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Second Miscellaneous Appeal No. 330 of 1965, decided on 26th February 1968.

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)

, S. 141‑Applicable only to Courts exercising civil jurisdiction‑Rent Controller and first appellate authority acting under provisions bf West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)‑Do not act as civil Court‑Provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, by virtue of its S. 141 not applicable to proceedings before Rent Controller or first appellate authority under Ordinance‑West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959).

Dr. Ilyas Dobash v. Muhammad Iqbal P L D 1960 Lah. 1112; Sh. Muhammad Nawaz v. Muhammad Azeem P L D 1961 Lah. 788; Mst. Shah Jeban v. Mst. Mukti P L D 1963 Kar. 777; Nafis Ahmad v. S. M. Hussain P L D 1964 Lah. 536; Dr. M. Fazil Zahir v. Mst. Begum Jan P L D 1966 Lah. 53 and Muhammad Azeem v. Sh. Muhammad Nawaz P L D_ 1966 S C 182 ref.

Khadim Mohy‑ud‑Din and others v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagra and others P L D 1965 S C 459 rel.

(b) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)

, read with West Pakistan General Clauses Act (VI of 15156), S. 10‑Rent Controller and first appellate authority acting under provisions of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959‑Competent to recall, review, rescind, vary, cancel, alter or amend their order‑Authority competent to Issue order- Has also power to vary or cancel that order‑Interpretation of statutes‑Rule of ejusdem generis‑Not applied in ascertainment of meanings of words and expressions use in S. 20, West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1950‑Word "order"‑Does not refer only to matters .;f the kind to which other expressions in same S. 20, such as "rule" "scheme" "form" or "bye‑laws" relate‑West Pakistan General Clauses Act (VI of 1956), S. 20.

Shahbaz v. The Crown P L.U 1956 F C 46 rel.

(c) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)

, Ss. 13 & 15(5)‑Controller competent to review and recall his ex parte order of eviction‑Section. 15(5) does not operate as bar to exercise of this power‑Finality envisaged in S. 5(15) Attaches for purpose only of saving the orders passed thereunder from being called in question in Court of law by suit or otherwise.

(d) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959),

Ss. 13 & 15(1)(b)‑Ex parte order of eviction‑Order of Controller refusing to set aside an ex parte order of eviction- Approximates in nature to an order of eviction under S. 13‑Such order therefore an order' under S. 13 and appealable under S.15(1)(b).

Din Muhammad v. Hidayat Hussain P L D 1968 Lah. 207 re, f:

Muhammad Amin v. Sh. Jamshed Ali P L D 1963 Lah. 523 rel.

(e) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959),

S. 15(4) read with Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 14‑Appeal to High Court‑Limitation‑Sections 5 & 14, Limita tion Act, 1908 applicable.

(f) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)

, S. 13‑Setting aside ex parte order of eviction‑Ex parte order of ejectment passed for default in appearance‑Application for setting aside‑Sufficient cause for non‑appearance: counsel busy in High Court and junior counsel absent due to illness‑Counsel appearing and making application same day soon after passing of ex parte order‑Circumstances, held, sufficient cause to support recalling of ex parte order.

Aakhruddin for Appellant.

Iqbal Qazi for Respondent.

Dates of hearing : 22nd January and 2nd February 1968.

This second appeal under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, calls in question the order of the First Appellate Authority, given on 30‑9‑19_65, in the following circumstances.

2. The respondent is landlady of the property bearing No. 39‑45‑PR‑2, Preedy Quarters, Saddar, Karachi. On 3‑1‑1964, she made an application to the Rent Controller under section 13 of the said Ordinance for the appellant's eviction from these premises, on the ground that the landlady proposed to demolish the existing building for the purpose of raising a new construction. On 5‑10‑1964, an application was made on behalf of the landlady under Order 1, rule 10, C. P. C., for addition of her daughter, Hutoxi P. Kawasji, as co‑applicant in the proceedings, as the said property bad been gifted to the latter during the pendency of the proceedings before the Controller. This application was granted by an order made on 24‑10‑1964, and the further hearing of the case was adjourned to 30th November 1964, on which date the appellant is stated to have been called absent. An ex parte order was therefore made by the Controller directing the appellant's eviction from the said premises. However, the same day, an application was made under Order IX, rule 13, C. P. C. for setting aside this ‑ex parte order, which application was dismissed on 22‑5‑1965. A first appeal was dismissed on the ground that no appeal was provided to the First Appellate Authority against this order. The appellant has now come by way of second appeal under section 15(4) of the said Ordinance.

3. Mr. Iqbal Kazi, the learned Advocate for the respondent, has taken two objections before me with regard to the maintainability of this appeal, vie. (1) that the application under Order IX, rule 13, C. P. C., for setting aside an ex parte order of eviction was not competent, as provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, were not applicable to proceedings under the said Ordinance, in that the Controller could not be deemed to be a Civil Court, and (ii) that the present appeal itself is not competent as it is directed against the order of the First Appellate Authority in an appeal which itself was not maintainable.

4. The question of the applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to proceedings before the Controller being of considerable importance the learned Advocates for both the parties were heard by me at length, and with their assistance I had opportunity to examine the various decisions of this Court on the point in question. The first case which was brought to my notice was that of Dr. Ilyas Dobash v. Muhammad Iqbal (P L D 1960 Lah. 1112) in which A. R. Changez, J., held that section 148, C. P. C. was not available for extension of time for deposit of arrears of rent, as this Code as such had not been made applicable to the proceedings under the Ordinance. But a contrary view was taken subsequently in several decisions, vie. Sh. Muhammad Nawaz v. Muhammad Azeem (P L D 1961 Lah. 788), Mst. Shah Jehan v. Mst. Mukti (P L D 1963 Kar. 777), Nafis Ahmad v. S. M. Hussain (P L D 1964 Lah. 536) and Dr. M. Fazil Zahir v. Mst. Begum Jan (P L D 1966 Lah. 53). In Sh. Muhammad Nawaz v. Muhammad Azeem, which is a Division Bench decision, Kayani, C. J., held that Order XXII of the Civil Procedure Code was available for joinder of legal representatives, in proceedings under the said Ordinance by virtue of section 141, C. P. C. which provides that the procedure prescribed in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any court of Civil Jurisdiction. This decision was taken to the Supreme Court, whose judgment is reported as Muhammad Azeem v. Sh. Muhammad Nawaz (P L D 1966 S C 182), in which their Lordships did not express any clear opinion on the question whether the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure were applicable to proceedings before the Controller, but held that the presence of the legal representatives of a deceased tenant was necessary in the litigation pending before the Controller for the tenant's eviction. The decision in Sh. Muhammad Nawaz v. Muhammad Azeem was followed by the Bench at Karachi in Mst. Shan Jehan v. Mst. Mukti, in which a dissent was recorded from the view of A. R. Changez, J., in P L D 1960 Lah. 1112 that section 148, C. P. C. did not apply to the proceedings before the Controller. The decision in Syed Nafis Ahmad Zaidi v. S. M. Hussain, also followed the rule laid down in Sh. Muhammad Nawaz v. Muhammad Azeem and it was held that the Controller had power to set aside an ex parte order under Order 1X, rule 13, C. P. C. Anwarul Haq, J., giving the Judgment of the Division Bench, observed that the provisions of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, were neither exhaustive, nor did they exclude the application of the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure Anwarul Haq, J., had again occasion to consider the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure to proceedings before the Controller in the case of Dr. M. Fazil Zahir and others v. Mat. Begum Jan and others in which the learned Judge held that the provisions of review contained in Order XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code were available to a tribunal acting under the said Ordinance. Thus, the rule laid down by the Lahore Bench of the High Court in Sh. Muhammad Nawaz v. Muhammad Azeem, that the Code of Civil Procedure applied to proceedings under the said Ordinance, has been consistently applied by this Court in all the subsequent decisions. But Kayani, C. J.'s proposition in that case is based on the assumption that the tribunals under the said Ordinance are Courts of Civil Jurisdictions and therefore section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, which provides that the procedure in the Code for suits shall be followed in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction, also applied to proceedings under the Ordinance. The question is, are the tribunals under the said Ordinance courts of Civil Jurisdiction Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have conclusively answered this question in Khadim Mohy‑ud‑Din and others v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagra and others (P L D 1965SC459), from which I would reproduce the following passages :‑

"From the provisions of the Ordinance it appears that though under section 16 the Controller' has been given powers of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence' he is not bound in every case to follow the procedure as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. He has been given powers under sections 4, 10(3) and 12 to make orders after holding such enquiry as he thinks fit. In such cases the question of nature of enquiry is left to him. . That means that in such enquiries the parties have no right to insist on production of such evidence which they desire to adduce in support of their case. Therefore, no machinery is prescribed for summoning witnesses or compelling production of documents in such enquiries. In short these enquiries may be such as are conducted by an Executive Officer. Furthermore, the Controller has been given power to regulate the use by a landlord of his own property, inasmuch as within the Urban area the landlord may not convert a residential building into a non‑residential building.

The power thus conferred on the Controller would ripper to be a purely executive. Then subsection (3) of section 13 says that before putting the landlord in possession of the tenanted premises the Controller should be "satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide. But there is no express mention of any enquiry by the Controller. If the word satisfied' imports the necessity of an enquiry even then it cannot be said that in holding such enquiry he will be bound by any particular procedure.

We, therefore conclude from the foregoing examination of the relevant provisions of the Ordinance that though some of the functions of the Controller are judicial in character but yet he is not required to act judicially in discharging many of his functions. In these circumstances, it will be difficult to hold that the Controller while performing his functions under this Ordinance acts as a Court. At the most it may be said that he acts in a quasi judicial capacity."

4. With regard to the judicial character of the Additional District Judge, as First Appellate Authority under the said Ordinance, their Lordships observed as follows :‑

"Subsection (1) gives power to the Provincial Government to appoint such District Judges as it thinks fit' as appellate authority. Now the question is : Is the District Judge as contemplated in this section the District Judge in his judicial capacity as the Presiding Officer of the Principal Court in the District or a persona designata If the Legislature really wanted that the District Judges should hear the appeal as the presiding Officer of the Principal Court in the District, it could have easily said so. The fact that the Provincial Government is given power to select for this purpose 'such District Judges as it thinks fit' indicates that the intention was not to confer appellate power on him as the Presiding Officer of the Principal Court in a District. This is also clear from the provisions of subsections (3) and (5) of section 15."

"There is no indication in the Ordinance itself that the District Judge is to exercise his authority as the Presiding Officer of the Principal Court in the Districts. On the other hand from the nature of his appointment; the character of his power and procedure; and the total ouster of jurisdiction or Court of law to question his order save as provided in the Ordinance it is clear that he while acting as appellate authority is not acting in hit ordinary judicial capacity as the Presiding Officer of his Court that such was not the intention of the Legislature is also clear from the Amendment of 1962 by which the words 'and Additional District Judge' were inserted in section 15 by Ordinance XXXII of 1962."

5. Thus, it is now settled that neither the Rent Controller not the First Appellate Authority, under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, acts as a Civil Court, and accordingly the rule laid down in Sh. Muhammad Nawaz v. Muhammad Azeem, and in the subsequent decisions of the High Court referred to above that the provisions of the Civil ‑Procedure Code applied to proceedings before the Controller, is no longer good law, because this rule rested on the proposition that the Code applied by virtue of its section 141, which section, however, is expressly made applicable only to courts exercising Civil jurisdiction. Since the tribunals under the Ordinance are not Civil Courts, section 141 cannot be invoked to regulate the proceedings under the Ordinance by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, unless these provisions are made expressly applicable to such proceedings.

6. The question then arises whether the Controller and the First Appellate Authority under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance are competent to recall, review, cancel, vary after or amend their orders. This question may be approached in three ways, that is :‑‑

(i) Section 20 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act. VI of 1956, provides that where, by any West Pakistan Act, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, scheme, form or bye‑laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind, any notifications, orders, rules, scheme, form, bye‑laws so issued,

(ii) Apart from section 20 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act there is a general principle that an authority empowered to issue an order has also the power to vary or cancel that order.

(iii) An order refusing to set aside an ex parse order of eviction approximates in nature to an order of eviction, and is therefore an order under section 13 of the Ordinance and so is appealable under section 15(1) (b) of the Ordinance.

No doubt, the view has been taken in some decisions that the word "order" in section 20 of the West. Pakistan Genera Clauses Act refers only to matters of the kind to which the other expressions in the section, such as "rule", "scheme", "form" or "byelaws", relate, and that the word "order" may not apply to particular cases. In my opinion; however, the rule of ejusde generis should not apply to the ascertainment of the meaning of the words and expressions used in this section. But apart from this provision, the tribunals under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restrictions Ordinance, like any other statutory authority, should be deemed to possess powers to recall their own orders, or to vary, or add to, such orders. If authority for this proposition is needed, I would refer to the decision of the Federal Court in Shahbaz. v. The Crown (P L D 1956 F C 46), in which it was observed, with regard to the power of the Government to recall an order of remission under section 401, Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), that "existence of such power is necessary in the case of all authorities empowered to pass orders under a statute or regulation and that is apparently the reason why in order to give finality to judicial orders provisions greatly restricting the use pf this power had to be introduced in the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes", and that "wherever there is no such restriction imposed on Government, there is no reason to deny them the power to correcting even the errors of Judgment'", and, further, "this power of correction is necessary for the proper discharge of their functions." Thus, the power to make order under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, includes the power to recall and correct such orders, including ex parte orders of eviction. Section 15(5) of the Ordinance, which makes the order of the Controller, an appellate authority or the High Court, final would not operate as a bar to th exercise of this power, because the finality which attaches to th orders referred in this subsection is for the purposes only of saving these orders from being called in question in a court of law by suit or otherwise. In this view of the matter, thong Order IX, rule 13, C. P. C., may not be available for setting aside the ex parte orders of the Controller, the power to make an order under the Ordinance includes the power to recall such order, or vary or alter it, or add thereto. Consequently, the appellants' application, though not maintainable under Order IX, rule 13, C. P. Cl., could be made udder the Ordinance itself and the Controller was competent to review and recall his earlier ex parte order of eviction.

7. The next question which requires consideration is, whether an appeal lay to the First Appellate Authority under the said Ordinance against the Controller's order refusing to set aside his earlier ex parte order of eviction. The learned Advocates for the parties agreed that under the relevant notifications, appeals to the First Appellate Authority were provided only against orders made under sections 4, 10, 12 and 13 of the Ordinance. The ex parte order of eviction was made under section 13. If the Controller had power to make this order, a fortiori he had also the power to recall this order or vary it, or add thereto and all such orders would be orders under section 13 of the Ordinance. The order refusing to set aside the earlier ex parse order would be an order under section 13, and would, accordingly, be appealable to the First Appellate Authority under section 15 of the. Ordinance. I may here refer to the recent decision given by my learned brother, Karam Elahi Chauhan, J, in Din Muhammad v. Hidayat Hussain (P L D 1968 Lah. 207), in which it has been held that order of the First Appellate Authority under the Ordinance refusing to set aside its ex parse order in an appeal, was not appealable to the High Court. This decision, however, has proceeded on the language of section 15(4) of the Ordinance, which is that "any party aggrieved by" the order on appeal by the appellate authority appointed by the. Government . . . . . may, within 30 days from the date of the order of the appellate authority . . . prefer an appeal to the High Court . .. . . . "My learned brother's view is based on the use of the expression "order passed on appeal'", which he has distinguished from an order passed in exercise of "appellate jurisdiction". But the language of the relevant notifications provides for appeals from orders "made by Controllers under sections 4, 10, 12 and 13" of the Ordinance, and an order refusing to set aside an ex parse order is one such order, Chauhan, J.'s decision would not apply with regard to the point at issue before me. Further, an order refusing to set aside an ex parse order approximates in nature to an order of eviction under section' 13, and therefore is itself an order under section 13. Let me refer in this connection to the case of Muhammad Amin v. Sh. Jamshed Ali (P L D 1963 Lah. 521). In this case it was held that an order tentatively determining the amount of rent under section 13(6) of the Ordinance, approximates in nature the order striking off the defence under the same subsection for failure to deposit arrears of rent as ordered by the Controller, and accordingly, the former order, being approximately of the same nature as the latter order, would be appealable under section 15(1)(b) of the Ordinance. On this reasoning, the order refusing to set aside the earlier ex pane order of eviction should also approximate in nature the order of eviction and would, like the latter order, be appealable to the first appellate authority. Thus the first appeal against the Controller's order refusing to set aside the earlier decision of ex parte eviction was competent in law, and the learned Additional District Judge fell in error in holding that no appeal lay to him from this order.

8. Assuming, however, that appeal to the First Appellate Authority did not lie against the Controller's order refusing to recall the ex parse order of eviction, an appeal to the High Court against such order is competent under section 15(4) of the Ordinance. But Mr. Iqbal Kazi, the learned Advocate for the respondent, contended that the period of 30 days prescribed for appeal against such orders has long expired, and, further, that no appeal against the Controller's order has in fact been preferred to the High Court. But the High Court is competent to treat the present appeal as an appeal from the Controller's order, whereby the appellant's application for setting aside the exparte order of eviction was refused. There is no doubt that considerable time has elapsed since this order was made, and the prescribed period of limitation, as Mr. Iqbal Kazi rightly pointed out, expired long ago. But then, is it not possible to exclude, in the computation of the limitation period, the time taken by the appellant in pursuing his first appeal before the Additional District Judge, or to condone the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Mr. Kazi took the view that even the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply .to proceedings under the said Ordinance. However, this view is contrary to the rule laid down by the Supreme Court and also to the view which this Court has taken in two cases to which I would presently refer. In Tahir Ali and others v. The Chief Judge, Karachi Small Causes Court (P L D 1963 S C 447), which is a decision under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act (VIII of 1953), their Lordships of the Supreme Court applied section 12 (3) of the Limitation Act, and held that the time required for obtaining a copy of the judgment of the Controller should be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed for a revision under section 15(l) of this Act. If Limitation Act could be made applicable to proceedings under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, there should be rio objection to making the former act applicable, to proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance also. Then, there is the decision of the High Court in Haji Ghulam Muhammad and another v. Ali Siraj (P L D 1964 Lah. 15), in which an appeal was preferred before the District Judge against the Controller's order dismissing an application under section 8 of the Ordinance, which section, however, was not included in the notifications of the Government conferring appellate powers on District Judges, and, therefore, the order under this section was appealable only to the High Court under section 15(4) of the Ordinance. My learned brother, Anwarul Haq, J., observed that the appeal before the District Judge could be treated as appeal to the High Court, and the time taken before the District Judge could be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act, if other conditions of this section were satisfied. In Hatim Ali v. Zulekhabibi (P L D 1964 Kar. 39) Wahiduddin Ahmad, J., (as he then was) held that section 5 of the Limitation Act was available for condonation of delay in presenting on appeal under section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance.

9. The circumstances of this case do, in fact, justify the application of section 14 of the Limitation Act, and consequent exclusion of time taken by the appellant in pursuing his first appeal before the Additional District Judge, the discussion in whose order, which is impugned before me, shows that in the state of law then prevailing, it could not conclusively be said that the first appeal to the lower appellate tribunal did not lie at all. The appeal to the Additional District Judge was made in good faith, and that appeal could therefore be treated as appeal to the High Court. The circumstances in this case would also justify the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act, so as to condone the delay in the appeal to the High Court against the Controller's order refusing to set aside the ex pane order of eviction.

10. The above discussion leads to the following conclusions :‑‑

A‑‑(i) that the power to make orders under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, implies by necessary implication, power to rescind, recall, vary, alter, or add to, these orders;

(ii) that the order of the Controller refusing to recall his earlier ex parte order of eviction was itself an order made under section 13 of the said Ordinance and was accordingly appealable to the First Appellate Authority, who erroneously declined to exercise the jurisdiction which vested in him to entertain the appeal brought before him by the appellant.

B‑(i) that even if it be assumed that the order of the Controller refusing to set aside the ex parte order of eviction was not an order under section 13 of the Ordinance and was not appealable to the First Appellate Authority, the order is appealable to the High Court under section 15(4) of the Ordinance ;

(ii) that the circumstances of the present case justifiably warrant that the appeal to the District Judge be treated as appeal to this Court or the present appeal be treated as an appeal direct from the order of the Controller refusing to set aside his earlier ex parte order of eviction ;

(iii) that these circumstances further justifiably require that the time taken by the appellant in pursuing his appeal before the Additional District Judge be excluded from the computation of the period of limitation prescribed for appeals to the High Court under the said Ordinance, and, further, that the delay, if any, be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act.

I would therefore hold that the appellant's first appeal before the Additional District Judge was competent and that this learned tribunal fell into error in declining to exercise the jurisdiction which vested in him under section 15 of the Ordinance. Assuming it is not so, I would treat the present appeal as an appeal under section 15(4) of the Ordinance, or the appeal before the Additional District Judge as appeal to this Court and would; for this purpose, apply sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act and condone the delay which has been caused in' bringing this appeal to the High Court.

10. Lastly, it is to be considered whether there are grounds to set aside the Controller's order dated 22‑5‑1965, by which he refused to set aside the ex parte order of eviction made by him on 30‑11‑1964. 1 have gone through the record of the proceedings before the Controller, and find that the application made under Order IX, rule 13, C. P. C. pas made the very day the order of eviction was passed by the Controller and way supported by the affidavit of Mr. Abdur Rauf Khan, Advocate, who represented the appellant in the eviction proceedings. Mr. Abdur Rauf Khan stated in his affidavit that on 30‑11‑1964 he was busy in the High Court in connection with Suit No. 105 of 1960, and that the previous day he had instructed his junior to attend the case before the, Controller, but that the junior failed to turn up in the court due to his illness. It is further stated that Mr. Abdur Rauf Khan was informed in the High Court by his clerk at 11‑30 a.m. that the Controller would proceed with the hearing of the eviction case before him, but that when he reached the Controller's court at 12‑00 in the noon, he found that the matter had already been decided ex parse. In my opinion, these grounds constitute sufficient cause, for which the Controller should have recalled his ex parte order of 30‑11‑1964. It is not denied that Mr. Abdur Rauf Khan did turn up before the Controller at 12‑00 in the noon on the very day the order of eviction was made. His engagement in the High Court should have been taken into consideration, particularly when the learned Advocate gave specific reference to the number of suit in which be was busy in the High Court. For these reasons, I am of the view that the ex parse order of the Controller made on 30‑11‑1964 for the appellant's eviction, the Controller's order dated 22‑5‑1965 refusing to set aside the ex parte order, and the order of the First Appellate Authority dated 30‑9‑65, cannot be sustained. I would accordingly accept this appeal, and set aside these orders and would remand the case to the Controller for decision on merits on the, respondent's application under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. In the circumstances of this case each party is left to bear its own costs.

A. F. Appeal accepted.

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