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Petition No. 220 of 1964, decided on 18th March 1965.
S. 7 (1) read with Government of Pakistan Finance Department Notification (Sales Tax) No. 9 dated 27th June 1951, item No. (6)-Expressing "products of re-rolling mills" Does not connote and include all products produced direct by re-rolling mills and those manufactured from them-Such products not exempt from sales tax.
Ss. 3, 4, 7 & 8
Provisions neither ultra vires the Constitution (1962) as amounting to delegated legislation nor violative of Fundamental Right No. 15 as being discriminatory-Constitution of Pakistan (1962), Arts. 48 & 131-Constitution of Pakistan (1962), Art. 6, Fundamental Right No. 15.-
The Sales Tax Act, 1951, considered as a whole, envisages that in the matter of imposition of sales tax there cannot be a rigid rule as to the rates of tax in regard to certain classes of goods and the exemption to be granted to goods which come within the purview of the Act from payment of tax. It is evident that the Legislature felt that in regard to these two matters, decision will be dependent upon the trade conditions prevailing in the country at a given time. It is because of this that wide powers in regard to the rates of tax exemption have been given to the Central Government. In this view of the matter, it cannot be accepted that the provisions of sections 7 and 8 of the Act amount to delegated legislation and are therefore ultra vires. The argument that the provisions admit of wide power of unguided discretion and that by refusing to grant exemption to a particular company while some of the manufacturers of similar goods were granted exemption it has as a matter of fact been left to a situation of unfair competition, is equally unsubstantiated.
The requirements which would justify exemption could not be anticipated by the Legislature and, therefore, it was not possible to enumerate them in the Sales Tax Act, 1951. Discretion had to be left, therefore, to the Executive Government to take decisions from time to time in this regard within the framework of the Act according to the exigencies of trade, and in the absence of any clear proof that the discretion has been abused against the petitioner to his prejudice, the contention that the impugned provisions are ultra vires as delegated legislation or violative of the 15th Fundamental Right guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be accepted. When the subject dealt with by the Legislature by its very nature suggests that a wide discretion has to be left to the Executive Government, allowing such discretion does not amount to delegated legislation, and in the absence of any proof of exercise of the power resulting in discrimination, the Court cannot interfere. In a system as in Pakistan, where separation of powers of the Legislature and the Judiciary and the Executive is provided for by the written Constitution, all that the Legislature is required to guard against is that it does not surrender or abdicate its power. In a given case, whether the Legislation amounts to surrender or abdication, will depend upon the nature of the impugned provisions read along with the other provisions of the law in question. If it is found that the power given to the Executive does not allow it to modify any essential feature of the law, then it does not amount to delegation of legislative power. The power to work out details within the framework of the law, if given, will be within permissible limits of delegation so as not to render it unconstitutional.
Messrs East and West Steamship Company v. Pakistan P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 41 rel.
Queen v. Burah 5 I A 178 ; Baxter v. Ah. Way (1909) 8 C L R 626 and Edward Mills Co. v. State of Ajmer A I R 1955 S C 25 ref.
Haidar Mota for Abdur Rab (II) for Petitioner.
Md. Nurul Huda, Deputy Attorney General and K. Harunur Rashid for Respondent No. 1.
Dates of hearing : 15th and 27th January 1965.
The petitioner has obtained this Rule upon the Sales Tax Officer, Companies Circle I, the Central Board of Revenue, Government of Pakistan, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, to show cause why a declaration should not be made to the effect that the impugned notice dated the 31st January 1964 issued by respondent No. 1 under section 28 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 is without lawful authority and as such of no legal effect.
The petitioner-company is a manufacturer of wires, namely, steel wires, galvanized iron wires, etc. of various sizes. The Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred under subsection (1) of section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, issued the following notification
"In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 (III of 1951), the Central Government is pleased to exempt the goods or class of goods specified hereunder being goods manufactured or produced in the Province or the Capital of the Federation from the tax payable under the Act, but (exceed in the case of goods specified in item 33 (a) nothing in this exemption shall affect the tax payable on the raw materials from which the - goods are manufactured ..
(3) Products of re-rolling mills."
It is said that, as the products of the petitioner-company are "products of re-rolling mills", they are, under the above notification, exempt from payment of sales tax. The petitionercompany, in support of the above claim, has asserted that it will be evident from the speech delivered by the Finance Minister in the Budget Session for the year 1963-64 that the products of the petitioner-company are products of re-rolling mills. It is said that the Finance Minister observed as follows :-
"The excise of item relating to S. M. Bars had not been clearly defined with the result that there are many disputes between the Department and manufacturers. Since there is no real justification for a distinction for excise purposes between the various products of Re-rolling Mills, I am spelling out this item to cover all such products duty from Rupees fifty to Rupees twenty-five per ton. I may add that products of Re-rolling Mills are already exempt from Sale Tax. This exemption is being continued."
The petitioner has then asserted that as a matter of fact the Finance Minister spelt out the various products of re-rolling Mills and for that purpose item No. 25 of the entry in the second column of the First Sehedule to the Central Excise and Salt Tax was amended. The item after amendment reads as follows:
"Mild Steel Products-
Mild Steel products, all sorts, including bars, rods, coils, wires, joista, Girders, angles, channels, tees, flats, beams, zeds, trough, piling, and all other rolled, forged or extruded shapes and sections."
The petitioner has then stated that on the 11th September 1963 the petitioner-company wrote a letter to the Secretary Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, drawing his attention to the above facts and claimed exemption from payment of sales tax. By a letter dated the 12th October 1963, the petitioner-company, however, was informed by the (sic) petitionercompany are not products of re-rolling mills, though in the manufacture of wires, some products of re-rolling mills are no doubt used as raw materials. It has then asserted that the Sales Tax Act has got no connection with the Central Excise and Salt Tax Act. The Finance Minister, so far as sales tax is concerned, in his speech said nothing more than that the products of re-rolling mills are exempt from sales tax. With reference to the statement of the petitioner that some manufacturers who manufacture rods of 3/8" and " sizes had been granted exemption under the notification in question, it has been asserted in the affidavit-in-opposition that those rods are not similar to the wires of such sizes which are produced by the petitioner-company.
A supplementary affidavit-in-opposition has also been filed by the respondent No. 1 and in this affidavit it has been stated that wires which are manufactured by the petitioner-Company are prepared by further subjecting Mild steel bars through a process of wire drawing plant. It is true that Mild steel bars are direct products of re-rolling mills but any other item like wires, wire nails, etc. produced from Mild steel bars are not the products of re-rolling mills and therefore liable to sales tax. It has then been stated that rods of", 3/8" and" sizes are not at all similar to the wires of the same sizes as they are not same but completely different and the said wires can never be considered as the product of re-rolling mills.
The petitioner-company has filed an affidavit-in-reply. In this affidavit, the assertions which are relevant for the disposal of the points are the following: It has been stated that the fact that some products of re-rolling mills are used as raw materials for the manufacture of wires does not mean that wires would cease to be the products of re-rolling mills and it is common for one re-rolling mill to consume the products of another re-rolling mill as raw materials for the manufacture of its products. In this affidavit, a notice published in a newspaper by the Tariff Commission and a letter issued to the petitioner-company by the Secretary of the Tariff Commission have been annexed to show that the Tariff Commission recognised wires as the products of re-rolling mills.
The first point that has been canvassed in this case is that the products of the petitioner-company are products of re-rolling mills and as such they are exempt from payment of sales sax under the notification, already referred to. The stand taken by the respondents in this connection is that the wires upon which sales tax was sought to be levied are not direct products of re-rolling mills. In manufacturing these wires, no doubt, some products of re-rolling mills are used as raw material but that does not show that the wires are products of re-rolling mills. It will be seen that in paragraph 22 of the petition the petitioner has quoted the licence granted to it under section 8 of the Sales Tax Act. Section 8 provides that every manufacturer or producer shall take out an annual licence in such form and subject to such conditions as the Central Government may prescribe for which the fee payable shall be Rs. 5. Section 8 of the Sales Tax Act runs as follows :-
"8. (1) Every manufacturer or producer shall take out an annual licence, in such form and subject to such conditions as the Central Government may prescribe for which the fee payable shall be rupees five.
(2) The Central Government may grant any class of manufacturer or producer exemption from the payment of the tax on goods manufactured or produced by him and no person who is a member of a class so exempted shall be given a licence:
Provided that where. a manufacturer is exempt from the payment of the tax in respect of goods manufactured by him as well as the raw materials used in the manufacture of such goods, a licence under this section may be issued with the prior approval of the Central Government and subject to such conditions as may be specified in this behalf.
(3) Any exemption granted under subsection (2) may be withdrawn by the Central Government at any time, and upon its withdrawal the provisions of subsection (1) shall apply to all members of the class in respect of which the exemption has been withdrawn."
The argument that since the licence granted to the petitioner-company shows that the petitioner-company was given permission for rolling of (1) Steel Wire (2) Copper wire, all sorts of wires manufactured by it are products of re-rolling mills, does not appeal to us. On the other hand, the very fact that in spite of the notification in question issued on the 27th June 1951, the Government granted and the petitioner took out a licence on the 16th August 1963, establishes beyond doubt that both parties understood on that date that the products in question were not covered by the said notification. In our view, equally unavailing is the argument of Mr: Haider Mota that, since for the purposes of the Central Excise and Salt Act and Tariff wires have been treated as products of re-rolling mills, they should be so treated for the purpose of payment of sales tax as well. It is worthy of note that item No. 25 of the Finance Ordinance, 1960 read as "Mild Steel bars" on which excise duty at a certain rate was payable. The Finance Minister, in his Budget speech, indicated that, as there were disputes between manufacturers and the Department in regard to the meaning of the wires it was necessary to spell it out. In order to do that under the Finance Act of 1963, the said item was replaced by the following:
"Mild steel products, all sorts, including bars, rods, coils, wires, joists, girders angles, channels, tees, flats, beams, zeds, trough, piling, and all other rolled, forged or extruded shapes and sections."
The above facts, in our view, cannot be called in aid to say that, the expression "products of re-rolling mills" connotes and includes all products which are not only produced direct by re-rolling mills but also those which are manufactured from them. Similarly, the fact that the Tariff Commission, for the purposes of protection of indigenous steel re-rolling industries, thought of considering wires also, does not help the petitioner-company in interpreting the expression in question in a manner which has been sought to be done on its behalf. We, therefore, find no substance in the contention that the products of the petitioner-company are under the notification exempt from payment of sales tax.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has then argued that sections 7 and 8 (2) of the Sales Tax Act are ultra vires as they amount to delegated legislation. It is said that as the instructions permit the Executive Government to grant exemption to any goods or class of goods or any person or class of persons without laying down any criterion for selection, they are liable to be struck down. In justification for advancing this argument, it has been stated that if these sections and some others which suffer from the same defect are declared ultra vires, then the whole Act will become ineffective or at least the petitioner-company will have this advantage that it will not be put to unfair competition with those who produce similar goods but have been exempt from payment of sales tax under the notification mentioned above. It has been said that under Article 48 of the Constitution the right to levy a tax is given to Legislatures. Article 131 provides that the Central Legislature shall have exclusive powers to make law in regard to any matter enumerated in the Third Schedule. It is, therefore, argued that when under the provisions of sections 7 and 8 (2) the Executive Government is given the right to exempt any goods or class of goods or any person or class of persons from the tax payable under the Act, it amounts virtually to handing over all the power of imposing the sales tax to the Executive Government and therefore these sections are ultra vires. Learned counsel in support of his contention in this regard has relied upon a number of decisions.
The second ground of attack on these provisions has been that they permit discrimination between goods and goods and person and persons and class of persons and class of persons. In order to bring the case of the petitioner under the last ground it has been alleged that the fact that the petitioner has been discriminated against would be evident from the manner in which the power has been actually exercised viz., that the respondents granted exemption to (1) East Bengal Trading and Industrial Corporation Ltd., (2) Sultan Mowjee Steel Industries, and (3) Rahim Metal Industries Ltd. from payment of sales tax on rods of the sizes of ", ", and ". In order to examine the soundness of these arguments, it is necessary to quote sections 3, 4, 7 and 8. We have already quoted section 8.
"3. There shall be levied and collected a tax on the value of-
(a) all goods produced or manufactured in Pakistan, payable by the manufacturer or producer ;
(b) all goods imported into Pakistan, payable by the importer ;
(c) all goods sold by a licensed wholesaler, payable by the licensed wholesaler ;
(d) such goods or classes of goods as the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf which are exported from Pakistan, payable by the exporter.
(2) The tax shall be a tax of fifteen per cent. on the value of the goods as aforesaid except in the case of goods specified in the Schedule to this Act in which case it shall be such percentage as may be fixed by the Central Government by notification in the official Gazette.
(3) The value of the goods shall be--
(i) In the case of goods falling under clause (a) of subsection (1) the sale price ;
(ii) in the case of goods falling under clause (b) or clause (d) of the said subsection the duty-paid value ;
(iii) in the case of goods falling under clause (c) of the said subsection being imported goods the duty-paid value:
(iv) in the case of goods falling under clause (c) of the said subsection being goods manufactured or produced in Pakistanthe price for which the goods were purchased by the licensed wholesaler.
(4) The tax in respect of the goods mentioned in clauses (a) and (c) of subsection (1) shall be payable on the occurrence of the first of the following events:
(i) when the goods are delivered to the purchaser, or
(ii) when the property in the goods passes to the purchaser, or (iii) when the goods are sent, consigned or exported to any place outside Pakistan, and for the purposes of this clause the goods shall be deemed to have been sold when they are sent, consigned or exported to any such place as aforesaid:
Provided that in the case of goods specified in the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (I of 1944), (hereinafter referred-to as the said Act), the tax shall be payable at the same time and in the same manner as the duty of excise irrespective of whether such duty is for the time being payable in respect of those goods or not and the provisions of the said Act relating to the payment of duty and the removal of goods shall, so far as may be, apply to the payment of the tax under this Act as they apply for the purposes of the said Act.
(5) The tax in respect of the goods mentioned in clauses (b) and (d) of subsection (1) shall be paid on importation or exportation, as the case may be, as provided hereunder-
(i) where the goods on importation are directly cleared for home consumption before the order for such clearance is made by the Customs officer ;
(ii) where the goods on importation are taken out of bond for home consumption-before the goods are removed from the warehouse ;
(iii) where the goods are exported by sea-before the shipping bill is passed by the Customs collector ;
(iv) where the goods are imported or exported by land-before the permit for the passage of the goods out of or into foreign territory is issued, and the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and of the Land Customs Act, 1924, relating respectively to the clearance, shipping arid removal of goods and the passage of goods out of or into foreign territory shall. So far as maybe, applied to the payment of the tax under this Act as they apply for the purposes of those Acts.
(6) Where goods are produced or manufactured in Pakistan tinder such circumstances or conditions as render it difficult to determine the value thereof for the tax because--
(a) a lease of such goods or the right of using the same but not the right of property therein is sold or given ; or
(b) such goods having a royalty imposed thereon, the royalty is uncertain, or is not from other causes a reliable means of estimating the value of the goods, or
(e) such goods are manufactured by contract for labour only and not including the value of the goods that enter into to same, or under any other unusual or peculiar manner or conditions ; or
(d) such goods are for use by the manufacture or producer and not for sale ;
the Sales Tax Officer may determine the value for the tax under this Act and all such transactions shall, for the purposes of this Act, be regarded as sales.
(7) If any person other than the manufacture of producer or importer or licensed wholesaler or exporter hereinbefore mentioned acquires from or against any one of these persons the right to sell any goods, whether as a result of the operation of law or of any transaction not taxable under the next succeeding section, the sale of such goods by him shall be taxable as if made by the manufacturer or producer or importer or licensed wholesaler or exporter, as the case may be, and the person so selling shall be liable to pay the tax."
"4. Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3, the tax shall not be payable on-
(a) goods sold by a licensed manufacturer to another licensed manufacturer if the goods are partly manufactured goods ; or
(b) goods imported by a licensed manufacturer if the goods are partly goods ; or
(e) goods imported by a licensed wholesaler; or
(d) goods sold by a licensed manufacturer to a licensed wholesaler or a licensed exporter ; or
(e) goods sold by a licensed wholesaler to a licensed manufacturer if the goods are partly manufactured goods ; or
(f) goods sold by a licensed wholesaler to another licensed wholesaler
Provided that if a licensed wholesaler sells goods to another licensed wholesaler at a price less than the value upon which the tax would be computed under clause (iii) or clause (iv) of subsection ( ) of section 3, the vendor shall forthwith become liable to pay the tax upon the difference between such value and his sale price."
"7. (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, exempt any goods or class of goods or any person or class of persons from the tax payable under this Act, and may also, by notification as aforesaid, make a reduction in the rate of tax leviable in respect of any goods or class of goods.
(2) Any exemption notified under subsection (1) may be made subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification."
The Act, if considered as a whole, will be found to envisage that in the matter of imposition of sales tax there cannot be a rigid rule as to the rates of tax in regard to certain classes of goods and the exemption to be granted to goods which come within the purview of the Act from payment of tax. If the provisions, quoted above, are considered, it will be evident that the Legislature felt that, in regard to the above two matters, decision will be dependent upon the trade conditions prevailing in the Country at a given time. It is because of this that wide powers in regard to the rates of tax exemption have been given to the Central Government. In this view of the matter, we are unable to accept the contention that the provision under attack amount to delegated legislation and are therefore ultra vices. In our opinion, the argument that the provisions admit of wide power of unguided discretion, and that by refusing to grant exemption to the petitioner-company while some of the manufacturers of similar goods were granted exemption it has as a matter of fact been left to a situation of unfair competition, is equally unsubstantiated. We have already noted that in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondents it has been stated that the articles, which were granted exemption, namely, rods of some sizes, are different from "wires" which are produced by the petitioner-company. At this stage, it is worth pointing out that the statement in the affidavit filed by the respondents does not appear to be fully satisfactory. More facts should have been stated to point out that difference between the two clauses of goods and the reason for exempting one class and not the other. Be that as it may, we are not satisfied that the petitioner, by the assertions made in the application, has succeeded in establishing a clear case of arbitrary discrimination, and in that view the petitioner-company is not entitled to any relief in this case.
The conclusions, at which we have arrived in regard to these two points receives supports from some observations in the case of Messrs East arid West Steamship Company v. Pakistan (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 41). In that case section 3 of the Control of Shipping Act was challenged on grounds which are the same as the grounds on which Mr. Haidar Mota has challenged the provisions of sections 3, 7 and 8 of the Sales Tax Act. The learned Chief Justice, in this connection, observed as follows :-
"From these provisions it seems to be perfectly clear that the Act proceeds on a definite policy, namely, the policy of placing the ships, for the period of the emergency, substantially at the disposal of the Government to enable it to direct what classes of cargo or passengers may be carried, to claim priority for Government cargo and passengers, to fix rates and freights, and to know the exact position of a Pakistan ship at a particular time so that if any urgency arises it may be called back for home service. This policy could successfully be carried out only if full powers which could not be controlled by rules, were given to the Shipping Authority, and the licensing system comtemplated by the Act is merely a means for the Shipping Authority to requisition shipping space to satisfy urgent and exceptional trade needs of the country. Financial injustice to the owners is avoided by the provisions for a Board to advise the Central Government in respect of rates.
Acting within the framework of the Act the Shipping Authority can protect Pakistan shipping against foreign competition, by regulating the rates can avoid cut throat competition between Pakistan shipping companies on the one had and prevent them from pooling together with a view to raising the rates to abnormal heights on the other. In the same manner the Authority can regulate exports and imports and maintain trade in essential goods and commodities between the two wings of the country which are separated by a distance of 1,500 miles and between which trade by air is impracticable and transport by rail can only be through a foreign country. If these were the objects intended to be attained by the Act, it was not possible for the Legislature to define in meticulous details how the Shipping Authority was to act in particular circumstances, and it was rightly considered to be necessary to leave him a large field of discretion so that he could act freely to meet a situation as it arose. The Legislature could not have possibly anticipated the varying trade situations, what the needs of Government or the community in the matter of carriage by sea may be, and what essential supplies would be needed from time to time by each wing. In view of this uncertainty considerable latitude had to be left to the shipping authority to cope with all possible situations. Even where legislation, which vests in public official absolute discretion to grant or refuse a licence to carry on an ordinary business, profession or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions to guide them in the execution of their discretionary power, has been held to be invalid on the ground of unauthorised delegation of legislative powers, an exception has always been recognized in the case of situations which require the vesting of discretion in public boards or officials where it is difficult or impracticable to lay down a definite comprehensive rule or the discretion relates to the administration of licensing requirements to protect the general welfare.
In the present case, the Legislature thought that the control of shipping was necessary in the interest of public welfare and from the very nature of the trade to be regulated it was necessary that the Shipping Authority should have abundant discretion if the policy and purposes of the Act were to be carried out. The Act is not, therefore, ex facie bad either on the ground of legislative authority or on the ground of excessive delegation that the Shipping Authority if it were so minded could administer it in a discriminatory manner. Objection on the first ground must fail because the Act lays down a policy which the Shipping Authority has to implement by the exercise of power given to him, while objection on the second ground must be repelled because the petition does not allege any discrimination in practice".
Cornelius, J. (as he then was) has observed:
"Therefore, it seems to me that reference to Article 5 of the Constitution is not really relevant in the present case. It cannot be said that by leaving discretion to the Shipping Authority, he is given the position of being a law unto himself in the sense that he can decide for himself in what conditions he will grant a permit or, as the case may be, refuse a permit. There is no question of legislation at all since each case has to be considered ad hoc in relation to the circumstances existing when it arises in the light of the requirements of the State, and in compliance with the policy laid down. That degree of discretion is vested in the Executive inherently as a necessary condition of its existence."
The above observations, in our view, clearly apply to the present case. The requirements which would justify exemption could not be anticipated by the Legislature and therefore it was not possible to enumerate them in the Act. Discretion had to be left, therefore to the Executive Government to take decision from time to time in this regard within the framework of the not according to the exigencies of trade, and in the absence of any clear proof that the discretion has been abused against the petitioner to his prejudice, we are unable to accept the contention that the impugned provisions are ultra vires as delegated legislation or violative of the 15th Fundamental Right guaranteed by the Constitution. When the subject dealt with by the Legislature by its very nature suggests that a wide discretion has to be left to the Executive Government allowing such discretion do not amount to delegated legislation, and in the absence of any proof of exercise of the power resulting in discrimination, the Court cannot interfere. In a system as ours, where separation of powers of the Legislature and the Judiciary and the Executive is provided for by the written Constitution, all that the Legislature is required to guard against is that it does not surrender or abdicate its power. In a given case, whether the legislation amounts to surrender or abdication, will depend upon the nature of the impugned provisions read alongwith the other provisions of the law in question. If it is found that the power given to the Executive does not allow it to modify any essential feature of the law, then it does not amount to delegation of legislative power. The power to work out details within the framework of the law, if given, has been held to be within permissible limits of delegation so as not to render it unconstitutional.
In the case of the Queen v. Burah (5 I A 178), the Judicial Committee pointed out that while the Indian Legislature acting within the limits of its powers given to it by the Act of the Parliament could not create a new legislative power, it could legislate it within its sphere conditionally. It was observed:
"Legislation, conditional on the use of particular powers, or on the exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the Legislature to persons in whom it places confidence, is no uncommon thing, and, in many circumstances, it may be highly convenient."
In the case of Baxter v. Ah. Way ((1909) 8 C L R 626 at p. 637). O'Conner, J. of the Australian High Court has observed as follows :-
"The aim of all Legislatures is to project their minds as far as possible into the future, and to provide in terms as general as possible for all contingencies likely to arise in the application of the law. But it is not possible to provide specifically for all cases and therefore, legislation from the very earliest times, and particularly in modern times, has taken the form of conditional legislation, leaving it to some specified authority to determine the circumstances in which the law shall be applied, or to what its operation shall be extended, or the particular class of persons or goods to which it shall be applied."
In that case the validity of certain provisions of the Customs Act of 1901 was challenged. By the Act, the importation of certain goods which were specifically mentioned was prohibited. The Act further gave power to the Governor-General-in-Council to include by proclamation other goods also within the prohibited list. The validity of the provision leaving power to the Governor-General to add to the list was challenged on the ground of being delegation of legislative powers. The contention however, was not accepted and it was held that it amounted only to conditional legislation. We have not been able to procure a copy of 8 C L R and have accordingly quoted the above passage and taken the facts of the case from the decision reported as Edward Mills Co. v. State of Ajmer (A I R 1955 S C 25 at p. 32).
Having found that the present case is covered by the decision of our Supreme Court in the case of East and West Steamship Co., we have felt it unnecessary to refer to some Indian decisions on which Mr. Haidar Mota has relied in support of his contention.
The result, therefore, is that this Rule is discharged with costs which we assess at ten Gold Mohurs.
SIKANDAR ALI, J
S. Q. Rule discharged.
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