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Appeal No. SUK‑803 of 1980, heard on 5th January, 1981.

‑‑ Ss. 1(3) & 2(xiv) read with Sind Local Government Ordinance (XII of 1979)‑Local Councils constituted under Local Council Laws‑Establishments engaged in carrying on industry‑Not exclud ed from provisions of Ordinance‑Employee of Town Committee, held, can file grievance petition before Labour Court in respect of a right guaranteed or secured by law, award or settlement‑Eligibility for promotion as distinguished from entitlement‑Does not create any vested right‑‑‑Grievance petition, held, not maintainable merely on basis of eligibility under rules‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), S. 25‑A.

Liaquat National Hospital v. Government of Sind P L D 1977 Kar. 843 and Mushtaq Hussain v. Province of Sind P L D 1978 Kar. 703 rel.

Mumtaz Ali Siddiqui for Appellant.

Date of hearing : 5th January, 1981.

The appellant, who is said to be working as Naka Munshi under the Town Committee, Panno Akil, since 18th December, 1965 is aggrieved by the appointment of one Nabi Bux Shaikh as Octroi Inspector and Qadir Bux as Assistant Octroi Inspector, in preference to him, although both are unqualified. Furthermore, the appellant has been reverted from the post of Naka Checker, to which he had been promoted, to his substan tive appointment as Naka Munshi. He, accordingly, filed a grievance petition before the learned Seventh Labour Court praying that he should at least be promoted as Assistant Octroi Inspector. The learned Labour Court has dismissed the appellant's petition on the ground that the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is not applicable to the employees of a Town Committee as it does not carry on any industry as defined in the said Ordinance. In coming to this conclusion the learned Labour Court has relied upon a decision of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court reported as District Council, Sargodha v. Sher Muhammad wherein it has been held that the District Council, Sargodha, did not indulge in any business, trade, manufacture etc. nor its object was to produce and distribute goods and consequently it was not engaged in carrying on an industry as defined in the I. R. O.

2. The term 'industry' has been defined in the I. R. O. as :‑‑

"'Industry' means any business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation."

It will be seen that the above definition is very wide and not only embraces any business, trade or manufacture but also any calling, service, employment r occupation. A Town Committee in the province of Sind is constituted under the Sind Local Councils Ordinance for the purposes of providing certain services and running the local Government within the area of the Town Committee. It, thus, is engaged in carrying on of undertakes services, employment or occupation for which it employs work men. If the intention of the Legislature had been that the provisions of the I. R. O. be restricted only to those establishments which carry on trade, business or manufacture or produce and distribute goods, as has been held by the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, it would not have been found necessary to specifically exclude from the purview of the I. R. O. the members of the armed Services of Pakistan, the persons engaged in the administration of the State, and employees of institutes and establishments maintained for the treatment and care of sick, infirm, destitute or mentally unfit persons, etc., as provided in subsection (3) of section I of the I. R. O. The very fact that these employees or these establishments are specifically excluded from the pur view of the I. R. O. clearly indicates that but for such exclusion they also would cone within the purview of the I. R. O.

3. Reference may also be made to the provisions of the Worker's Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972. In that Ordinance the term "Establishment" has been defined as follows: ‑

"Establishment means any office, firm, industrial unit, undertaking, shop or premises in which workers are employed for the purposes of carrying on any business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation.

4. It will be seen that an establishment for the purposes of the said Ordinance and an establishment under the I. R. O. are somewhat similar at least so far as the purposes for which the workers are employed.

The words "any business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employ ment or occupation" as used in the Workers' Children (Education) Ordi nance, 1972, which are identical with the definition of "Industry" as contained in the I. R. O. were considered by a Division Bench of the High Court in the case of Liaquat National Hospital v. Government of Sind (P L D 1977 Kar. 843) and it was held that the element of profit and gain is not an essential ingredient of the definition of "establishment" as contained in the said Ordinance and as the word "service" has not been defined in the Ordinance there was no reason for restricting its application to service analogous to business, trade or manufacture. The Division Bench held that the Liaquat National Hospital and the Holy Family Hospital, which claim ed to be non‑profit‑making institutions dedicated to the service of God and humanity, are nevertheless establishments for the purposes of the Worker's Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972, and thus liable to pay the cess levied under the said Ordinance. I am, therefore, of the view, with great respect to the learned Single Judge who has decided the case of the District Council, Sargodha, that the local councils, including town committees constituted under the Local Councils laws, are establishments engaged in carrying on an "industry" as defined in the I. R. O. and the provisions of the said Ordinance would be applicable to their employees.

4‑A. This, however, is not the end of the matter, for a grievance petition under section 25‑A, I. R. O. can only be filed in respect of a right guaranteed or secured by Law, an award or a settlement for the time being in force. Mr. Mumtaz Ali Siddiqui, the learned counsel for the appellant, was unable to satisfy me that the appellant has any such right. The rules applicable to the appellant are West Pakistan Local Councils and Municipal Committees Service Rules, 1963. Rule 9 of the said Rules/'o provides that vacancies in the different classes and grades of Municipal service shall be filled by initial recruitment or transfer or by promotion or by selection. The Appendix to the said Rules provides that promotion the Senior grade in Class III service will be on the basis of fitness from among the members of the service in Class III, Junior grade, serving in the District. The qualification of Matriculation from a recognised University or Board is prescribed in the case of initial recruitment and not for pro motion. As such, even if it be correct that the persons who were pro moted respectively as Octroi Inspectors and Assistant Octroi Inspectors in preference to the appellant were non‑matriculates, does not result in infringement of the Rules. It is not disputed that they are senior to the appellant. As such they appear to have a preferential claim to promotion posts. Furthermore, the appellant at best was only eligible to the pro motion post, of Octroi Inspector and Assistant Octroi Inspector and was not entitled to be appointed to the said posts. The distinction between "eligibility" and "entitlement to a promotion post" has succinctly been brought out in the case of Muttaqi Hussain v. Province of Sind (P L D 1978 Kar. 703) wherein it is pointed out that the word "eligible" means only legally qualified to be promoted but does not mean to be entitled or to having vested rightly to promotion. The appellant, thus, is not entitled to maintain or file a grievance petition against his non‑selection for the promotion post.

5. The appellant has also made a grievance that he was reverted from the post as Octroi Checker to the lower post of Naka Munshi. It, however, appears that the Town Committee, Panno Akil, bad abolished the post of Octroi Checker and consequently there is no post of Checker in the Town Committee to which the appellant can be appointed. He was, therefore, rightly reverted to his substantive post of Naka Munshi.

6. For the reasons discussed by me above I find no merit in this appeal and, accordingly, dismiss the same to limine.

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