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S. A. O. No. 57 of 1963, decided on 18Ch February 1963.

S. 15‑Expression "an order" in S. 15(1)(6) and S. 15(4)‑ deans order passed under specific provisions of Ordinance‑Each and every routine order of Controller regulating proceedings under Ordinance not open to appeal "An order" of Controller to be appeal-able directly to High Court under S. 15 (4) must be one which "conclusively determines the rights of the parties"‑Controller allowing imp-lead of another as party‑‑Order, held, not appeal-able.

Karam Elahi Chauhan for Appellants.

Date of hearing: 18th February 1963.

This is a second appeal for an order of the Rent Controller, dated the 13th of February 1962, allowing the application of one Mst. Raj Bibi that she should be joined as a party to the application under section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) instituted by the present appellants for ejectment of Muhammad Hussain and others, respondents, from a house situated in the city of Multan.

2. The learned District Judge to whom an appeal was presented by the appellants, in the first instance, agreed with the order of the Rent Controller on merits, but it escaped his notice as well as of the learned counsel for the respondents, that no appeal 'lay from such an order. The injustice which resulted from this omission is manifest. The application for ejectment was instituted on the 15th of December 1950. The impugned order was made on the 13th of February 1962, and the appeal in the Court of the District Judge was disposed of on the 2nd of January 1963. Thus more than three years have passed and so far even the proper parties have not been brought on the record.

3. In support of the contention that a second appeal is competent from each and every order made by the Rent Controller, Mr. Karam Elahi Chauhan relied on the words "such class of cases" in section 15(I)(a) "a party aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller" in clause (b), and, the clause in sub-section (4) "if an appellate authority has not been appointed in respect of any class of cases any party aggrieved by an order of the Controller may prefer an appeal in writing to the High Court". According to the learned counsel the term an order' embraces all kinds of orders made by a Rent Controller, includ ing those which finally adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and those which merely regulate the proceedings resulting in final adjudication in an action brought under the provisions of the Ordinance.

4. In an earlier case (not reported) I have analyzed the scheme of the Ordinance and interpreted the term an order in clause (b) of section 15(1) and subsection (4) as an order assed under the specific provisions of the Ordinance, such as an order under section 4 determining fair rent, an order under section 5 authorising increase in fair rent, an order under section 8 for recovery of rent which should not have been 4 paid, an order under section 9 for increase of rent in certain circumstances, an order under section 10 directing the landlord not to interfere with the amenities enjoyed by a tenant, an order under section 12 authorizing the tenant to make necessary repairs if the landlord fails to make them an order under section 13 for the eviction of a tenant. Section 15(I), which deals with the appointment of appellate authorities, contemplates that the powers of all such authorities may not be the same although in actual practice they are. The wisdom of this provision is not apparent, but it is worthy of note that the appellate autho rities are to be appointed "for the purposes of this Ordinance" which brings out that the appellate authorities will hear appeals from such orders as are contemplated in the Ordinance and not otherwise.

5. If the term an order' is given such wide meaning as the learned counsel contends for, then every routine order, e.g., an order adjourning the hearing of the case, summoning of witnesses, production of documents, framing of issues, allocation of onus of proof, etc. would be appeal-able to the High Court as the appellate jurisdiction of the District Judge is confined to orders under sections 4, 8, 10 and 13. Surely, it could not have been the intention of the author of the Ordinance that in case of important orders, which may be passed under the Ordi nance, appeals will lie to the District Judge‑ but in case of routine orders the appeals will lie to the High Court. I feel fortified in the view that this was not so by the explanation to section 15 (4), whereby an appeal from an original order is to be heard and determined as an appeal from a decree under section 96 and from an appellate order under section 100, Civil Procedure Code. An appeal under section 96, Civil Procedure Code, lies from a decree which is defined in section 2 (2) as follows:‑

" decree' means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, it conclusive ly determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary, or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 47 or section 144, but shall not include‑

(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or

(b) any order of dismissal for default."

An appeal under section 100, Civil Procedure Code, is confined to the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law, etc. An appeal under section 15 (4) of the Ordinance must, therefore, be from such orders which are forma expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the Con troller expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the application under one or other of the sections of the Ordinance quoted above. The words which require special attention in this respect are "conclusively determines the rights of the parties". If this consideration is kept in view, there is no scope for the contention that all orders made by a Rent Controller to regulate the proceedings under the Ordinance can be brought in appeal before the High Court.

6. There is yet another aspect of the case. Under the ordinary, law, ejectment of tenants or adjudication of other disputes arising out of the relationship of landlord and tenant was to take place by suits under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As it took long time to decide these suits, the jurisdiction of civil Courts Was ousted and Courts of Rent Controllers created for expeditious disposal of these matters,. To this end, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, except the power of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence, were not made applicable to the proceed ings under the Ordinance. But if an appeal is competent from each routine order made by the Rent Controller, as contended by Mr. Karam Elahi Chauhan, then certainly the object of the Ordinance to expedite the disposal of actions which might be lodged under it is defeated; indeed there will be no end to such proceedings.

7. For the reasons given above, I hold that the impugned order of the Rent Controller, dated the 17th of February 1962. imp-leading Mst: Raj Bibi as a party to the proceedings in the application for the eviction of the respondents is not appeal-able under section 15 of the Ordinance.

8. This appeal is also liable to be dismissed as barred by time. Assuming, without conceding, that an appeal lay from the impugned order, as the District Judge could not hear it, the same should have been preferred to this Court within 30 days from the date of the passing of the impugned order, i.e. on or before the 13th of March 1962, but was actually filed on the 15th of February 1963, after the delay of 11 months and 2 days.

9. Dismissed in limine.

K. B. A

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