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Civil Revision No. 479‑D of 1981, decided on 17th May 1982.

‑ S. 25‑A read with Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 9 Industrial dispute‑Jurisdiction‑Section 25‑A of Ordinance, by implication, held, ousts jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of disputes determinable by Labour Courts.

Messrs Chalna Fibre Company Limited, Khulna and 4 others v. Abdul Jabbar and 9 others P L D 1968 S C 381; Safiuddin Kazi v. Moslem Ali Howladar and others P L D 1960 Dacca 674; Mst. Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum and others P L D 1975 S C 624; Abdur Rehman Shah v. The West (Punjab) Province P L D 1975 Lah. 954; Pakistan (represented by the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Rehabilitation Works, Islamabad) and another v. H. H. Ahmed 1971 S C M R 626; Muhammad Qasim v. Karachi Development Authority 1980 P L C 1097; Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and 5 others v. Muhammad Izharul Ahsan Qureshi P L D 1979 Kar. 640 and Municipal Committee, Jhang v. Muhammad Ramzan P L D 1978 Lah. 498 ref.

Azam S. Suharwardy for Petitioners.

Syed Muhammad Naqi for Respondents.

Dates of hearing: 16th November 1981 and 17th May 1982.

The petitioners, Muhammad Saeed and others were serving as railway employees when they were dismissed from service. Order of their dis missal was challenged by them by means of a civil suit which was dismissed by a Civil Judge on the ground that the suit could not be heard by a Civil Court. Judgment and decree of the learned trial Court were questioned by the petitioners by taking an appeal before Additional District Judge but without success. They have, therefore, come up in revision.

2. The petitioners have been non‑suited on the ground that the matter in dispute could be determined by a Labour Court under sec tion 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance, and since a special forum had been provided to redress the grievance voiced by the petitioners, its cognizance could not be taken by the Civil Courts.

3. Assailing the aforesaid view, it was contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that there was nothing in the said Ordinance ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and, therefore, the learned trial Court had erred in declining its jurisdiction to the petitioners. According to him the forum of the Labour Court was provided to the petitioners in addition to, and not in substitution of, the forum of Civil Court. He relied o n Messrs Chalna Fibre Company Limited, Khulna and 4 others v. Abdul Jabbar and, and 9 others (P L D 1968 S C 381), Safi‑ud‑Din Qazi v. Moslem Ali Howladar and others (P L D 1960 Dacca 674), Mst. Hamida Begum v. Mst, Murad Begum and others (P L D 1975 S C 624) Abdur Rehman Shah v. The West (Punjab) Province (P L D 1975 Lah. 954), Pakistan (represented by the Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Ministry of Rehabili tation and Works, Islamabad) and another v. H. H. Ahmed (1971 S C M R 626) and Muhammad Qasim v. Karachi Development Authority (1980 P L C 1097) to support This contention.

4. On the other hand, it was urged by learned counsel for the respondents that by providing a special forum to deal with matters like one in dispute, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts had been impliedly barred by section 25‑A of the said Ordinance and, therefore, no valid exception could be taken to the orders of the two Courts below. In this connection, he invited my attention to Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and 5 others v. Muhammad 1zharul Ahsan Qureshi (P L D 1979 Kar.640) and Municipal Committee, Jhang v. Muhammad Ramzan (P L D 1978 Lah. 498).

5. According to section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Sec tion 25‑A of the said Ordinance or any other provision thereof does not expressly bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to hear matters like the one in hand. What is, therefore, to be examined is whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in regard to such matters has been impliedly barred.

6. Section 25‑A of the said Ordinance empowers a Labour Court to bear and decide industrial disputes. According to clause (xiii) of sec tion 2 of the said Ordinance any dispute relating to the terms of employ ment of a worker is also an industrial dispute. Since the petitioners were dismissed from service it would appear that the dispute taken by them to the Civil Court was an industrial dispute within the meaning of clause (xiii) of section 2 of the said Ordinance. It is not denied that the petitioners were employed as workers at the time of their dismissal. As indicated above, in the suit brought by the petitioners they bad challenged the order of their dismissal. It would, therefore, follow that the matter involved in the suit was within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court.

7. Although it has not been provided in section 25‑A of the said Ordinance that the Labour Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try matters of which cognizance can be taken by it yet it appears that since the Legislature had set up a special forum, namely, Labour Court, to decide such matters, the intention of the law‑makers was to absolve the Civil Courts of the responsibility of adjudicating upon such matters. If they had intended otherwise, there was hardly any need to have a network of Labour Courts in addition to that of the Civil Courts. If the disputes referred to in section 25‑A of the said Ordinance are allowed to be agitated before the Labour Courts as well as the Civil Courts, it would result in nothing but confusion and conflicts. Perhaps the Labour Courts were set up by the Legislature, with a view to avoiding delays which occur in the disposal of cases by Civil Courts. My feeling, therefore, is that section 25‑A of the said Ordinance has, by implication, ousted the jurisdic tion of Civil Courts in respect of disputes which can be determined by the) Labour Courts.

8. The view taken by me derives support from the cases of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and 5 others and Municipal Com mittee Jhang cited by learned counsel for the respondents. As for the cases of Messrs Chalna Fibre Company Limited, Khulna and 4 others, Safiud Din Kazi, Mst. Hamida Begum, Abdur Rehman Shah, Pakistan (represented by the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan Ministry of Re habilitation and Works, Islamabad) and another and Muhammad Qasim, relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners, what was ruled therein was that if any matter of civil nature was not within the jurisdiction of a tribunal of special jurisdiction it could be heard by a Civil Court. As explained above, the dispute involved in the instant case could be deter mined by the Labour Court and, therefore, the authorities relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners are of no help to him.

9. In result, I hold that the learned trial Court, being a civil Court, had no jurisdiction to hear the suit brought by the petitioners.. The judgments and decrees of the two Courts below are, therefore, unexcep tionable. The civil revision is, accordingly, dismissed. Since the point agitated in this case was not free from difficulty, I make ,no order as to costs.

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