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BIRJIS KHATOON versus JABBAR AHMAD


Sections 13 and 14 were found to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement between the eviction tenant and the landlord when she was already a widow, under which not only the rent rate was increased but also the tenant presented section 14 of the ordinance. This, of course, is not applicable in these circumstances because the landlord could not take advantage of his widow prior to the execution of the agreement before section 14, it is believed that the tenant already existed before the event. I have come up which entitles the landlord to take advantage of this part.

1983 C L C 3066

[Karachi]

Before Fakhruddin H. Shaikh, J

Mst. BIRJIS KHATOON‑Appellant

versus

JABBAR AHMAD‑.Respondent

First Rent Appeal No. 459 of 1981, decided on 15th December, 1982.

(a) Sind Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)‑

‑‑‑ Ss. 13 & 14‑‑Ejectment‑‑Fresh tenancy agreement taking place according to terms and conditions of compromise reached between tenant and landlady when she was already widow whereby not only rate of rent was enhanced but also tenant required to deposit b advance‑Section 14 of Ordinance, held, not applicable in circum stances as landlady could not take advantage of her having become" widow before agreement executed ‑ Section 14, held further, presupposes that tenancy came into existence before event which entitles landlady to take benefit of section.

(b) Sind Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)‑

‑‑‑‑ S. 14‑Ejectment‑Relationship of landlord and tenant comes to an end as soon as ejectment order passed‑Compromise reached during appeal against ejectment at fresh terms and conditions of " tenancy held, envisages new agreement coining into existence between par ties New agreement taking place subsequent to appellant becoming widow benefit of S. 14 of Ordinance not available to landlady.

(c) Sind Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)‑

‑‑Ss. 13 & 14‑Ejectment‑Personal requirement of son‑Possession of another shop rented by landlady delivered to her‑Case falling under mischief of S. 14(2)‑Landlady, held, not entitled to recover possession as her son can carry shop another can carry ,,business in vacated shop.

P L D 1982 Kar. 823 ref.

Asif A. Zahidi for Appellant.

Rafiq Ahmad for Respondent.

Date of hearing : 15th December, 1982.

JUDGMENT

This is an appeal from the order of Rent Controller, Karachi dated 25th August, 1981 whereby application of the appellant under sec tion 14(3) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance) was dismissed. The facts of the cast are as under :

2. The appellant is owner of two shops on Plot No. 562, P. I. B Colony, Karachi‑5. One of these shops was rented out to the respondent at Rs. 50 per month by the husband of the appellant Syed Asiful Haq. Her husband died on 15th October, 1980 and thereafter she served notice on the respondent on 15th November, 1980 that she wanted the shop for the use of her son and that the respondent hand over possession of the shop to her within two months. As the respondent did not vacate the hop, hence she filed ejectment application which was dismissed as stated above.

3. Before filing this ejectment application the appellant who is her self owner of the property in question, had filed a rent case against the same respondent which was allowed. Respondent Jabbar Ahmad filed appeal against that ejectment order which was heard by the VIth Addi tional District Judge, Karachi. It was Rent Appeal No. 284/1979. In that appeal the parties filed compromise on 5th November, 1980. According to the terms of the compromise the respondent was to continue in the shop in question payment of enhanced rent at Rs. 100 p. m. instead of Rs. 50 per month which was the previous rate of rent. The respon dent was also required to deposit Rs. 2,000 with the appellant as future rent. This compromise was accepted by the learned District Judge on 5th November, 1980 and the appeal was disposed of in terms of the same.

4. It appears that after three months of the compromise, fresh rent application under section 14(3) of the said Ordinance was filed out of which the present appeal has arisen. The learned Rent Controller framed two issues in the case regarding maintainability of the ejectment application under section 14(3) of the said Ordinance and as to whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of section 14. Both these issues were decided against the appellant.

5. The facts which have been narrated above would disclose that the property was rented out by the appellant previously at Rs. 50 p. m. An ejectment order was also passed in favour of the appellant which was, subjected to appeal. During the appeal a compromise was filed in November, 1980 when the appellant was already a widow. The terms and conditions of this compromise clearly show that a fresh tenancy agreement had taken place between the parties. Not only the rate oil rent was enhanced but the tenant was also required to deposit Rs. 2,000; by way of advance rent. Under these circumstances the learned Rent Controller was justified in holding that section 14 of the said Ordinance is not applicable. This section is not applicable when the premises are rented out by a widow herself after she has become widow. She cannot take advantage of her having become widow before the tenancy agreement is executed. Section 14 of the said Ordinance pre‑supposes that the tenancy came into existence before the event which entitles a landlady to take benefit of the said section. In the present case the landlady was already widow at the time when she rented out the shop in question to the respondent by a fresh tenancy agreement dated 5th November, 1980 by means of the compromise application, a certified copy of which is on the record. It is not denied that the appellant had already become widow before the compromise was entered into.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the compro mise application does not amount to a fresh tenancy agreement but would be a continuation of the existing tenancy agreement with variation of the terms and conditions thereof. The argument is misconceived. As soon as an ejectment order was passed, the relationship of landlord and, tenant between the parties came to an end. However, during appeal a compromise was arrived at and fresh terms and conditions of tenancy were settled between the parties. The effect of the fresh agreement shall be that a new tenancy agreement came into existence between the parties, and as this agreement had taken place subsequent to the appellant becom ing widow, the benefit of section 14 of the said Ordinance would not be available to her in view of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 the said Ordinance.

7. The claim of the appellant has also been challenged on another ground namely, that she has already obtained possession of another shop which has rented out to Ulfat Hameed. She had filed ejectment against Ulfat Hameed which was allowed. Ulfat Hameed had filed appeal in High Court being F. R. A. No. 476 of 1981 which was dismissed on 4th November, 1981. The judgment in the above appeal is reported in P L D 1982 Kar. 823. Mr. Rafiq Ahmad learned counsel for the respondent has stated at the Bar that after the dismissal of the appeal the possession of the shop has been delivered by Ulfat Hameed to the present appellant. In view of this fact the case of the appellant shall fall within the mischief of section 14(2) of the said Ordinance and she shall not be entitled to recover possession of another shop which is in possession of the respondent. If she requires a shop for the use of her son to run business, the shop possession of which she has already obtained from Ulfat Hameed can‑be utilised for the purpose. It is also stated at the Bar that the other shop is bigger than the one in dispute in the present appeal.

For the above reasons the appeal is dismissed with costs.

M. Y. H. ‑‑‑‑‑‑‑ Appeal dismissed.

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