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Civil Appeal No. K‑148 of 1983, decided on 7th June, 1984.
(On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Sind at Karachi, dated 25‑7 19 3 passed in First Rent Appeal No. 523 of 1983).
‑‑‑Art.185(3)‑‑Sind Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979), S.14‑ Ejectment‑‑Personal need of landlord‑‑Leave granted to consider whether bona fide of requirement of landlord was relevant consideration for purpose of eviction under S.14, as leave had already been granted on similar point in another case.
‑‑‑S. 14‑‑Ejectment‑‑Porsonal requirement of landlord‑‑Rent Controller, upon assessing evidence adduced before him, coming to conclusion that landlord in good faith required premises for establishing business he was previously doing‑‑Concurrent finding of two Courts below, supported by evidence on record being that requirement of landlord was for bona fide personal use, held, not liable to be reopened‑‑Appeal dismissed.
K.P. Moidoo v. Mst. Noor Jahan Begum Appeal No. K‑307 of 1982 ref.
Ahmedullah Farooqi, Advocate‑on‑Record for Appellant.
Badrudduja Khan, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Nazir Ahmad, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent.
Date of hearing: 7th June, 1984.
This is an appeal by special leave from an order, dated 25‑7‑1983 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Sind High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant against the order of his eviction from the shop premises let out to him by the respondent situated at Commercial Area, Liaquatabad, Karachi. The Rent Controller had ordered the appellant's eviction under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 vide order, dated 26‑5‑1983.
2. Leave was granted in this case to consider the contention of the appellant that it was necessary for the landlord under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 to satisfy the Controller that he required the premises bona fide for personal use before he can succeed to obtain the eviction of the tenant. This Court was persuaded to grant leave in this case on the question whether the bona fide of the requirement of the landlord is a relevant consideration for the purpose of eviction under section 14, as this Court had already granted leave to appeal in Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. K‑307 of 1982 K.P. Moidoo v. Mst. Noor Jahan Begum. In that case a plea in defence was raised by the tenant to the effect that the landlord did not in fact need the building in good faith for personal use, but the Rent Controller had refused to go into the question on the view that good faith was not a requirement of section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance. The High Court in appeal also upheld the view holding that it was not necessary for the landlord under section 14 to prove the bona fide of his requirement.
3. Today after hearing the learned counsel we, however, find that the present case does not involve the question of law that was raised in Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. K‑307 of 1982. In fact in this case a specific issue was framed by the learned Rent Controller to the effect whether the landlord required the premises in question reasonably in good faith for his use and the parties had led evidence thereon. The learned Rent Controller upon assessing the evidence adduced before him came to the conclusion that the respondent genuinely in good faith required the premises for establishing a business as he was previously doing and owing to disappearance of his son he had let out the shop to the respondent in the intervening period an order to search his son. The High Court was satisfied with this finding of the learned Rent Controller and affirmed the same, consequently this being' a finding of fact supported by evidence declined to upset the same. Thus the concurrent finding of the two Courts below that the requirement of the respondent was for bona fide personal use is not liable to be reopened in the present petition. We are satisfied that the finding arrived at was supportable by the evidence on record and, therefore, we cannot permit the reopening of the issue at this stage.
4. The appeal is, therefore, without substance and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
M. I. Appeal dismissed.
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