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Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 504 of 1981, decided on 11th August, 1981.

(On appeal from the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court dated 20-4-1981 in W. P. 2061 of 1981).

--- S. 13(6)-Non-compliance with order of .Rent Controller for deposit of rent-Striking off of defence of tenant-Tenant entitled to an oppor tunity of showing cause before striking off big defence---Requirement of principle of natural justice would be satisfied if tenant or his counsel made aware of proceedings or proposed action-Adjourn ment of five days granted by Rent Controller for consideration of merits of explanation offered from tenant's side-Held, enough time and opportunity to tenant to make an explanation and to substantiate it-Tenant failing to make an explanation-Held further, striking off of defence of tenant by Rent Controller not without lawful authority, in circumstances of case, and High Court rightly refused to interfere in writ jurisdiction-Natural justice-Maxim : Audi alteram partem (no one should be condemned unheard).

Din Muhammad and another v. Umar Hayat and others 1981 S C M R 326 ; Municipal Committee, Gujranwala v. Barkat Bibi and S others 1979 S C M R 264 and Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lundkhor v. Safdar Ali P L D 1967 S C 530 ref.

Shahid Hussain Qadri, Advocate and Muhammad Aslam Chaudhary, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondents.

Date of hearing : 11th August, 1981.

.-Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 20-4-1981, whereby a constitutional petition, arising out of the striking off, of the defence of the petitioner (tenant) under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (and his consequential eviction from the property in dispute) was dismissed.

Non-compliance with the order of the learned Rent Controller for deposit made under section 13(t) is not denied. The learned Single Judge in the High Court, after noticing the argument advanced before him, namely, that, "the petitioner was misled by the order passed under section 13(6)", considered this plea in the context of the proceeding; before the learned Rent Controller. He came to the conclusion that the decision on facts by the learned Controller, which was affirmed by the learned first appellate Court; was against the petitioner. It was also held that they had not acted illegally or even with any material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdic tion, and that their orders were not without lawful authority. Therefore, the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.

No doubt a tenant is entitled to an opportunity of showing cause before his defence is struck off as held in Din Mohammad and another v. Umar A and others (1), relied upon by the learned counsel, who has now raised a contention in this behalf but this exercise need not be done in a full-fledged trial as if it were a regular matter being dealt with under the Civil Procedure Code Municipal Committee, Gujran wala v. Barkat Bibi and 5 others (2) and Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lundkhor v. Safdar Ali (3). The requirement of the principle of natural justice will be satisfied if the tenant and or his counsel is made aware of the proceedings or proposed action with regard to the striking off of the defence. Once that is done, it is not necessary for the Rent Controller to invite, ask or order the tenant to produce evidence. Normally the tenant, when he is made aware of the default with regard to the deposit under section 13(6), either takes the plea that he has made the deposits and he is granted a short time to produce the receipts. In such cases this would satisfy the requirement of justice regarding opportunity. If, on the other hand, his plea is other than that of deposit, he or his counsel makes the statement in this behalf immediately so as to avoid criticism on the basis of afterthought if he postpones, explanation. And, once he is afforded an opportunity to offer an explanation verbal or in writing, may be on the same day when the question whether proper deposit has been made or not arises, it would again satisfy the requirement of justice with regard to opportunity ; unless a genuine and honest request for a short adjournment is sought to produce some material in support of his explanation ; of course, other than that material which is available at the time when this question arises. If the request for adjournment in this behalf is intended to delay the proceedings and is vexatious the Rent Controller would be duty bound and also perfectly justified to refuse the same because one of the purposes of the relevant law is to expedite the disposal of cases brought thereunder. And, on the other band, if the request merits acceptance, one or two short adjournments would normally be considered enough to decide the questions relateable to the deposit of rent and the striking off of the defence. It is necessary to emphasize that while doing so, there is no need to frame issues nor to record evidence in any formal manner. Examination of original documents and/or copies, as also the prioress of questioning the parties and or their counsel, normally proves not only helpful but conclusive in this behalf-purpose being always not to incur avoidable delays.

In this case it is noted in the impugned order that the matter was adjourned-by the learned Rent Controller (on 18-9-1980 to 22-9-1980) for the consideration of the merits of the explanation offered from the petitioner's side. There was enough time and opportunity to the petitioner to make an explanation, if he so desired and to substantiate it by any material other than his own verbal or written statement. If as stated now by the learned counsel, the petitioner was misled by his own counsel (who appeared before the Rent Controller) regarding the language of the order passed under sec tion 13(6), the counsel could have made a statement in this behalf provided he wanted to support his client.

After hearing the learned counsel, we an- satisfied that the striking off of the defence of the petitioner by the learned Rent Controller was not B without lawful authority. The High Court could not have interfered in its writ jurisdiction, and rightly refused to do so. Therefore, this petition is dismissed as having no force.

S. Q Petition dismissed.

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