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First Rent Appeal No. 857 of 1982, decided on 4th October, 1982.

‑ S. 14‑Eviction proceedings‑Relief has to be granted in accordance with circumstances as come to prevail on date of passing of order and not on date of institution of a case.

Wali Muhammad v. Hamida P L D 1981 Kar. 794 ref.

‑‑ S. 14‑Bona fide need of landlord has to be established‑Words "bona fide" in Ordinance‑Interpretation.

The mere use of the word "need" would envelop the concept of bona fides. After all, it has to be established that a person needs the premises, and, in such enquiry, it can never be said that the word has to be interpreted as if it were divorced from the concept of bona fides, or mala fides. Taking that view would mean that even unreasonable and fanciful need will have to be met only if the landlord were to come and say that he needs the premises. Such an intention could never be attributed to the Legislature, because the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance is enactment of a nature that is designed to protect the right of occupation of a tenant.

‑‑ S. 14‑Landlord's need‑Held, subject to judicial scrutiny in order to find whether genuine.

After all, a landlord, when he is projecting his needs, has to subject himself to judicial scrutiny, so that it should be found, whether the needs, that he expresses, are genuine, or, he is wanting more accommodation on account of desire to live in unreasonable luxury, or, a desire to dislodge his tenant.

Muhammad Jamil for Appellant.

The present appeal has been filed by S. Israr Alam, who is the owner of House No. C/44 in North Nazimabad, Karachi. The appellant filed a case of ejectment against the respondent on the ground that be needed the premises in occupation of the respondent for his personal use. The case was filed by aid of section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance on the premises that the appellant had retired from police service.

I have heard Mr. Muhammad Jamil at length, and I have also perused the record in the case. Since I have taken the view that this appeal is without substance, I have not thought it fit to issue any notice to the respondent, as that might unnecessarily burden him with expenditure and trouble.

Briefly, the facts are that the house in question is double‑storeyed. Each floor was in occupation of different tenants. The respondent is in possession of the upper storey, and the accommodation therein consists of three bed rooms with attached baths, one drawing‑cum‑dining room, one kitchen, one guest room, a garage and two servant quarters. The ground floor also has equal accommodation. Initially, the appellant filed two separate cases against the tenants of each storey of the bungalow, but it seems that, during the pendency of the case out of which the present appeal arises, the appellant was able to get the possession of the ground floor of the said house. One of the main reasons that had persuaded the learned Senior Civil Judge to decline relief in favour of the appellant was that at the time of passing of the final order, the appellant, having obtained possession of the ground floor of the bungalow, was not in genuine need of the premises in occupation of the respondents.

The learned Advocate has initially contended that relief has to be given by relating it to the facts as existed on the date of filing of the application. To put it in simple words, the contention boils down to this that, if, during the pendency of a case, grounded on the need of the landlord, it is established that the landlord had obtained other premises, then, regardless of that circumstance, eviction of the other tenant should also be granted. I have not been able to persuade myself to agree with that view, because relief has

to be granted in accordance with the circumstances as come to prevail on

the date of passing of the order, and not on the date of the institution of the cause. In the instant case, the landlord had filed two cases against two tenants, and, if be had succeeded in obtaining possession from one tenant, then the question, which arises, would be, whether he could still plead the ground of necessity and need in order to obtain eviction of the other tenant. Nothing has been placed before me to take the view that is canvassed by the learned Advocate. He has, however, drawn my attention to paragraph 4 in the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Wali Muhammad v. Hamida (P L D 1981 Kar. 794). In the above case, the learned Judge took the view that the question of bona fides could not be investigated by this Court in cases under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance. The learned Judge compared the language of the new Ordinance with the language used in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, in which statute the words "in good faith" were also used. I am not able to agree with that view, because the mere use of the word "need" would envelop the concept of bona fides. After all, it has to be established that a person needs the premises, and, in such enquiry, it can never be said that the word has to be interpreted as if it were divorced from the concept of bona fides, or, mala fides. Taking that view would mean that even unreasonable and fanciful need will have to be met only if the landlord were to come and say that he needs the premises. Such an intention could never be attributed to the Legislature, because the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance is enactment of a nature that is designed to protect the right of occupation of a tenant.

The question that then arises is, whether the appellant needs the premises. Mr. Muhammad Jamil has taken me through the entire evidence, and I find that the landlord has a family consisting of four sons and one daughter. Mr. Muhammad Jamil stated that some, out of the four sons, were of marriageable age, but, on a reading of the application and the affidavit of evidence submitted by the appellant, I find total absence in regard to particulars of the ages of the children. It would, therefore, not be correct to say that the landlord requires the premises, or, additional accommodation for lodging his sons, who may be of marriageable age. On the other hand, the accommodation, that is presently available with the landlord, is ample and sufficient. After all, a landlord, when he is projecting his needs, has to subject himself to judicial scrutiny, so that it should be found, whether the needs, that he expresses, are genuine, or, he is wanting more accommodation on account of desire to live in unreasonable luxury, or, a desire to dislodge his tenant. Applying that test, I am of the view that, in the instant case, the landlord has sufficient accommodation, and his demand for more accommodation is not genuine.

Subsection (2) of section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance would also bar the grant of relief in this case, as the provision, which is in the nature of an exception, seems to completely bar any relief for the reason that the appellant is admittedly in occupation of a building owned by him.

Considering all the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that the order passed by the Controller is justified and does not call for interference. This appeal is dismissed in limine.

M. Y. M. Appeal dismissed.

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