis commences or prosecution is lodged, is a vested right and the right is governed by the law prevailing on that day and not after wards.

6 There is no dispute with this broad principle of the interpretation of statutes on which the learned counsel has relied. However, it has hardly any application to the facts and circum stances of the present case. There is no change in the law em bodied in clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of West Pakistan. It remains unaltered and, therefore, the right of appeal, if any, vested in the appellant under it remains uneffec ted as before. In the present case, as discussed above, by virtue of the amendment in the Rent Restriction Ordinance introduced .on 11‑5‑1966, the appellate authority, namely, the District Judge was constituted as the Presiding Officer of the principal Court in the District. He had heard the appeal, filed before him on 20th April 1967 and disposed of by him on 26th July 1967, in that capacity as a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court.

7. Even otherwise, in our opinion there is no question of .any vested right of appeal in the appellant which was retrospec tively taken away. In essence the Letters Patent Appeal under) clause 10, is more in the nature of an intra Court arrangement designed to exercise control over its own affairs in the High Court. The appeal to the Division Bench against a judgment by the Single Bench is internal with the High Court and strictly speaking it is not in the nature of an appeal, to the superior Court against the decision of an inferior Court. In Sheikh Muzafjar Din v. Mst. Allah Vasai and others (P L D 1953 Lah. 284) it was held:‑--

"A Letters Patent Appeal is not really an appeal in the strict sense. It may be more aptly described as an internal arrangement of the Court for reviewing its own decision given in the first instance by one member of the Court. The first as well as the second decision remains a decision of the Court."

Therefore, it would not be correct to construe the provisions contained in clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of West Pakistan from the point of view of a right of appeal vested in the litigants. So far as the appellant is concerned there was no interference with his substantive right by the promulgation of the aforesaid amendment in the Rent Restriction Ordinance. He was not altogether debarred from preferring the Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge after obtaining the requisite certificate from him if otherwise it was a fit case for appeal. In this connection it will be helpful to reproduce below from the observations by Lord Dennings, J. made in relation to the provisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act, 1959 in the Attorney‑General v. Vernazza (1960 A C 965) under somewhat similar circumstances:‑--

"The Court of appeal seem to have thought that the new Act effects Mr. Vernazza's substantive right to carry on his pending proceedings ; and that it ought not to be given a retrospective operation. I cannot, I am afraid, share this view. The new Act does not prevent Mr. Vernazza from continuing proceedings which it is proper for him to carry on. It only prevents him from continuing proceedings which are an abuse of the process of the Court. If the proceedings are not an abuse and he has prima facie grounds for them, then he will be given leave to continue them. This is no interference with a substantive right They (the Courts) are only exercising a control over their own procedure. No man, let alone a vexatious litigant, has a vested right to bring or continue proceedings which are an abuse of the process of the Court."

8. For the foregoing reasons we hold that this Letters Patent Appeal is not competent, without the necessary certificate from the learned Single Judge in Chambers, required under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this High Court. It is, there fore, dismissed in limine.

K.B.A. Appeal dismissed.

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