Find a Lawyer

‑‑ Art. 199 ‑ Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979), S. 7 ‑Suit filed by Banking Company against petitioner also impleading Rice Milling Corporation and Govern ment of Pakistan as parties‑‑‑Amount clamed in suit due from petitioner on account of cash credit facility to petitioner‑Special Judge (Banking) granting leave to defend suit to petitioner upon furnishing security to extent of amount claimed ‑ Petitioner challenging conditional leave to defend suit in review on ground that Special Judge has no jurisdiction to proceed against Rice Milling Corporation and Government of Pakistan‑Special Judge (Banking) upholding objection and rejecting review application on ground that there was no error on face of order ‑ No exception, held, can be taken to order of Special Judge (Banking) ‑ Order of Special Judge (Banking) being appealable before Court, held further, petitioner had alternate and efficacious remedy available against such order, High Court not interfered therein under Art. 199.

Mamoon A. Kazi for Petitioners.

Nemo for Respondents.

Date of hearing : 10th November, 1981.

SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.‑The petitioners who were defendants in a suit instituted against them by respondent 2 for recovery of a sum of Rs. 6,23,034 before the Special Court (Banking) for Sind exercising jurisdiction under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, have challenged the order passed by the Special Judge on 15th September, 1981 rejecting the review application of the petitioners, as illegal and without jurisdiction. The relevant facts in short are as follows :‑

Respondent 2 which is banking company instituted Suit No. 70 of 1980 against the petitioners impleading Rice Milling Corporation and Government of Pakistan also as defendants in the above suit leave to defend the suit was granted to the petitioners by the Special Court on 28th February, 198t upon furnishing security to the extent of the amount claimed in the suit on or before 28th March, 1981. No security was furnished by the petitioners as ordered but instead an application was filed before the Special Court for review of the order dated 28th February, Court. The only point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners before us is that the proceedings before the Special Court were without jurisdiction as the Special Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the dispute between a Banking Company and a borrower only arising out of the transaction of a loan. It is contended by the learned counsel that since the Rice Milling Corporation and the Government of Pakistan, who were impleaded as defendants in the suit were not the borrower as defined in the Ordinance and the transaction as disclosed in the plaint was not a transaction of loan, there fore, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Special Court in‑ the Suit was wholly without jurisdiction. According .to the allegations in the plaint the amount was claimed as due on account of cash credit facility granted to the petitioners which is not disputed

The respondent 2 had claimed the amount in the suit against the petitioners as an amount due on account of cash credit facility granted to the petitioners. The Special Court granted conditional leave to defend the suit to the petitioners. The petitioners challenged the order granting conditional leave to the petitioners by way of a review application. The Special Judge, refused to review the order granting conditional leave to defend the suit to the petitioners on the ground that there was no error on the face of order dated 28th February, 1981. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended before us that the proceedings before the Special Court by way of the suit were coram non judice as the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed against two of the defendants in the suit namely the Rice Milling Corporation and Government of Pakistan. It is, however, conceded by the learned counsel that in so far the petitioners were concerned the Special Court bad the jurisdiction to proceed against them. We have gone through the order dated 15th September, 1981, whereby the review application of the petitioners was rejected by the Special Court and after careful examination of the same we are of the view that no exception can be taken to the said order. In fact the contention now raised by the petitioners before us that the Special Court bad no jurisdiction over the Rice Milling Corporation and Government of Pakistan was upheld by the Special Court, while rejecting the review application of petitioners as the suit against them was dismissed by the Special Court on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over them. Besides, the order dated 15th September, 1981 is clearly appealable under the provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, as by the said order the suit against the petitioners was decreed by the Special Court. The petitioners, therefore, had an alternate and efficacious remedy available to them against the above order which is an additional reason for not y exercising the jurisdiction by us under Article 199 of the Constitution.

For the aforesaid reasons we dismiss the petition summarily.

M.Y.M, Petition dismissed.

Find a Lawyer Near You

Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.