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Petition No. LHR‑333 of 1980/Pb., decided on 24th January, 1981.
‑‑ S. 38 (3‑a)‑Revision‑Suo motu power of Appellate Tribunal No right to an aggrieved party to apply for exercise of suo motu powers of Tribunal‑Petitioner seeking suspension of order of Labour Court regarding suspension of transfer order of a workman‑Peti tioner an establishment under Government (Punjab Road Transport Board) flouting orders of Labour Court by filling revision petition without succeeding in getting an interim Order from Appellate Tri bunal‑Exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction, in circumstances, refused.
Muhammad Salim Khan for Petitioners.
Muhammad Asghar Malik fur Respondent.
Vide order dated 26‑8‑1980 (Annexure A') Muhammad Iqbal Lodhi, Office Superintendent (respondent) was transferred from Dera Ghazi Khan to Sahiwal. He was directed to report to the District Manager, Govern ment Transport Service, Sahiwal without availing any joining time. Ghulam Sarwar, who was transferred to Headquarters Office vide Office Order No. Estt‑1/5/237‑VII (i) AE dated 2‑12‑1980 was posted as Superintendent in Government Transport Service, Dera Ghazi Khan, in place of Muhammad Iqbal Lodhi. Vide Office Order No. 233 dated 27‑8‑1980 (Annexure 'B') the District Manager, Government Transport Service, Dera Ghazi Khan relieved and struck off the respondent from the strength of that service with effect from 27‑8‑1980 and directed to Mr. Lodhi to hand over charge to Muhammad Bashir, Assistant (Estt.), till Ghulam Sarwar resumed duty as Superintendent. The respondent after serving a grievance notice, challenged the order of his transfer before Punjab Labour Court No. 9, Multan by filing a petition under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 on 20‑9‑1980 (Annexure C'). Alongwith the main petition an application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for grant of stay was also filed. Vide order dated 29‑9‑1980 (Annexure D‑1') after bearing the present respondent and the representative of the present petitioners Management, the Labour Court granted interim stay in favour of Muhammad Iqbal Lodhi, respondents, by suspending implementation of transfer order. Subsequently, vide impugned order dated 9‑10‑1980 (Annexure D‑2) after bearing the counsel for the parties at length and exhaustively dealing with the various aspects of the case the Labour Court confirmed the stay order granted earlier on 29‑9‑1980. The petitioners presented the present revision petition on 16‑11‑1980 and the same was admitted for regular hearing on 22‑11‑1980 and notice was issued to the opposite‑party for 8‑12‑1980. It was stated in the interim order that the request for suspension of the impugned order would be considered on the next date of hearing after service of the respon dent. On the next date of hearing i.e. 8‑12‑1980 as the senior counsel (Mr. Muhammad Salim Khan) for the petitioners was not available the case was adjourned to 14‑2‑1981 at Multan for hearing the arguments of the parties. However subsequently, on the same day i.e. 8‑12‑1980 Mr. Muhammad Salim Khan, senior counsel for the petitioner Board appeared and prayed for some early date as stay order had not been granted. The case was adjourned to 24‑1‑1981 instead of 14‑2‑1981 and notice for respondent was given Dasti.
2. Today during the arguments of the counsel for the parties it came to my notice that the impugned order of the Labour Court granting stay order in favour of Muhammad Iqbal Lodhi, respondent, first on 29‑9‑1980 and then confirming the same on 9‑10‑1980 has not been complied with so far. It is an admitted fact that the operation of the impugned order was neither suspended by this Tribunal nor by any other competent Court or Authority. In such a situation it is surprising that from 29‑9‑1980 the respondent has been deprived of the fruit of the stay order granted in his favour by the Labour Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner Board has not been able to offer any satisfactory explanation, except that he had challenged the impugned order of the Labour Court in revision before this Tribunal and had also prayed for the suspension of the operation of the impugned order. No doubt the main object for filing the present revision petition may be to get the operation of the impugned order suspended otherwise, as alleged by the counsel for the petitioner‑Board, the whole object for filing the present revision petition would be defeated, but the fact remains that till the operation of the impugned order of the Labour Court is actually suspended by this Tribunal or by some other superior Court or competent Authority, the petitioner‑Board was duty bound under the law to implement the impugned order of the Labour Court. The petitioner‑Board is a Government establishment and is not expected to flout the orders of the Courts by behaving like an owner of a private establishment. The result is that although the operation of the impugned order was not suspended by this Tribunal or by any other competent Court of law or authority, yet the actual effect upon the opposite‑party for not implementing the impugned order by the petitioner‑Board is as if the operation of the impugned order had been suspended.
3. It is not denied that subsection (3‑a) of section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 does not give any right to an aggrieved party but only confers suo motu revisional power upon the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
4. In view of the above situation, I feel that it is not a fit case for exercise of my suo motu revisional jurisdiction under section 38(3‑a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Consequently, this revision petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed with costs.
Petition dismissed.
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