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Appeal No. KAR‑92 of 1983, decided on 8th January, 1984.

(a) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)‑

‑‑‑ S. 2(i)‑"Workman"‑Chowkidar or security guard‑Duties in cluding searching of persons leaving factory gate and to check goods passing out according to gate passes to see that nothing taken out un authorisedly‑Such duties, held, involved significant use of hands amounting to manual work‑Held: a workman.

Rehmat Ali Security Papers Ltd. and another P L D 1982 Kar. 913 rel.

--Ss. 35 & 37 read with Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 189, 201, 202 & 203 and Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.3---Decision of High Court Whether binding upon Labour Court and Appellate Tribunal---Arts.202 & 203 of Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 and S. 3 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 held not relevant for deciding such issue Courts subordinate to high Court enumerated in S.3 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 subordinate to High Court for purposes of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and cannot be considered as such for purposes of Art. 201 of Constitution of Pakistan, 1973‑Courts within territorial jurisdiction of High Court are subordinate to that High Court for purposes of Art. 201 ibid to the extent that question of law decided or principle of law enunciated by High Court would be binding on such Courts‑Question of law decided or principle of law enunciated by Division Bench of Sind High Court, held, binding upon Sind Labour Courts and Sind Appellate Tribunal‑[Premier Tobacco Industries Mazdoor Union v. Peoples Labour Union Mandra and 2 others 1981 P L C 279 dissented from].

Premier Tobacco Industries Mazdoor Union v. Peoples Labour Union Mandra and 2 others 1981 P L C 279 dissented from.

Naeem Bukhari for Appellants.

M. M. Jeelani for Respondent.

Date of hearing : 5th October, 1983.

The respondent was employed as a Chowkidar (Security Guard) with the appellant establishment. His services were terminated vide letter, dated 8th August, 1982, as no longer required by the appellants. He served a grievance notice on the appellant and his grievance having not been redressed he filed an application under section 25‑A, I. R. O., 1969, before the learned Labour Court No. III at Karachi. The learned Labour Court vide impugned order, dated 19th February, 1983 set aside the order of his removal from service being illegal and directed his re‑instatement with back benefits. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant establishment has come up in this appeal.

3. I have persued the material evidence recorded before the learned Labour Court and have also heard the learned counsel for the parties, Mr. Naeem Bukhari for the appellant and Mr. M. M. Jeelani for the respon dent. Mr. Naeem Bukhari for the appellant has mainly contended that the respondent was not a workman within the meaning of section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, as being a Chowkidar he was not doing any manual work and, therefore, his application under section 25‑A, I. R. O., was not maintainable. On the other hand, Mr. M. M. Jeelani has contended that the main duties of the respondent as a Chowkidar were to search persons entering into and leaving the factory gate and also to search the vehicles going out of the factory gate to ensure that nothing was taken out unauthorisedly from the factory and that since that process involved significant use of the hands, the respondent was definitely doing manual work within the meaning of definition of the 'workman' as defined in section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.

3. The appellants examined Humayun G. Shafi, Manager Administra tion of the factory, whereas the respondent examined himself. Mr. M. M. Jeelani has referred to the evidence of Mr. Humayun G. Shaft, the only witness examined on behalf of the appellant establishment. The witness has admitted in very clear terms that the duties of the respondent included searching of persons of those leaving the gate of the factory and to check the goods/articles passing out of the factory, according to the gate passes. These admissions clearly support the case of the respondent who has enumerated his duties as Chowkidar in his affidavit in evidence. They include the searching of persons getting into and going out of the factor gate and also searching of the vehicles to check the goods passing out Of the factory to see that nothing was taken out of the factory unauthorisedly. This part of his duties as a chowkidar obviously involved significant use of hands and he was definitely performing manual work within the meaning of definition of workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance. In that respect, Mr. M. M. Jeelani has also relied on the recent Division Bench decision of the Sind High Court in the case of Rehmat Ali v. Security Papers Ltd. and another (P L D 1982 Kar.915) wherein it was clearly held that mere fact that a person is employed by the designation of chowkidar or Security Guard will not exclude him from the definition of workman' given in section 2(i) of the Ordinance. The Court will have to determine the nature of his duties. If a chowkidar or Security Guard performs any of the duties of the nature, referred to in the definition, he will be covered by the definition. I would, therefore, appear that the respondent being a chowkidar (Security Guard) was a workman' within the meaning of definition in the Ordinance.

4. Confronted with this situation, Mr. Naeem Bukhari, the learned counsel for the appellant establishment has contended, firstly, that the decision of a High Court is not binding on this Tribunal and the Labour Court has been challenged before the Supreme Court, it cannot be followed till it is maintained by the Supreme Court. In my view, the contentions of the learned counsel have no force. As regards his first contention, he has relied on the decision of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case of Premier Tobacco Industries Mazdoor Union v. People's Labour Union, Mandra and 2 others (1981 P L C 279), wherein it was held that under Article 201 of th Constitution, any decision of a High Court shall to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law shall be binding on all Courts subordinate to it, and since the Labour Courts and the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal are not the Courts subordinate to a High Court within the meaning of section 3 of the C. P. C., they would not be bound by the decisions of a High Court. In that respect, the only' relevant Articles of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, are 189 and 201 which read as under :‑

Article 189.‑Any decision of the Supreme Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question of Law or is based upon or enunciate a principle of Law, be binding on all other Courts in Pakistan."

Article 201.‑Subject to Article 189, any decision, of a High Court shall, be the extent that it decides a question of Law or is based upon or enunciate a principle of Law, be binding on all Courts subordinate to it."

5. In my view, Articles 202 and 203 of the Constitution do not seem to be relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue in question, for the simple reason that the Article 202 opens with the words "subject to the Constitution and Law", whereas Article 203 follows Article 202. In my view, section 5 of the C. P. C. is also irrelevant for the purpose of interpreting Article 201 of the Constitution, for the simple reason that section 3 of the C. P. C. enumerates the Courts subordinate to the High Court as mentioned therein clearly for the purpose of the Code of Civil Procedure only, as stated therein. Therefore, the Courts subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be considered to be the Courts subordinate to the High Court also for the purpose of Articles 201 of the Constitution. Articles 189 and 201, if read in conjunction] would make the intention of the Constitution more clear that the Courts within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to that; High Court only for the purpose of Article 201 to the extent that the question of Law decided by the High Court or principle of Law enunciated by it, would be binding on all such Courts. In my humble opinion, there fore, I would respectfully disagree with the view held by the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal in the decision cited above. Since the Sind High Court has decided a question of Law or has enunciated a principle of Law in the above‑mentioned Division Bench decision as already stated by me above, the Labour Courts and this Tribunal working within its terri torial jurisdiction are bound by such decision. What I further find that till such decision is reversed by the Supreme Court, it holds ground and neither the Labour Courts nor this Tribunal can possibly disagree with it as it is a decision of our own High Court. I, therefore, find no force in the con tention raised on behalf of the appellants by its learned counsel in that res pect. I further find that on the basis of the evidence available on the record, the respondent is definitely a "workman" within the meaning of section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, and consequently, order of termination of his services was illegal.

6. The result is that the appeal is dismissed.

A. E.

Appeal dismissed.

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