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Writ Petition No. 3133 of 1979, decided on 5th May, 1980.

-- S. 25.A(5)-Adjudication of grievance petition-Jurisdiction of Labour Court--Scope of enquire b3, Labour Court Evidence-- Petitioner, held, entitled in proceedings before Labour Court to summon record not summoned in domestic inquiry-Labour Court allowing petitioner to summon such record--Labour Appellate Tribunal reversing order of Labour Court-Order of Labour Court upheld and that of Appellate Tribunal set aside by High Court Writ Jurisdiction--Constitution of Pakistan 1973, Art. 199.

Crescent Jute Products Ltd. Jaranwala v. Muhammad Yaqoob etc. N L R 1979 Labour S C rel.

Ch. Ghulam Qadir for Petitioners.

Nemo for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

Javed Altaf for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4.

Date of hearing : 5th May, 1980.

Petitioner employee's services were terminated by his employer respon dent No. 3, on the ground of misconduct as he was alleged to have abused the officers and attempted to attack by a chair a senior Engineer. Further that he by force made the officers to leave their places of duties. After inquiry, the services of the petitioner were terminated on 4th September, 1977. He filed an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the Punjab Labour Court, No. 3. He also filed an application for summoning of some record which was resisted by the employer but was allowed by the Punjab Labour Court No. 3 vide order dated 10th December, 1977. The employer filed an appeal and the learned Appellate Tribunal held, that the petitioner was" not entitled to summon the record as he had not done so before the Inquiry Officer. He distinguished the case Crescent Jute products Ltd. Jaranwala v. Muhammad Yaqoob etc. (N L R 1979 Labour S C) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner with an observation that only applied to the facts and evidence already on the record before the Inquiry Officer, and not to new facts and evidence which was sought to be produced before the Labour Court. This is vide order dated 10th March, 1979. The petitioner has filed this constitutional petition challenging the last mentioned order.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the allega tions against the petitioner were that he had misconducted himself from about 10-30 to 11-15 a.m., whereas the petitioner had his duties during night hours from 10 p. m. to 6 p. m. in the morning and that he had left the premises after his duty hours. In order to prove that he was not present at the time of occurrence, he wanted to produce the documentary evidence, which had rightly been allowed to be called by the learned Labour Court but that order has without lawful authority been set aside by the learned Appellate Tribunal vide order, dated 10th March, 1979.

3. Learned counsel for the Management has submitted that the evidence sought to be produced by the petitioner had not been asked to be called by the petitioner during the course of inquiry proceedings and he having not done so be was not entitled to call that evidence and, the learned Appellate Tribunal has rightly accepted the appeal of the Manage ment respondent No. 3. Secondly, that the Labour Courts can examine the validity of the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officers but have no jurisdiction to substitute fresh case.

4. The judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner before the learned Appellate Tribunal as well as before this Court lays down that.

"in subsection (5) of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance XXIII of 1969, it is laid down that 'in adjudicating and determining a grievance under subsection (4), the Labour Court shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case."

From the language of the statute hereinbefore reproduced it is clear that the Labour Court has the jurisdiction to go behind a dismissal order and to see for itself as to whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the concerned case it was justified or not, both on merits as well as law. The words 'shall go into all the facts of the case' are a clear' guide with regard to the wide scope of the enquiry which a Junior Labour Court undertake under section 25-A. These words indeed have been used with a purpose and have to be given full effect so as to achieve the result desired. These words show that when a case is brought before Junior Labour Court, the scope of enquiry is wider than for example the scope of a Tribunal examining only the legality of an order impugned before it. The words 'shall go into the facts of the case' ,dearly signify that the Junior Labour Court has full and complete powers to enter even into questions of fact and to arrive at its own conclusions regard less of there being no illegality of procedure in the domestic proceedings. By use of these words the intention of the Legislature appears to provide a double check, one in the form of a domestic enquiry to be held by an employer and the other in the form of a judicial determination by the Junior Labour Court itself. In other words the intention of subsection (5) of section 25-A appears to provide another forum in determining the grievance afresh after considering the facts on which any impugned order is based.

In view of the above enunciation of law by the learned Supreme Court of Pakistan, there is no doubt that the petitioner against whom the allegation was that he misconducted himself between 10-30 a.m. and 11-15 a.m. had the right to produce evidence to show that that was not the period of his working in the premises and that he had night shift from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. What the effect of that evidence would be is not for this Court to say. It would be for the Labour Court to decide as to whether the petitioner whose duty hours were from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. was present during 10-30 a.m. to 11-15 a.m. in the premises and had conducted himself as alleged against him.

5. In view of what has been stated above, the impugned order of the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore dated 10th March. 1979 is declared to have been passed without lawful authority and of no legal effect. As it is a service matter, for its expeditious disposal the parties are directed to appear before the Punjab Labour Court No. 3 on 11th May, 1980. The petition is allowed with costs.

A. E.

Petition accepted.

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