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Letters Patent Appeal No. 201 of 1959, decided on 26th January 1966.

Ss. 22, 9 & 24-Expression "in respect of any matter which the Provincial Government or any other officer is by this Act empowered to determine, decide or dispose of in S. 22-Grounds on which consolidation proceedings challenged such as could be determined by authorities mentioned in S. 22-Party should not rush to civil Court without first exhausting remedy before appellate and revisional authority under Act.

Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. A I R 1940 P C 105 distinguished.

S. 24 Revisional powers of Financial Commissioner-Very wide and unfettered.

Khan Inayatullah Khan for Appellants.

S. Asad Ali for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

Dates of hearing: 19th (2-30 p.m.) and 20th January 1966 (10-40 a.m.).

This is an L. P. A. against the judgment of Kaikaus, J. dated 3-11-1959 whereby he allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs who had challenged the proceedings under the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Act (IV of 1936), hereinafter called the Act.

2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal briefly put are these. The appellants were mortgages of certain land. Proceedings under the Act were taken in respect of the village where the mortgaged land was situate and the mortgagor was granted other land in exchange for the land mortgaged. The land so granted to the mortgagor was inferior in quality. The consolidation proceedings were challenged mainly on the ground that they were without notice to them, behind their back and collusive. The suit was against the mortgagor and the transferees of the mortgaged land.

3. The trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned District Judge held that the proceedings were vitiated because of want of notice to the plaintiffs, and also on the ground that the land received in exchange was of inferior quality. Some of the defendant-transferees of the land mortgaged to the plaintiffs filed an appeal in the High Court. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the consolidation proceedings did not suffer from want of notice to the plaintiffs; the required notices under rules 6 and 16 of the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1937, were properly issued. On the question whether the land granted to mortgagors in exchange was of inferior quality or not, the learned Judge in Chambers held that as no plea for ascertaining the value of the land to be received in exchange was taken before the Consolidation Officer, the consolidation proceedings cannot be set aside in a civil suit.

4. The learned Advocate for the appellants raised three points before us, namely, (1) that the mortgages were neither served nor heard by the Consolidation Officer; (2) that the Sub-Registrar should have been intimated by the Consolidation Officer about the land granted to the mortgages in exchange of the land which was in their possession; and (3) that the appellants have suffered substantial loss.

5. It is not necessary to decide the points urged by the learned Advocate for the appellants as we are of the view that the civil suit was barred by the provisions of section 22 of the Act. This section reads as under: -

"No Civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted, or application made, to obtain a decision or order in respect of any matter which the provincial Government or any officer is, by this Act, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of."

We have underlined the relevant words which need our inter-pretation. Before considering section 22 of the Act, we may note that the observations made by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. (A I R 1940 P C 105) that the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, will not apply to the present case because of the circumstances which we would presently mention. In the present case, the appellants rushed to the Civil Court without exhausting their remedy before the appellate and revisional authority. The grounds on which the appellants challenged the consolidation proceedings in a Civil Court were such in respect of which, if well-founded, the appellate Court or the revisional Court could give its decision. Under section 22 of the Act, reproduced above, jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred in respect of any matter which the Provincial Government or any officer is by the Act empowered to determine, decide or dispose of. The learned Advocate for the appellants conceded before us that under subsection (1) of section 9 of the Act the Collector could rectify the mistake if any, committed by the Consolidation Officer. If the Collector failed, under section 9(2) of the Act, a second appeal could be filed to the Commissioner. There is a provision for revision also under section 24 of the Act. The learned Advocate for the appellants, however, submitted that it was a case of wrong advice on behalf of the counsel for the appellants. In this connection he also submitted that when the appellants came to know about the consolidation proceedings, the appeal was much beyond time. At any rate, the admitted position is that a revision could have been filed to the Financial Commissioner stating the circumstances under which no appeal could be filed. Section 24 of the Act reads as under: ---

"The Financial Commissioner may, at any time for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by any officer under this Act, call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit."

The above provision of law puts no fetters on the power of the Financial Commissioner to reverse an order passed by the Consolidation Officer on the grounds on which the civil proceedings were instituted. The power of the Financial Commissioner is very wide and unfettered by any condition. We are of the view that in the circumstances of the present case the Civil suit was barred under section 22 of the Act as the specific grounds on which the consolidation proceedings had been challenged in the Civil Court are matters which can be determined by authorities mentioned in section 22 of the Act.

6. For the reasons given above, we would dismiss the appeal with no order as to costs.

K. B. A.

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