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Appeal from Appellate Decree 754 of 1948 decided on 23rd August 1951, against the Decree of H. G. S. Bivar, I.C.S., District Judge of Zilla Sylhet, dated the 30th August 1947, affirming the Decree of Abani Bhusan Ganguli, Subordinate judge, 2nd Court, Sylhet, dated the 14th May 1947.

, S. 12‑Time requisite for obtaining copies‑Partition suit‑Judgment and decree signed on different dates‑Application for copy of decree made beyond 30 days of date of signing decree‑Time spent in obtaining copy of decree not to be allowed‑Separate applications for copies of judgment and decree made on different days‑Time over lapping not be allowed twice over. The word " requisite " in subsections (2.) and (3) of section 12 of the Limitation Act means something more than "required". In determining what is ‑the " time requisite " in section 12, the conduct of the appellant must be considered and no period can be regarded as requisite which need not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain a copy of the decree or order.

" Requisite" means "properly required".

No period can be regarded as "requisite" which is not sub sequent to the presentation of application for copy.

The application for copy must be made before the period of appeal expires. That is, exclusion under section 12 can be claimed only if the application for copy is made at a time when the right to appeal subsists.

Under subsections (2) and (3) of section 12, an appellant is entitled to get a deduction of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree as well as a copy of the judgment and if he has applied for copies of the decree and the judgment at different times, both these periods should be excluded in com puting the period of limitation prescribed for presentation of an appeal, unless the two periods overlap partially or entirely in which case the appellant is not entitled to get a deduction of the same period of time twice over.

In the present case, the judgment was pronounced on the 14th May 1947, and in taking a copy of the judgment 11 days were required but the decree was signed on the 30th June, and application for copy of the decree was made on the 5th August, and copy was obtained on the 25th August, and the appeal was filed on the 28th August 1947. Therefore, the application for copy of the decree having been made when the right to appeal did not subsist, the appellants were not entitled to avail of the provisions in section 12 and exclude the time in obtaining copy of the decree. Of course, the appellants would be entitled to exclude the time requisite for getting the copy of the judgment and that is a period of 11 days only. If the time is to be computed from the date of signing the decree on the 30th June 1947, then the appeal should have been filed on the 10th August, but it was filed on the 28th August, when it was clearly barred by limitation.

(Case law discussed).

K. M. Hasan for Appellants.

Tapendra Kumar Pal for Respondents No. 1.

This appeal is by the defendants against the decision of the learned District Judge of Sylhet, who has dismissed the appellants' appeal before him as barred by limitation.

The only question before us is whether the decision of the learned Judge on the question of limitation is correct or not.

To appreciate the point involved, we may state the facts very briefly, which are :‑The plaintiffs' suit for partition was decreed in the preliminary form by the learned Subordinate Judge, Second Court, Sylhet, on the 14th May 1947. The defendants appellants applied for copy of the judgment on the 21st May, 1947, and it was ready for delivery on the‑31st May, 1947. The decree, however, was nut signed until the 30th June, 1947, and thereafter the appellants applied for copy of the decree on the 5th August, 1947, and it was ready for delivery on the 25th August, 1947, and the appeal before the learned District Judge was filed on the 28th August, 1947, and the learned District judge held that as the appeal was not filed within the prescribed period of limitation, it was barred by limitation and the memorandum of appeal was rejected. The appellants before the learned District Judge made an attempt to vacate the aforesaid order by invoking the aid of section 5 of the Limitation Act but in vain. Hence this appeal by the defendants.

The learned Advocate for the appellants contends that the decision of the learned District judge is erroneous because if his clients are entitled to get the benefit of the provisions in subsections (2) and (3) of section 12 of the Limitation Act, in computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal, then the appeal before the lower appellate Court should be held to have been filed within the prescribed period. The learned Advocate argues that under Article 152 of the Limitation Act, an appeal is to be filed to the. Court of the District judge within 30 days from the date of the decree appealed from. In this case that period runs from the 1st July, 1947, and it would expire on the 30th July. The learned Advocate further argues that as he can exclude the 11 days required to take the copy of the judgment under subsection (3) of section 12 and also the 21 days required to obtain the copy of the decree the appellants would get 11 plus 21 plus 30=62 days from the date of the signing of the decree, i.e., 30th June, 1947, for filing the appeal, that is, upto the 31st August, 1947, but as the appeal had been filed on the 28th August, the learned District judge was in error in holding that .the appeal before him was barred by limitation. In other words the learned Advocate argues that as under subsection (2) of section 12 the time for obtaining a copy and as under subsection (3) of that section the time requisite for obtaining copy of the judgment is to be excluded, here in this case 32 days and the limitation for filing the appeal being 30 days from the date of the decree under Article 152 of the Limitation Act, the limitation shall be com puted from the 1st July, 1947 [as under subsection (1) of section 12 the date of signing of the decree shall be excluded] and if all these periods are taken into account, the appeal would have been in time if filed within 30 plus 32=62 days from the 1st July, 1947, i.e., if filed within the 31st August, 1947, and as already said, it was filed on the 28th August, the appeal was filed within time and was not barred by limitation. In support of his argument Mr: Hasan placed great reliance on the case of Bechi v. Ahsan‑ullah Khan I L R 12 All. 461 (F B) and Ramzan Baksh v. Muhammad Ishag I L R 47 All. 509 while Mr. Tapan Pal, the learned Advocat for the respondents, in reply to that argument of Mr. Hasan drew our attention to the case of Beni Madhub Mitter v. Matungini Dassi I L R 13 Cal. 104 (F. B).

In deciding the question before us we may refer to certain statutory provisions. Under section 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure an appeal lies from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decision of such Court. Order XLI, Rule 1, sub‑rule (1) provides that every appeal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or his Pleader and presented to the Court or to such officer as it appoints on his behalf and shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and (unless the appellate Court dispenses therewith) of the judgment on which it is founded. Therefore, it is manifestly clear that what is most essential in filing an appeal is that the memorandum must be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and the filing of the copy of the judgment may be dispensed with by the appellate Court. Under Order XX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pro nounced. The date of the decree does not mean the date when the decree is reduced to writing and signed by the Court, but the date on which the Court delivered the judg ment. See the " Brenhilda " v. B.1. S. N. Co. L R 8 I A 159 p.163. It is also well‑settled that for the purpose of appeal time runs from the date of pronouncement of the judgment, vide Beni Madhub v. Matungini (supra), and Sagarmal v. Lachmisaran I L R 1 Pat. 771. " A law of limitation limits the time after which a suit or other proceeding cannot be maintained in a Court of Justice " Mitra, Limitation and Prescription, 6th Edition, Vol. 1, Lecture 1, page 1. Now for the period of limitation for preferring an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure to the Court of the District judge, is 30 days from the date of the decree or order appealed from is provided for in Article 152 of the Limitation Act. In section 3 of the Limitation Act it is provided that every appeal preferred after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Section 9 of the Act provides that when once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or liability to sue stops it.

It is correct on principle as well as on authorities as has been pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Harinath v. Mathuramohan L R 20 I A 183 ; Khumlal v. Gobindkrishna L R 38 I A 87, and by this Court in Ashutosh v. Arun Sankar A I R 1950 Dac. 13 (17), that the intention of the law of limitation is not to give a right where there is none, but to interpose a bar, after certain period, to a suit or cause to enforce an existing right. It is equally well‑settled on statute law and authorities that when a right accrues and limitation commences to flow it will not cease to flow. It may be observed here that in the case before us the limitation for filing the appeal in the lower appellate Court commenced to run from the 1st, July, 1947, because under subsection (1) of section 12 of the Limitation Act, the date of signing of the decree (i.e., the 30th June, 1947) shall be excluded. It is true that the decree bears the date of the judgment (Order XX, Rule 7, C. P. C.) but as the appeal must be filed accompanied by the decree [Order XLI, r.1 (1), C. P. C.], the appeal cannot be filed until the decree is drawn up and signed, in this case it was signed on the 30th June, 1947, so the period prescribed for filing the appeal shall have to be calculated from the 1^st July, 1947, and the period of 30 days prescribed in Article 152 of the Act will extend up to the 30th July, 1947. The statute of limitation prescribes in subsections (1), (2) and (3) how the period of limitation provided for an appeal shall be calculated. Under subsection (1) the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded (here 30th June, 1947) and sub section (2) provides that in computing the period of limitation for an appeal, the date on which the judgment complained of was pronounced (here the 14th May, 1947) and the time " requisite " for obtaining a copy of the decree (in this case from 5th to 21st August, 1947, i.e., 21 days) appealed from shall be excluded and where a decree is appealed from under subsection (3) of that section, the time " requisite " for obtain ing a .copy of the judgment on which it is found (in this case 21st to 31st May, 1947, i.e., It days) shall also be excluded. Therefore, Mr. Hasan argues that as the decree was signed on the 30th June, 1947, his clients are entitled to deduct the 30th June, 1947, the 14th May, 1947 (date of pronouncement of the judgment) and also the 32 (11 plus 21) days requisite for obtaining copies of judgment and decree shall be excluded and that counted from the 1st July, 1947, will give his clients in all 62 days, that is, up to the 31st August, 1947, for filing the appeal and as his clients filed the appeal on the 28th August, 1947, it was filed in time. This argument of the learned Advocate for the appellants, in our opinion, is misconceived and fallacious as will be apparent from the relevant dates noted above. Apart from the two decisions on which Mr. Hasan relies and which we shall presently note, his clients are entitled to exclude in this case only the date of pronounce ment of judgment and the date of signing of the decree and the period of 11 days requisite for obtaining copy of judgment under section 12 of the Limitation Act, and on that computa tion, the last date for filing the appeal counting from the 1st July, 1947, will be the 10th August, 1947, because neither in law nor on authorities or his clients entitled to deduct the period for obtaining copy of the decree as the application for copy of the decree was made on the 5th August, 1947, which was admittedly beyond 30 days after the decree was signed on the 30th June, 1947.

In determining the question we need consider what the word "requisite" used in subsections (2) and (3) of sec tion 12 of the Limitation Act means. In our opinion, the word " requisite " means something more than " required " In determining what is the " time requisite" in section 2, the conduct of the appellant must be considered and no period A can be regarded as requisite which need not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain a copy of the decree or order. Lord Philmore in Surty v Chattyar L R 55 I A 161 p.170 observes

" The word requisite' is a strong word ; it may be regarded as meaning something more than the word " re quired ". It means ' properly required ', and it throws upon the Pleader or Counsel for the appellant the necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default."

Lord Buckmaster in Pramathanath Roy v. Lee L R 49 I A 307 P. 309‑10 observes :

The appellant's contention is that the time 'requisite' within the meaning of that subsection (subsection 2 of sec tion 12 of the Limitation Act) is the time which, in the circumstances of the case, is actually occupied in obtaining the decree, and that, so regarded, the time that ought to be deducted here is more than sufficient to rectify the delay. Now the learned judges in the appeal Court have held that in determining what is the requisite time referred to in section 12, subsection 2, of the Limitation Act the conduct of the appellant must be considered, and their Lordships think that in so determining they have rightly regarded the statutory provision. In their Lordships' opinion, no period can be regarded as requisite under the Act, which need not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain a copy of the decree or order. In the present case he took none, and the periods between July 30 and August 6, and again between August 7 and August 16, which were in the appellant's control, are sufficiently great to prevent the appellant saying that the time that did elapse must have elapsed even if he acted with reasonable promptitude."

The word "requisite" means "properly required". See also Ramesesbayya v. Ram henkatarathnam A I R 1938 Mad. 823 ;IB Mst. Hirabai v. Indrabahadur Singh I L R 1940 Nag. 312‑A I RI 1938 Nag. 287 ; Kamruddin Hyder v. M. N. Mitter I L R 53 Cal. 432 ; Secretary of State v. Parijat Devi I L R 59 Cal. 1215 (F B) ; Kanji Devi v: IJelji Haridas I L R 1950 Bom. 696 and Kedar Lail v, Harilall 85 C L J 299 (303). Again "requisite" means reasonably requisite. See Subramanyam v. Narasinham I L R 43 Mad. 640 and Naul Mal v. Reru Mal A I R 1935 Lah: 625. Again what is reasonably required is a question of fact. See Murlidhar v. Motilal I L R 1937 Bom. 443 (F B); A I R 1937 Bom. 162 (164) and Naul v. Reru Mall (supra). It will not be out of place to mention here that the principle of the decisions given in cases from the original side of the High Court, namely, the "time requisite" in section 12 refers to time "properly required", and that the appellant must act with reasonable diligence and promptitude, is equally applicable to appeals from the Mufassil. Compare Mathela v. Sher Muhammad I L R 17 Lah. 621 (627) where the principle laid down in Pramatha's case (supra) has been followed though the Lahore decision was in a case from the Mufassil.

Again it is well‑settled that no period can be regarded as "requisite" which is not subsequent to the presentation of C application for copy. See Bechi v. Ahsan‑ullah Khan (supra) I Yamaji v. Antaji I L R 23 Born. 442 and Gokul Prosad v. Kunwar Bahadur I L R 10 Luck. 250. That is the time requisite for obtaining copies cannot include any period antecedent to the application for copy. Per Walia, C. J. in Subramanyam v. Narasinham (supra). The general rule seems to be that the time requisite for obtaining a copy in section 12 does not begin until an application for copy has been made.

Bechi v. Ahsan‑ullah (supra) ; Beni Madhub v. Matungini (supra) ; Secretary of State v. Parijat Devi (supra) ; Gabriel Christian v. Chandra Mohan I L R 15 Pat. 284 (F B) and Murlidhar v. Motilal (supra) but in the last four decisions under special circumstances, namely where the interval between the date for pronouncing the judgment and the date of the signing of the decree was very short it has been held that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree may begin before an application for a copy has been made. We may say that they only prove the general rule.

It is now well‑settled that the application for copy must be made before the period of appeal expires. That is, exclusion under section 12 can be claimed only if the application for c copy is made at a time when the right to appeal subsists. See Ramey v. Broughton I L R 10 Cal. 652 (661) ; Siyadarunessa v. Muhammad I L R 10 All. 342 p, 345‑6 which has been followed by Jenkins, C. J. and Chandravarkar, J. in Tukaram Gopal v. Pandurang Sadarm I L R 25 Bom. 584 and Pandharinath v. Shankar I L R 25 Bom. 586 ; Sitamban Chetty v. Ramanandhan Chetty I L R 33 Mad. 256 ; Mulraj v. Naidhar Mal I L R 42 All. 260 ; Macmillan dz Co. Ltd. v. Cooper I L R 48 Bom. 292 ; Ramzan Baksh v. Muhammad Ishaq (supra) and Kedar Lall Seal v. Harilall Seal (supra).

In the present case, as we have already seen, the judgment was pronounced on the 15th May 1947, and in taking a copy of judgment 11 days was required but the decree was signed on the 30th June, and application for copy of the decree was made on the 5th August and copy was obtained on the 25th August and the appeal was filed on the '28th August 1947. Therefore, the application for copy of the, decree having been made when the right to appeal did not subsist, the appellants were not entitled to avail of the provisions in section 12 and exclude the time in obtaining copy of the decree. Of course, F the appellants would be entitled to exclude the time requisite for getting the copy of the judgment and that is a period of 11 days only. If the time is to be computed from the date of signing the decree on the 30th June 1947, then the appeal should have been filed on the 10th August but it was filed on the 28th August when it was clearly barred by limitation. That follows from the principles enunciated above. Mr. Hasan felt this difficulty and he wanted to get over the same by arguing that if the 11 days for obtaining the copy of the judgment be added to 30 days prescribed for limitation from the date of signing of the decree, it would give time till the 9th August 1947, for filing the appeal and as the application for copy of the decree was made on the 5th August 1947, it should be held that the application for copy was made when the right to appeal subsisted and, therefore, if we then exclude the 21 days required for taking copy of the decree, the appeal filed on the 28th August 1947, would be taken to have been filed within time. But we are unable to give effect to this contention of Mr. Hasan. An appellant can exclude the time for taking copy of the decree in computing limitation for filing an appeal and it is also true that in doing so he may also exclude the period in taking copy of the judgment. But it is not intelligible to us how and on what principle, what Mr. Hasan says, can be done.

Mr. Hasan argues that the appellants are entitled under section 12, subsections (2) and (3) to a deduction of the time requisite as well for obtaining a copy of the decree as for obtaining a copy of the judgment and as they have applied for copies of judgment and decree they are entitled to exclude the time for obtaining both the copies. It is well‑settled on authorities that under subsections (2) and (3) of section 12, an appellant is entitled to get a deduction of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree as well as a copy of the judgment and if he has applied for copies of the decree and the judgment at different times, both these periods should be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed for presentation of an appeal, unless the two periods overlap partially or entirely in which case the appellant is not entitled to get a deduction of the same period of time twice over. See for example, Rajani Kanta v. Kalimohan (1916) 21 C W N 217 ; Macmillan & Co. Ltd. v. K. r7. Cooper (supra) ; Ramzan Bakhsh v. Muhammad Ishaq (supra) ; Girish v. Narayan 65 C L J 415 ; Kanji Devi v. helji Haridas (supra) and compare Badsha Miyan v. Pandu rang A I R 1930 Nag. 113 (F B) and Yusufali v. Kasimali I L R 15 Luck. 376 (F B). As we have already held that on principle and authorities the appellant is entitled to get a deduction of the time requisite for copies only when he has applied when his right to appeal subsists, the aforesaid conten tion of Mr. Hasan cannot be accepted as correct, because the appellants here are only entitled to get deduction of the time for obtaining copy of the judgment only and not of the decree but that does not save the appeal from the bar of limitation. We may observe here that the expression "time requisite" on principle and authorities means simply the time required by the appellant to obtain a copy of the decree provided he acts with reasonable promptitude and diligence and it has nothing to do with the period of time spent by him in obtaining the copy which he chooses to file with the memorandum of appeal. See Mathela v Sher Muhammad (supra) following Pramatha v. Lee (supra). On the principle and authorities we respectfully agree with the decision of Mears, C. J. (with whom Tudball, J. concurred) in Mulraj v. Naidharmal (supra), where it has been held that in order to obtain the benefit of section 12 of the Limitation Act an appellant must apply once and for all copies of all essential documents before the period of limitation for appeal has run out and an appellant cannot seek in aid the extended period if he finds later that an essential document has been omitted. That decision was held to be right on merits in Ramzan Bakhsh v. Muhammad Ishaq (supra) though their Lordships in the latter case excluded the period of time in obtaining a copy of the decree in the peculiar circumstances of that case though applied for after the period of appeal had run out. In our opinion each case will have to be decided on its peculiar facts and that decision does not lay down any general proposition and even if it so laid down, we respectfully dissent from that, as in our opinion it is not in accordance with principles. Moreover the decision in Ramzan Bakhsh's case (supra) is, in our opinion, contrary to the Full Bench decision of that Court in Bechi v. Ahsan ullah Khan (supra) where it has been laid down that in computing the time to be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act from a period of limitation, the "time requisite for obtaining a copy" does not begin until an application for copies has been made, and if, therefore, after judgment, .the decree remains unsigned such interval is not to be excluded from the period of limitation, unless, an application for copies having been made, the applicant is actually and necessarily delayed through the decree not having been signed. We res pectfully agree with that decision of the Full Bench.

The aforesaid decision of the Allahabad Full Bench is apparently not in full accord with Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Beni Madhab Mitter v. Matungini Dassi (supra) where it has been held that where a suitor is unable to obtain a copy of the decree from which he desires to appeal, by reason of the decree being unsigned, he is entitled under section 12 of the Limitation Act to deduct the time between the delivery of the judgment and that of the signing of the decree in computing the time taken in presenting the appeal.

The first question is what is the date of the decree, and for the purpose of ascertaining that it is necessary to look to Rule 7 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure where it is provided that "the decree shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced; and, when the judge has satisfied himself that the decree has been drawn up in accordance with judgment, he shall sign the decree" and the provision is in same terms as in section 205 of the Code of 1882, so that whatever may be the day on which the actual signature is made, the date of the decree for all practical purpose, is to be the date on which the judgment was pronounced. It will be borne in mind that under Order XLI, rule 1 (1) same as section 541 of the Code of 1882 it is necessary that the memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied with a copy of the decree appealed from and it is to be borne in mind that the Limitation Act provides that the period of 30 days in Article 152 begins to run from the date of the decree and not from the date of signing of the decree. In Beni Madhab's case the judgment was pronounced on the 17th July 1883, and that consequently to be taken as the date of decree. The decree was not in fact signed until the 23rd July and the appellants applied for copy on the 3rd August and obtained it on the 11th August so that he applied when his right to appeal subsisted and the appeal was presented on the 30th August and so in these circum stances after excluding the 8 days occupied in obtaining copy of the decree under section 12 of the Limitation Act, the appeal was in fact within time. But Sir Comar Petharam, C. J. in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench at p. 107 of I L R 13 Cal 104 (supra) observes as follows :

But in our opinion the fact that the decree was not in existence that is, signed by the particular judge, and could not therefore be copied until 23rd July that is, six days after the date it bears, entitled the appellants to ask us to deduct those six dais in addition to the eight days, and thus to hold that under section 12 the appeal has been presented within the prescribed time. In this case the appellant obtained a copy of the decree (having made his application earlier) on the 11th August 1883, and he filed the appeal on the 30th idem, and was therefore well within time.

There is a marked point of distinction between the facts of the case now before us and the facts of the case which was before the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court. In the aforesaid Allahabad Full Bench case the application for copy had been made before the decree had been signed and in both the Full Bench cases the application for copies had been made before the period of appeal, reckoned from the date of judg ment, had expired. In the case before us the application for copy of the decree was not made till after the expiry of 30 days from the date of the judgment, that is to say, till after the period of limitation, if reckoned from the date of the judgment, had expired. The Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in dealing with the question of limitation in 1886, con sidered what would be the effect if the decree were not signed till after the period of limitation had expired, but did not consi der what would be the effect if the appellant had taken no step to obtain the copy of the decree within the period of limitation. This point was considered by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Curt in I L R 12 All. 461 (supra) and appears to be of considerable importance in the appeal before us. In dealing with that point, as we have already indicated, the Allahabad High Court held that the appellant was only entitled to be excused under section 12 of the Limitation Act for a delay for which he was not himself responsible, and to us that appears to be the correct principle underlying that section.

We are, therefore, of opinion that in the present case the appellants are not entitled to ask us under section 12 of the Limitation Act to deduct the period which expired between the signing of the judgment and the signing of the decree, because they having failed to apply for a copy of the decree within the period of limitation, cannot be allowed to say that they were prevented from filing the application in time by reason of the fact that the decree was not signed.

The case of Beni Madhab (supra) has been explained by Lord Buckmaster in the case of Pramathanath Roy v. Lee (supra) in the following words :

It is then urged that there is an authority, decided in 1886, which has been the origin of a practice undeviatingly followed by the Court in Calcutta in the interpretation of the statute and that practice is said to be that in determining what is the time requisite which may be deducted you are, in all cases, to look at the time that has actually elapsed in obtaining the order. Their Lordships are unable to see how this decision, Beni Madhub Mitter v. Matungini Dassi, I L R 13 Cal. 104 can have been so misunderstood. In that case, judgment was pronounced on 17th July 1883, and the decree was signed on 23rd July so that only six days elapsed between the pronouncing of the judgment and the signing of the decree. It would be impossible for anybody to suggest that that was an unreasonable time. Again, the application for the copy was made on 3rd August and it was obtained on 11th August ; another eight days elapsed there for which the appellant need not be held responsible. All that that case decided was that those two periods of time, one of which was prompt and effective and the other of which the appellant might not have been able td control, ought to be deducted from the length of the time between the decree and the lodging of the memorandum. It certainly does not support the proposition that in determining what period is to be deducted in any case the time actually consumed in obtaining the decree is to be regarded.

We may observe with great respect that their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council have enunciated the law on the subject in unequivocal terms and that view is in accordance with our decision in this case. We may observe in passing that very recently the Assam High Court in Katimal Brahma v. Mohannath A I R 1949 Assam 23 and in Governor- General‑in‑Council v. Jesraj Tilakchand A I R 1950 Assam 83 in similar circumstances as appearing in the case before us, has taken the same view as we have taken.

Therefore, considering the matter on principle and on authorities, we hold that the appeal of the appellants before the lower appellate Court was barred by limitation and the learned District judge was right in his decision.

The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails as the only contention of the learned Advocate for the appellants is negatived, and it is‑dismissed. But considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs in this Court as well as in the lower appellate Court:

----‑ I agree.

A. H. Appeal dismissed.

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