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Civil Revision No. 1180 of 1981, decided on 2^ndNovember, 1981.

‑‑‑‑ Ss. 17 & 22‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115 read with Ss. 3 & 4‑Revision‑‑Courts enumerated in S. 3, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, unless provided otherwise in any other statute, only Courts subordinate to High Court‑‑‑Civil Court meaning‑Court of general or plenary jurisdiction and not Court of special jurisdic tion and Labour Court constituted under Industrial Relations Ordi nance, 1969 being not a Court of general or plenary jurisdiction but a Court of special jurisdiction and Labour Court not being declared subordinate to High Court either by Payment of Wages Act, 1936 or by Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (as amended) nor any other statute saying so, Punjab Labour Court, held, not subordinate to High Court and Appellate orders passed by such Court not open to revision before High Court. to 52]A H

Messrs S. M. Rehman 4 Co. v. Motabar and others P L D 1981 S C 282 distinguished.

Wajahat Ali Hasnie v. Mst. Ghazala P L D 1971 Lah. 641; Muhammad Ayub Butt v. Allied Bank Ltd., Peshawar P L D 1981. S C 359 and Azhar Hussain v. Chartered Bank, Faisalabad 1981 C L C 516 ref.

Abdul Karim Saggu for Petitioner:

This is a revision petition under section 115, C. P. C. from appellate order dated 31st May, 1981, passed by Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore, dismissing the appeal of petitioner employee under section 17 of Payment of Wages Act, 1936, against an order of authority under Payment of Wages Act, 1936 whereby the latter had declined to issue a direction to respondent Railway for payment of wages amounting to Rs. 10,473 to petitioner.

2. I had questioned the learned counsel for the petitioner as to how this revision petition is competent. In response to this question, he has referred me to the case of Messrs S. M. Rehman & Co. v. Motabar and others (1) in which. it has been held that revision under section 115, C. P. C. against an order of appellate authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is competent. It is however clear from the report that the said case related to point of time when District Judge was the appellate authority under section 17 of Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and could hear the appeal against refusal of the authority under Payment of Wages Act, 1936, to give a direction for payment of wages to an employee and the Supreme Court had after taking note of the circum stances that the term "District Judge" had not beets deflated in Payment of Wages Act, concluded that term "District Judge" had to be given its ordinary meaning as indicated in General Clauses Act and in the Civil Procedure Code according to which it is a Court subordinate to High Court. It was accordingly held that appellate order of District Judge under Payment of Wages Act was amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. However, the case in hand is distinguishable on facts as in the present case the appellate authority was Punjab Labour Court. By an amendment made by Ordinance X11 of 1974 and later by Act XI of 1975 the words 1District Court' were substituted by the words 'Labour Court' constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1369 (XXIII of 1969), within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to which the appeal relates arose'. The accident with petitioner in the instant case took place on 30th June, 1977 and petitioner having been treated in Railway Hospital was said to have been declared fit on 3rd September, 1977. He filed a claim before authority under Payment of Wages Act on some date falling after 31st December, 1979 when he had withdrawn his previous application. His application for claim for payment of wages, etc. for the period after the date of accident was rejected by the Payment of Wages Authority for Pakistan Railways, Labour, on 27th October, 1980. An appeal under section 17 of Payment of Wages Act was filed before Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore, under the amended law. it is, therefore, clear that the above authority of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the facts of the case in hand.

3. The question, however, arises as to whether Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore, is a Court subordinate to the High Court, so as to make a revision under section 115, C. P. C. competent before High Court, because under section 115, C. P. C. a revision lies to the High Court, only against an order of any Court subordinate to the High Court.

4. I have considered the said question. Section 3, C. P. C. lays down that for the purposes of the Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of District Judge is subordinate to the High Court and District Court. Here the civil Court means a Court of general or plenary jurisdiction and not a Court of special jurisdiction. Labour Court constituted under Industrial Relations Ordinance is not a Court of general or plenary jurisdiction buts a Court of special jurisdiction. As appellate authority under section 17 of Payment of Wages Act, it administers special law enacted in Payment of Wages Act. The said Act as laid in its preamble deals with regulation of wages to certain classes of persons employed in an industry and is thus concerned exclusively with special rights of a particular class of individuals. Section 22 of the said Act bars suit before Civil Courts of general and plenary jurisdiction in respect of recovery of wages of a workman employed in any industry. It is, therefore, clear that the Labour Court which is the appellate authority in this case is a special Court of special jurisdiction and has a separate entity and is different from the Courts, which are subordinate to High Court.

5. Even otherwise it is clear that Punjab Labour Court is not a g Court subordinate to the High Court as required by section 115, C. P. C. so as to make the revision before High Court competent. Section C. P. C. in its full context reads as below :‑

"3. Subordination of Courts.‑.For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every civil Court of grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court or d District Court."

This section seems to specify the Courts subordinate to High Court for the purposes of C. P. C. The point has already been considered in the case of Wajahat Ali Hasnie v. Mst. Ghazala (P I. D 1971 Lah. 641) by Mr. Justice Nasim Hasan Shah, now a Judge of the Supreme Court. The relevant portion may be quoted here with advantage: ‑‑‑

"I cannot accept the broad and unqualified proposition that once it is held that an officer, authority, or functionary is exercising the functions of a Court in relation to rights that may be called civil, that Officer, authority or functionary must be held to be subordinate to the High Court. The result of any such finding would be that all Courts which adjudicate upon the civil rights of subjects whether in cases between the subjects themselves or between the State and the subject will be subordinate to the High Court and this will bring within the sphere of subordination not only the revenue Courts which admittedly decide civil disputes between the parties but also the income‑tax authorities which determine the subject's liability to the State. I respectfully agree and may add that the words subordinate Court' to section 115 of the Code of Civil Pro cedure ought to be understood in the sense given to them in section 3, otherwise the words for the purposes of this Code' would be rendered useless. Since section 3 is enacted for the purposes of the Code and deals with all the civil Courts and their subordination to one another, the inference appears to be irresistible that no Court other than that mentioned in it can be said to be subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure."

It was further ordered in this case:‑

"A Court which is inferior in rank to High Court is treated as subordinate to it for purpose of exercise of jurisdiction only if it has been declared subordinate to it by a statutory period."

Dictum of law laid down in this decision of the Lahore High Court appears to have been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan (Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Aslam Riaz Hussain and Mr. Justice Nasim Hasan Shah) in case of Muhammad Ayub Butt v. Allied Bank Ltd., Peshawar (P L D 1981 S G 159). It is, therefore settled that unless it is provided otherwise in any other statute, the Courts enumerated in section 3 are the only Courts subordinate to the High Court. Punjab Labour Court is not mentioned in section 3, C. P. C. as a Court subordinate to the High Court. There is nothing either in Payment of Wages Act, 1936 or Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, as amended (under which Labour Court i, constituted) laying down that the Labour Court is a Court subordinate to the High Court. There appear to be no other statute, which says so. 0 In these circumstances it is clear that Punjab Labour Court is not a Court subordinate to High Court and against an order passed by it in its appellate jurisdiction no revision is competent to the High Court.

6. However, even if it were to be assumed that Punjab Labour Court is a Court subordinate to high Court, oven then this revision under section 115, C. P. C. would not be competent. Section 17 of Payment of Wages Act is reproduced below:‑--

"17. Appeal.‑‑(1) An appeal against a direction made under, subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 15 may be preferred within thirty days of the date on which the direction was made before the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XX111 of 1969), within whose juris diction the cause of action to which the appeal relates arose‑

(a) By the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under section 3, if the total sum directed to be paid by way of wages and compensation exceeds three hundred rupees:--

Provided that no appeal under this clause shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate of the authority to the effect that the appellant has deposit ed with the authority the amount payable under the direc tion appealed against; or

(6) by an employed person, if the total amount of wages claimed to have been withheld from him or from the unpaid group to which he belonged exceeds fifty rupees ; or

(c) by any person directed‑ to pay a penalty under subsec tion (4) of section 15.

(1‑A) All appeals pending before at any District Court under this section immediately before the commencement of the Labour Laws (Amendment) Act, 1974, shall on such commencement, stand transferred to, and be disposed of by, the Labour Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to which the appeal relates arose.

(2) Save as provided in subsection (1) any direction made under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 15 shall be final."

Section 4, C. P. C. provides that "in the absence of any specific pro vision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure pres cribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force." A already shown, Payment of Wages Act is a special statute and Punjab Labour Court is a Court of special jurisdiction and nothing in the C. P. C. affects the special jurisdiction or special power or special procedure prescribed by the Payment of Wages Act. Matters falling within the said Act are governed and have to be regulated by provision of that Act alone. Now under said subsection (2) of section 17, it is obvious that finality attaches to a decision made in appeal against a direction made under subsection (3) of section 15 of Payment of Wages Act which provides for grant or refusal by the Authority under Payment of Wages Act of a direction to employer to pay wages compensation to the employee. The finality with which the appellate order of Punjab Labour Court under section 17 (1) of said Payment of Wages Act is invested under section 17(2) of Payment of Wages Act, by implication excludes the revisional juris diction of the High Court. I am Mortified in this view of mine by the following observation by Mr. Justice Nasim Hasan Shall (now Judge of Supreme Court) in the above‑quoted case of Wajahat All Hasnie:‑‑

"Under the provisions of the Act the Family Court is subordinate to the High Court if it is presided over by a presided who is or has been District Judge or an Additional District Judge and to the District Court in any other case, vide section 14 of the Family Courts Act. But merely because of this subordination to the High Court it does not automatically follow that the orders passed by such a Court become revisable by the High Court. The revisional power is contained in section 115 of the C. P. C, However, by virtue of section 17 of the Act, the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure does not, as provided in section 4, override any special or local law. The provisions of section 17 of the Family Courts Act must, therefore, be given their full effect with the result that even if the Family Court is regarded as a Court subordinate to the High Court, the effect of section 17 of the Act is to exclude the orders of the Family Court from the operation of section 115, C. P. C. and the said provision of law is not avail able for obtaining revision oaf orders passed by the Family Courts."

The above dictum of law was also referred with approval in the Supreme Court case noted above and is now the law of the land. I rosy also add that on similar reasoning my learned brother Muhammad Ilyas, J. had also held in case of 4zhar Hussain v. Chartered Bank Faisalabad (3) that revisions against interlocutory orders passed by special Court under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance were incompetent. This case too was referred to approvingly in the said Supreme Court decision. It is thus clear that appellate order of Punjab Labour Court under section 17 (1) of Payment of Wages Act is not assailable be for High Court in its revision jurisdiction in view of section 17 (2) of Payment of Wages Act, read with section 4 of C. P. C.

7. In view of the above, this civil revision is not competent. It is accordingly dismissed in limine.

Petition dismissed,

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