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Application No. 30 of 1983, decided on 15^th August, 1984.

(a) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)‑‑

‑‑‑S.O. 12(3)‑‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), S. 25 A‑‑Grievance notice‑‑Termination of service of permanent workman‑ Reasons to be mentioned explicitly in termination order‑‑Employer has no unfettered power to terminate services stating that same no longer required‑‑Termination. purportedly due to abolition of post‑‑Neither an order regarding abolition of post issued nor same mentioned in termination order and fact of abolition of post not proved before Labour Court‑ Termination order, in circumstances, held, not sustainable and applicant awarded re‑instatement by Labour Court with all back benefits [1987 P L C 24 , 1981 P L C 361, 1982 P 1. C 105 and 1982 P L C 443 held not applicable].

1981 P L C 24; 1981 P 1. C 361; 1982 P L C 105 and 1982 P L C 443 held not applicable.

Appeal No. 84 of 1983 (unreported) and 1984 P L C 79,2 rel. 1984 P L C 792 rel.

---‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑Grievance notice‑‑Service denied‑‑Receipt of empty envelop through post from applicant workmen admitted‑‑Employer, in circum stances, held, bound to inform applicant and ask him to supply copy of letter intended to be sent‑‑Plea that envelop was empty not established‑‑Contention of non‑receipt of grievance notice, in circum stances, rejected.

Salahuddin H. Ahmed for Applicant.

M. Ibrahim Soomro for Respondent.

This application under section 25‑A, of I.R.O., 1969 has been preferred for re‑instatement with back benefits.

2. According to the application moved by the applicant on 2‑5‑1983, he was appointed on 26‑2‑1979 as Storekeeper. He worked as such till 14‑3‑1983 when his services were terminated as per Annexure A/l without assigning any reason. He accordingly served a grievance notice on 17‑3‑1983 and having received no reply he approached this Court for the reinstatement.

3. This application was resisted on behalf of the respondent. In its reply statement dated 28‑5‑1983 the respondent contended that in fact this applicant was appointed as a Tool Clerk in the year 1980 and not as Storekeeper in the year 1979 and further that he was brought on regular cadre in the year 1982. While denying that the terms and conditions of service of the applicant were regulated by the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 or Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, it has been pleaded that this applicant was terminated on 15‑3‑1983 because the post of Tool Clerk had been abolished and so his services were no more required. It has also been pleaded that the fact of abolition of the post was notified to him at the time of handing over termination order. It has also been pleaded in the reply statement that the grievance notice was not served on the respondent and that only an empty envelope was sent by the applicant. It has accordingly been contended in the reply statement that since the applicant has failed to serve the grievance notice as required by law, his application is not maintainable.

4. In order to substantiate its case the applicant examined himself while one Mohammad Umer Khan Manager of the respondent establishment, was tendered in evidence on behalf of the respondent. After the evidence I have heard Mr. Salahuddin H. Ahmed Advocate for the applicant and Mr. Ibrahim Soomro Advocate for the respondent. I have also considered the evidence on record.

5. It has been contended on behalf of the applicant that the termination order impugned in these proceedings, is without any reasons and so the termination of the applicant is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel urged that the respondent neither mentioned the fact of abolition of post in the termination letter nor it produced any documentary proof to this effect and so the termination is not legal. As to the non‑service of the grievance notice it has been argued on behalf of the applicant that it was duly served on the respondent. Learned counsel submits that if the envelop was empty then the said envelop should have been produced in the Court or the respondent should have intimated the applicant on receipt of the empty envelop. Learned counsel has placed reliance on an unreported order passed in Appeal No. 84 of 1983, decided by the Hon'ble Tribunal on 28‑2‑1983 as also 1984 P L C 792.

6. Mr. Ibrahim Soomro learned counsel for the respondent has strenuously argued that it is the sole and unfettered discretion of the management to terminate any employee under the provisions of Standing Order 12(3) if at any time his services are no more required. The only condition attached to the exercise of this discretion is that the termination should not be mala fide. Learned counsel submits that in the instant case the applicant has not been able to prove any mala fide on the part of the management and so the impugned termination order cannot be assailed in these proceedings. Learned counsel submits that in para. 3 of the application of the applicant it was alleged that he was removed from service because he was insisting upon the management to provide him certain benefits and that the management became annoyed with him and so in order to get rid of him his services were terminated without any reasons whatsoever. However, in the cross‑examination, the applicant specifically admitted that the management had no annoyance or enmity with him. In this situation, learned counsel urged that impugned order has to be accepted as proper as it was not passed with any mala fide intentions. As to the service of the grievance notice, learned counsel submits that only an empty envelop was sent by the applicant and so the grievance notice cannot be said to have been served upon the management. According to the learned counsel, it was the bounden duty of the applicant to prove the service of grievance notice and since he did not lead any evidence to this effect his application has to be thrown away. Finally learned counsel relied upon 1981 P L C 24 and 361 on the question of sole discretion of the management to terminate any person at any stage without assigning any reason and 1982 P L C 105 and 443 on the ground of service of grievance notice.

7. Admittedly the applicant was terminated vide letter, dated 14‑3‑1983 and according to this letter the services of the applicant were said to be no more required. According to the provisions of Standing Order 12, services of any permanent worker can be terminated on giving one month's notice or on payment of one month wages in lieu of notice but it cannot be argued that such termination would be without any reason. Subsection (1) of Standing Order 12 also speaks of disclosing any reason for termination even the termination is for the reason other than misconduct. Subsection (3) thereof makes this position more clear by laying down that at the time of termination the reasons must be explicitly stated in the order itself. The two authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent are not at all helpful to him. Both these reported cases pertain to retrenchment and in such a situation as well it has been held that the management should also be for bona fide reorganization and should not be with any mala fide intentions. Learned counsel for the respondent has himself argued that the termination power should be exercised with bona fide intentions and such intentions can be examined by the Labour Court. Accordingly, while examining the record of this case I find that the services of the applicant have been terminated without any reasons whatsoever. The plea of abolition of the post raised by the respondent now in this Court has also not been substantiated. The solitary witness examined on behalf of the respondent has very clearly admitted that the management had not passed any order for the abolition of this post. At one stage this witness took a plea that such an order of abolition of post was pasted on the notice board but he was unable to produce the said order in this Court. If any plea of abolition of post has been advanced in this Court, the respondent was under legal obligation to prove the same. As stated above, the respondent could not produce any such order in this Court through it was specifically required to be produced. Accordingly, it cannot be argued on behalf of the respondent that this termination order was on the ground of abolition of post itself. Since the impugned order was without any reasons whatsoever and since the plea raised in this Court on behalf of the respondent has not been established, this order cannot be maintained. In the cases cited at the bar on behalf of the applicant also it has been specifically held that such type of termination should also contain proper reasons for termination and if the orders are without any reasons the same are liable to be set aside. I would state here that the management has not been given any unfettered powers to terminate the services of any person without assigning reason simply because such an employee is not liked by the respondent. Such type of termination letters have never been approved by the Labour Courts.

8. The other submission of the learned counsel for the respondent about non‑service of grievance notice is also devoid of any substance. The respondent has himself admitted the receipt of an envelop through said to have been sent to him by the applicant after his termination envelop was empty and did not contain any letter, it was the respondent to have intimated to the applicant and he been called upon to furnish the copy of letter which was by him to be sent to the management. The respondent also produce the so‑called empty envelop said to have been received it was asked to do so on behalf of the applicant. The relied upon by the learned counsel are of no help to the simple reason that in those reported cases nothing was the management and the worker could not prove that he communication to the management. In the instant case position is altogether different inasmuch as respondent has admitted the receipt of an envelop through post and so the burden was on the respondent to prove that such an envelop was empty and did contain nothing. In this view of the matter I repel this contention of the learned counsel for the respondent as well.

9. In the result I allow this application and by holding that the impugned order was not tenable in law, I order the reinstatement of the applicant with all back benefits.

A. E.

Application allowed.

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