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Civil Revision Nos. 21 to 25 of 1949, decided on 30th December, 1949, from the order of Sub‑Judge, Quetta, dated 29th October, 1946.

S. 33‑Revisional Powers of Court‑‑Supplementary‑Can be invoked only in case where important question of law and custom involved.

Revisional powers of Judicial Commissioner's Court under section 33 of the British Baluchistan Courts Regulation are only supplementary and they can be invoked only in a case where an important question of law or custom is involved.

S, 3 (2)‑‑Does not mean than rent must be determined on basis of standard rents of similar Premises.

The last sentence of this subsection namely " and in so doing shall have regard to the standard rents of other similar premises in the sauce locality " cannot be interpreted to mean that the rent' to be determined must invariably be based on the standard rents of other similar premises fixed previously,

The intention of the Legislature; which is sufficiently clear from the words used, appears to be that the Court dealing with an application for determination of rent under subsection (2) of section 3 of the aforesaid Regulation, while taking into consider ation other factors, shall also keep in view the standard rents of other similar premises in the same locality, provided there were any.

As all these five 'revision petitions, which have been filed in this Court under section 115 of the Civil Pro cedure Code read with section 33 of the British Baluchistan Courts Regulation 1939, are directed against the same order of the Sub‑Judge, Quetta, I proposal to deal with them jointly.

It is clear that the revisional powers of this Court under section 33 of the British Baluchistan Courts Regulation are only supplementary and they can be invoked only in a case where an important question of law or custom is involved. As no such question is before me the aforesaid section has no applica tion to these revision petitions.

As regards section 115 of Civil Procedure Code, it is also clear that these powers are entirely discretionary and can be exercised only, in cases in which no appeal lies to the High Court and in which, the lower Court has exercised .a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. According. to the interpretation of this section by their Lordships of the Privy Council in A I R 1917 P. C. 71 (74), which is the leading case on this point and which has invariably been followed by this High Court, the provisions of section 115 apply to juris diction alone and are not directed against conclusions of ,4aw and fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. I accordingly propose t0 deal with these revision petitions' in the light of the remarks stated above. It may be noted that no appeal lies to the High Court or even to the Court of District judge in. this case under the provisions of the Rent Control Regulation.

An attempt was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to show that the lower Court had acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. His main contention are that the lower Court refused to grant an adjournment sought by the petitioner on 24th May, 1949 in order to enable him to produce further evidence in support of his 'contention that the rent charged by him from the respondents was reasonable or at least was not higher than that charged by other landlords Pot similar premises in the same locality and that the Court, while determining rent of the Mops in question under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Rent Control Regulations should have the rent on the basis of the standard refit of other , similar, premised in the same locality. The learned Counsel accordingly maintains that the lower Court did riot exercise its Jurisdiction property in dealing, with the case and for that reason interference by this Court would be justified.

On going through the records I do not find any subs4Race in the first contention.. The lower Court, as is clear from its order of 24th May, 1949, was inclined to want an adjournment but, as the petitioner had not bound down his witnesses on the previous date of hearing, ,although be had been expressly directed bb the Court to do so, and as he also refused, to pay.' the, caste of the adjournment asked for by him, the learned Sub judge had no alternative but to refuse the adjournment,

As regards the second contention, I cannot' agree with the learned Counsel interpretation of subsection (2) of section 3 ,of, the heat Control Regulation. The last sentence of this sub, section namely gad in so doing shall have regard to standard rents of other similar premises in the same locality cannot be interpreted to mean that the rent to be determine must invariably be based on the standard rents of other similar premises fixed previously. Such an interpretation is clearly tenable inasmuch as the provisions of this subsection would rendered incapable of application in cases where no standard rent of similar premises was fixed previously in the same locality. Even the determination of rent in Me very first case dealt with under this provision of law would have been impossible for the simple reason that no standard rent existed prior to the mulgation of the Rent Control Regulation. The intention of the Legislature, which is sufficiently clear from the words used, appears to be that the Court dealing with an application for determination of rent under subsection (2) of section 3 of the aforesaid regulation, while taking into consideration other factors, shall also keep in view the standard rents of other similar premises in the same locality, provided there were any. In this particular case the lower Court has stated that the parties did not adduce any evidence to show what was the standard rent, if any, of other similar premises in the same locality.

I am accordingly satisfied that there is nothing in this case to suggest that the lower Court has in any way acted illegally or with ' material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. I therefore hold that the grounds urged before me do not in any way attract the provisions of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. For the reasons stated above I am left with no opinion but to reject these petitions with costs.

K.M.A. Petitions dismissed.

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