Find a Lawyer

premises in occupation of the petitioner‑tenant under subsection (1) of sec tion 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, which subsection reads as follows;--

"14.‑(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force, the landlord of a building who is a widow, or a minor whose both parents are dead are a salaried employee due to retire within the next six months or has retired or a person who is due to attain the age of sixty years within the next six months or has attained the age of sixty years, may, by notice in writing, inform the tenant that he or she needs the building for personal use and require him to deliver vacant possession of the build ing within such time as may be specified in the notice, not earlier than two months from the receipt thereof:

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply where more than six months have elapsed since the landlord has retired or attained the age of sixty years or, as the case may be, has become widow or orphan."

The case of the landlady was that she was 60 years old ; she required the non‑residential premises in occupation of the tenant for her personal use, and that she had no other non‑residential premises owned and possessed by her. It was not disputed that the landlady had given requisite notice to the tenant contemplated by the aforesaid subsection.

The Rent Controller by his ex parte order dated 5‑4‑1980 granted the application which order was affirmed in first appeal by the High Court and hence the present petition.

The limited contention raised in support of this petition relates to sub. section (2) of Section 14, which reads as follows :‑

"(2) The landlord shall not be entitled to avail the benefit of sub section (1) if he is in occupation of a building owned by him in any locality."

The learned counsel contended that admittedly the landlady owned an possessed a residential premises in the same locality and therefore, the benefit of a summary eviction under subsection (1) of section 14 was not available to, her. The learned counsel went on to argue that the language of subsection (2 is of the widest import and would mean that there would no occasion for a landlord to have recourse to subsection (1) if the landlord is owner in pos. session of any premises in any locality irrespective of the purpose for which the eviction was sought or the purpose to which the owned premises was in use. To our mind subsection (2) of section 14 cannot be read in isolation from subsection (1) for there has to be a nexus between the personal use for which the eviction is sought, and the premises said to be owned and possessed by the landlord in any locality referred to in subsection (2). The wide meaning sought to be put by the learned counsel to subsection (2) would negate the very intent of the Legislature which is to give the benefit to certain class of persons to obtain summary eviction for personal use only if the other building owned by the landlord was in fact not put to such use or capable of being put to such use for which purpose eviction is sought, the existence of such other building would be irrelevant for the purpose of sub section (I) of section 14. To give an illustration, a landlord may be owner occupant of a godown premises in any locality which premises cannot reasonably be used as residential premises, but if the meaning sought to be given by the learned counsel is accepted, the result wilt be that such landlord cannot evict a tenant from a residential premises though the same may be required for the personal use of the landlord. The contention, therefore, is without force.