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-- S. 42 - Title to immovable property - Mutation - Evidentiary value-Plea of being bona fide purchaser of .land-Evidence of payment of consideration, a necessary ingredient of right asserted No- documentary evidence in form of receipt to bear out payment alleged to have been made produced - Mutation simply incorporates a transaction which has already taken place and, as such, mutation is only a piece of evidence, though not an unimportant one but it does not take place of transaction itself, nor per its own force, proves transaction which, even in presence of a mutation, stands in need of being independently proved like any other fact-Proof of payment of consideration, therefor, cannot be deemed to have been provided by mutation.

-- S. 42-Possession of immovable property-Plea of being bona fide purchaser of land-Unsupported entries of Khasra Girdawari regarding nature of possession, held, by one or the other person are only valueless.

-- S. 115-Revision--Khasra Girdawari not being foundation of title but only evidence thereof, interpretation of entries made therein remained a question of fact-No jurisdictional error of Courts below pointed out as having b.-en committed in reaching finding-Concurrent findings of fact reached by Courts below on basis of evidence led, held, were sacrosanct for purposes of revision-West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S. 42.

Devi Das and others v. Yaran Khan and others A I R 1937 Lab. 656 and Wali Muhammad v. Muhammad Bakhsh A I R 1930 P C 91 ref.

-J Possession of one co-sharer ensures also for benefit of other co-sharers-.Co. sharer, therefore, has a right to claim himself to be in possession of land through other co-sharers.

Saadullah Khan and 6 others v. Mir Mayo Khan and 14 others P L D 1970 Pesh. 150 (D. B.) ref.

Ch. Muhammad Asif Ranjha for Petitioners.

Respondent No. 5, Mst. Fatima widow of Ahmad, and the petitioners herein, who happened to be the alienees in third succession of the land on account of a transfer thereof made by her after securing in the year 1950 the inheritance from her son Yara who died issueless and could not have transferred a title in the land .for more than her 1/3rd share. The suit was held to be within time under Article 120 of the Limitation Act on the basis of possession of land proved to have been held by them. Plea of the defendants about their being the bona fide purchasers of the land was negatived with the finding that there was no evidence about payment of consideration nor regarding any inquiry held by them about the title and possession of the land. Consequently, the suit was decreed and an appeal filed by the present petitioners has been dismissed by the learned District Judge by affirming the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court and they have now come upto this Court in revision.

2. It is argued by the learned counsel that the two Courts below have wrongly disregarded the entry of mutation Exh. D. 7 in holding that the petitioners have not been proved to be the bona fide purchasers. This argument is incorrect because they have considered this mutation and in the year 1948, were sued out for declaration by respondents Nos. 1 to 4 herein, namely, Shahmand, a real brother of the aforesaid Ahmad, and the three sons of Muhammad, their only other brother. The case set tip in the plaint, is that only 1/3rd share of land left by Yara had vested in his mother Mst. Fatoa while the remaining 2/3rd share thereof had devolved upon them. The suit was resisted on a number of pleas giving rise to a total of 8 issues involving the questions of limitation, estoppel and the defendants being the bona fide purchasers of land. Trial Court found on the basis of evidence led in the suit that Yara had died in the year 1948 with the result that the plaintiff-respondents became co-sharers in the land in dispute to the extent of 2/3rd upon the 1/3rd share thereof being inherited by Mst. Fatima held that there is no evidence of payment of consideration, a necessary ingredient of the right asserted. Clearly enough, a mutation simply incorporates a transaction which has already taken place and, as much, mutation is only a piece of evidence, though not an unimportant one but it does not take the place of the transaction itself nor, its own force, prove the transaction which, even in the presence of a mutation, stands in need of being independently proved like any other fact. This has been the consistent view of the superior A Courts taken in innumerable cases during the last more than half a century. Hence the proof of payment of consideration cannot be deemed to have been provided by the mutation Exh. D. 7. Learned counsel has not been able to point out any documentary evidence, in the form of receipt, to bear out the payment alleged to have been made by the petitioners and the ocular evidence adduced on the point has been disbelieved by the two Courts below. Hence, the conclusion of the two Courts below that a necessary condition for being the bona fide purchasers has not been proved in this case, is simply unexceptionable.