Find a Lawyer

Bail Application No. 136 of 1956, decided on 9th October 1956.

, Ss. 337 (3) & 498 Approver cannot be admitted to bail.

Where an accused person who had accepted tender of pardon, applied to be released on bail

Held, that under S. 337 (3), Cr. P. C. an approver could not be enlarged on bail.

Section 498, Criminal Procedure Code being general could not over‑ride section 337 which specially deals with approvers.

Muhammad Abdul Majid v. Emperor 1927 Sind 173 dissented from.

Muhammad Akram for Petitioner.

Khawaja Muhammad Sharif for Government.

The point involved in this bail application is whether Ghulam Nabi approver in the case Government versus Fazal‑ur- Rehman under section 302 A. P. C, pending for trial before the Sessions Judge Muzaffarabad should be enlarged on bail or not. It has been contended by the learned Government Advocate that section 337, Criminal Procedure Code sub‑clause 3 is a bar to the release of the approver on bail. Counsel for the defendant relies on Muhammad Abdul Majid v. Emperor (1927 Sind 173) wherein Mr. Rup Chand Billa Ram, A. J. C., observed that section 337 should be interpreted as obligatory only on the Magistrate granting the pardon requiring him to detain the accomplice in custody and as in no way affecting the powers of superior Court. The learned A. J. C. in his judgment remarked a under

"It is one of the cardinal principles of interpretation of statutes that the construction which produces the greatest harmony and the least inconsistency between different parts of the same statute should prevail : Attorney‑General versus Sillem. This rule equally applies where the Court is tailed upon to examine if the general words employed in any one part of the Statute were not intended to be applied without some limitation Cox versus Hakes. If clause 3 is inter preted in the manner suggested by me it is consistent with the provisions not only of section 498 but also of clause (5) of section 497 of the Code which provide for granting and cancellation of bail by superior Courts. At the same time it appears to me to be more consistent with avowed intention of the legislature.

He further remarked "It is therefore more consistent than not that clause (3) should be interpreted as obligatory only on the Magistrate granting the pardon requiring him to detain the accomplice in custody and is in no way affecting the powers of the Superior Court."

I do not agree with the interpretation put on sub‑clause (3) of section 337, Cr. P. C. by the learned A. J. C.

When the language of the Statute is plain and admits of only one meaning the task of interpretation does not arise. The elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases are used in their ordinary meaning and that they are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. The wording of sub‑clause (3), section 337 of Criminal Procedure Code is plain and unambiguous and is to be construed in its ordinary sense. Sub‑clause (3) of section 337 clearly lays down that "such a person unless he is already on bail shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial".

The language is plain and does not call for any interpretation. Besides section 337 is a special section which deals with approvers and therefore section 498, Criminal Procedure Code which is a general section does not over‑ride it. I, therefore hold that in view of section 337 sub‑clause (3) the approver Ghulam Nabi cannot be enlarged on bail. The bail application is there fore rejected.

K./A. H. Application rejected.

Find a Lawyer Near You

Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.