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Second Appeal from Order No. 89 of 1962, decided on 14th Match 1967.

S. 13(2)(iv) (as it existed in 1960 before amendment by Ordinance XXI of 1965)‑Cl. (iv) covers cases of "vacant building sites" on which building is sought to be constructed by landlord for the first time‑Interpretation of statutes‑Intention of Legislature to be culled, in first instance, from actual words of statute, but a con struction which leaves without effect a part of statute should normally be rejected‑Cl. (iv) to be read as a whole.

From a reading of the entire subsection (2) (iv) of section 13, West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, as a whole and particularly of the last part of it, no doubt is left that the Legislature intended to cover the cases of vacant building sites also if the condition of intention to construct a building thereon and obtaining of the necessary sanction from the local authority had been complied with.

To ascertain the intention of the Legislature, it is now settled law that, at least in the first instance, an effort has to be made to cull out the intention from the actual words used in the statute which falls for interpretation. The difficulty however, arises when it is found that the result of such an effort is unintelligible. The opening lines of the unamended section seem to give the impression that it is to come into operation only when the landlord intends to demolish the building for constructing a new building on the same site. In other words, the existence of a building and the intention to demolish it are the sine qua non' for the attraction of the provisions of the subsec tion. The last words, i.e. "may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord possession of the building or rented land" are clear authority or the proposition that even if the property in dispute is just rented land or which the landlord intends to construct a new building, he is entitled to an order for the ejectment of the tenant notwithstanding the fact there is no building existing on that land which is intended to be demolished and reconstructed this is further supported by the fact that the word "constructing" instead of "reconstructing" has been used in the opening lines. If any other interpretation were to be put upon the language of this subsection the result would be that the word "or rented land" occurring towards the end of the subsection would become absolutely redundant, and it is exiomatic that 'a construction which will leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected', for redundancy is not to be easily attributed to the Legislature. The words "or rented land" can be given effect to only by inter preting the section as suggested above.

Siraj‑ud‑Din Ahmad for Appellant.

Abdul Majid Sheikh for Respondent.

Dates of hearing : 1^st and 2nd November 1966.

Muhammad Sharif deceased, the owner of vacant land measuring eleven Marlas situated in Misri Shah Lahore, filed an application for ejectment of Aziz‑ud‑Din, its tenant, on the 29th of July 1960. The ground for seeking ejectment was default in the payment of rent from the 1st of November 1958 and secondly because the landlord wanted to construct a building on the site. The tenant contested the application and the follow ing issues were framed:‑

(1) Whether the petitioner's application is not main tainable

(2) Whether the present application cannot proceed in view of the dismissal of an earlier application of ejectment

(3) Whether the petitioner wants to reconstruct a building on the disputed site

(4) Is the respondent a defaulter

Issues Nos. 1 and 3 were found against the petitioner. As for issue No. 4, the Rent Controller found that since an earlier application for ejectment on the ground of default was dismissed on the 28th of September 1959 the question of payment of rent up to the 27th of April 1959, i.e. the date when the earlier peti tion was filed, could not be re agitated in the present case. He therefore, held that the petition was not maintainable for the default in payment of rent due before the 28th of September 1959. He found the application maintainable on the ground that the land was required for construction of a building as well as for default after the date mentioned above. He, however, was of the view that no default had, in fact, been committed and he, therefore, decided issue No. 4 against the petitioner. The result was that the ejectment‑application was dismissed.

2. The landlord appealed unsuccessfully to the Appellate Authority. Hence this second appeal.

3. The only point pressed and argued before me is whether an application for ejectment of a tenant from a vacant site could have been made on the date the present application was filed on the ground that it was required by the landlord for construction of a building.

4. The present application had been filed on the 29th July 1963. The relevant portion of section 13(2) (iv) before its amendment by Ordinance XXI of 1965 read as follows:‑--

"The landlord intends to demolish the building for const ructing a new building on the same site and has already obtained the necessary sanction for the said construction from the improvement Trust or the Municipal Corporation, Muni cipality, Municipal Committee, Town Committee or Notified Area Committee, of the area where such building is situated, the Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application."

Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that although the words used in the section are "to demolish the building for constructing a new building" it would be applicable even to cases where there is no existing building on the plot of land in question and ejectment is sought for the purpose of erecting a building for the first time on it.

5. In the alternative it is pleaded that this section was deleted by section 5 of Ordinance XXI of 1965 during the pendency of the present case and was substituted by the following provision‑--

"The building or rented land is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for the reconstruction or erection of a building on the site, and the landlord has obtained the necessary sanction for the said reconstruction or erection from the Town Improvement Trust, Municipal Corporation, Municipal Committee or Town Committee for the area where such building or rented land is situated."

and, therefore, the landlord is entitled to take advantage of the change in the law pendente lite and have the tenant ejected on the basis of it, for, as re‑worded the section is surely available for the ejectment of a tenant from rented land if the landlord requires it simply for the erection of a building.

6. The section as it stood before its amendment, referred to above, authorised ejectment from a building as well as a rented land as is clear from the words:‑‑

"May make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land."

But the opening part of the sentence which lays down the reason for which such as ejectment may be sought by a tenant is restricted to cases in which the landlord "intends to demolish the building for constructing a new building on the same site." The opening sentence gives the impression that ejectment is contemplated only from a building when one is sought to be pulled down and another to be built up on its ruins. It does not convey the meaning that ejectment may be sought from an open building is sought to be constructed on it. This impression is further fortified by the words of the area where such building is situated" because had the intention been to cover cases like that of the petitioner the latter quotation would have been as follows "of the area where such building or rented land is situated." This impression, however, is not supported by the part of the section,‑--

"put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land."

From a reading of the entire subsection as a whole and particu larly of the last part quoted above, no doubt is left in my mind that the Legislature intended to cover the cases of vacant building sites also if the condition of intention to construct a building A thereon and obtaining of the necessary sanction from the local authority had been complied with. This impression is further, supported by the fact that the section, as amended in 1965, does no more than make this intention clear. The fact, however, remains that the Legislature failed to convey its intention through the words used by it in the unamended section and the ques tion would be as to whether it is open to a Court under these circumstances to afford relief to a litigent in spite of the difficulty, referred to above.

7. The argument advanced in this case is in a very short compass, i.e. to ascertain the intention of the Legislature. It is now settled law that, at least in the first instance, an effort has to be made to cull out the intention from the actual words used in the Statute which falls for interpretation. The difficulty, however, arises when it is found that the result of such an effort is unintelligible. The opening lines of the unamended section seem to give the impression that it is to come into operation only when the landlord intends to demolish the building for const ructing a new building on the same site. In other words, the existence of a building and the intention to demolish it are the sine qua non' for the attraction of the provisions of the subsection. The last words, i.e. "may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land" are clear authority for the proposition that even if the property in dispute is just rented land on which the landlord intends to construct a new building, he is entitled to an order for the ejectment of the tenant notwithstanding the fact there is no building existing on that land which is intended to be demo lished and reconstructed. This is further supported by the fact that the word "constructing" instead of "reconstructing" has been used in the opening lines. If any other interpretation were to be put upon the language of this subsection the result would be that the words "or rented land" occurring towards the end of the subsection would become absolutely redundant, and it is exiomatic that a construction which will leave without effect any part of the langunge of a statute will normally be rejected', for redundancy is not to be easily attributed to the Legislature. The words "or rented land" can be given effect to only by interpreting the section as has been suggested above.

8. I may point out that this is not a case of cassus omisus' nor do I propose to add any words to the section itself. All that I have done is to read the provisions of the entire subsection together so as to make it intelligible. As I look at it, is a case where the intention of the Legislature is quite clear but the language used by it is unfortunately faulty.

9. In view of my conclusion, that the application out of which this appeal has arisen was competent even under the unamended section, I need not concern myself with the further question whether the amended section would be applicable to the present proceedings so as to make the application maintainable.

10. The appeal is, therefore, accepted and the case is remanded to the learned Rent Controller for being proceeded with in accordance with law. Costs shall be costs in the cause.

A.H. Case remanded.

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